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ABSTRACT 
Homeland security was changed by the events of September 11, 2001, including 
how we make life and death decisions. Terrorism, all hazards, and public health issues 
increase the number of decisions involving the expenditure of civilian lives. These 
Considered Risk Casualties are akin to the military concept of “acceptable losses.”  
Homeland security professionals have little or no experience, let alone guidance, in 
decision making under circumstances that bring this condition to the civilian population.   
Other disciplines such as philosophy, theology, bioethics, and the military, etc. 
have examined principles that are involved in the concept of accepting loss of life and 
have identified theoretical circumstances under which acceptance is achieved. Homeland 
security has had little discussion of these matters and virtually no criteria to support such 
decision making.  Examining the observations, and how those disciplines test the 
concept, can inform and assist homeland security practitioners when having to make 
these decisions.   
Examining homeland security events that addressed loss of life can expand the 
range of scenarios those disciplines use for their analysis. An educational process that 
draws on other sectors’ experience can serve to improve decision making capabilities.  
Future research opportunities exist within and external to homeland security and those 
disciplines’  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On September 11, 2001, government officials made a decision to shoot down an 
occupied, commercial airliner that had been hijacked by terrorists. The government 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has promulgated a plan that distributes scarce 
pandemic vaccine to a series of prioritized individuals. What both these matters have in 
common is that the government has made decisions that will result in the death of some 
citizens in order to benefit others. Such situations are similar to conditions that exist 
within the military concept of “acceptable losses,” i.e., to achieve a desirable objective, it 
is sometimes necessary to expend lives and/or property. Throughout history, within 
varying limits, there has been a societal tolerance for that concept in military matters. 
There is no concomitant understanding for such a concept being applied within civilian 
circumstances. 
Current and ongoing threats from terrorism and severe natural disasters have 
focused attention on the status of emergency services across the nation.  Police, fire, and 
emergency medical services are part of the homeland security resources and capabilities. 
The resources of these agencies are finite and some of the most valuable and necessary in 
the country. The types of situations described above, that have previously been associated 
with war and the battlefield, are now the types of events that will be encountered by 
homeland security managers. They will be required to make decisions that lead to there 
being Considered Risk Casualties (injury, death, and/or destruction of property among 
the civilian population as an anticipated, but unintended consequence of a decision). In 
short, they will be deciding, in a wide range of situations, who will survive, and as on 
September 11, this may involve significant numbers of people. Those civilian, homeland 
security decision makers need to be supported and prepared for making such decisions. 
Set criteria that establish the level of losses that are permissible for particular 
types of objectives do not exist in this country. However, other disciplines outside the 
military and homeland security have long, in some cases for centuries, examined, 
discussed, and researched the various conditions under which deaths of innocent 
individuals can be tolerated. Philosophy, theology, and bioethics are just some of the 
 xiv
disciplines that have a rich history of analysis and pronouncements about such situations. 
By reviewing the range of topics discussed in these other disciplines, such as the 
difference between killing and letting die, harming some to save others, rationing scarce 
resources, treatment decisions in the SARS epidemic, and theological maxims such as the 
Principle of Double Effect, one can establish a direct corollary to  homeland security 
decision making. The analyzing of multiple, actual Considered Risk Casualty events and 
describing the decision factors considered by the decision makers themselves, establishes 
a relationship between the abstract observations of the other disciplines, and actual 
command decisions in homeland security. 
The American military has a practiced process for preparing personnel to address 
these types of decisions, but in both the military and civilian homeland security realms, 
these decisions depend on the experience and integrity of the individual decision maker. 
Experience and integrity vary substantially between individuals, potentially creating 
decisions and outcomes that can be dramatically different even for similar circumstances. 
In order to reduce the levels of variance that naturally exist between  homeland security 
decision makers and to assist them in these most consequential decisions and 
circumstances, it is recommended that an educational program that draws upon the 
wealth of knowledge that exists in the humanities and social sciences, and that directly 
relates to Considered Risk Casualty decisions be developed. Educating homeland security 
personnel in the abstract observations of these other disciplines can serve to provide a 
level of experiences beyond that of a single individual, and help inform the decision 
maker in times of Considered Risk Casualty conditions. Indeed, the traditional 
emergency service concepts of duty and response requirements around which all planning 
and operations are based and that are being re-evaluated in the face of these new threats, 
can be served by such an educational program. 
Conversely, providing the other disciplines with an understanding  of the actual 
conditions under which Considered Risk Casualty decisions are required, can enhance the 
range of circumstances and factors that serve as the basis of their discussions which are 
now largely limited to abstractions. Establishing such a relationship between these other 
disciplines and homeland security will bring mutual benefit to both entities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Due to the enormous cost of anti-terror efforts -- difficult issues and trade-
offs arise concerning cost-effectiveness, diminishing returns and levels of 
‘acceptable losses.  
(Perl, 2006) 
It was like the wave of water that cleaves and moves around both sides of the bow 
of a ship and joins together again once the boat has continued on its course.  It was only 
a few minutes after the second plane had hit the south tower of the World Trade Center, 
and I was moving with another manager from our office through the sea of people 
moving north on Church Street away from the unfolding horror a scant few blocks behind 
them.  We were wearing our blue “raid jackets” with the large, block, yellow letters FBI 
across the back, front and on the sleeves.  Moving against this human tide should have 
been difficult, but we moved unimpeded, for as we approached them and they noticed the 
letters on the jacket, they immediately parted like that wave to permit us to continue our 
advance. The expressions on their faces and particularly the looks in their eyes are part 
of a plethora of images that were being etched in my memory, and although I didn’t know 
it at the time, they were but the beginning of many more to come in the minutes, hours, 
days, and months that followed.  Mostly, those eyes seemed reassured that someone was 
responding, and that resources known about but taken for granted in normal times, were 
moving in to take a position between them and the death and destruction they were 
escaping. 
We were not alone in our a southbound movement, for sharing the street with us 
was an endless line of, fire engines, police cars, ambulances, and other official and 
emergency vehicles of every description, size, and purpose that the city of New York 
could dispatch.  On an average weekday morning the sound of cars, taxis, buses, trucks 
and other vehicles that supply the transportation and commercial requirements for the 
very core of the world’s capitalist engine, create a backdrop of sound that is as 
permanent and familiar as the sound of your own breathing; but not on this morning. 
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There was only the sound of the sirens from these massing emergency vehicles, and it 
came from all directions simultaneously. No, I was not alone by any means in my 
movement toward the Trade Center, and although I did not realize it then, we were all 
moving towards decisions of life and death, both professional and personal, that would 
change our lives forever. 
It is hard to imagine, but in the middle of all that movement, for a moment a 
firefighter sitting in the jump seat of one of those trucks passing on my right, locked 
glances with me.  Possibly we sought each other out in some odd comradeship of those 
who were moving towards the problem as opposed to the thousands who are moving 
away from it, but nevertheless, at that moment we looked at each other and I saw that 
mixture of concern and commitment that would become a recognizable, universal 
expression in the minutes and months that followed.  With that look, the thought came to 
me, “They’re riding to their death and they know it,” never thinking that I might also be 
walking towards mine. I looked straight up over me nearly a quarter of a mile  high at the 
huge hole in the face of the North Tower, at the raging fires and smoke, and at the people 
you could see at the windows on the upper floors, and thought about the risk to all those 
firefighters and others going to their rescue.  Owing to a past relationship with the New 
York City Fire Department I knew that the previous single largest loss of life in their 
ranks had been 12 men killed in a 1966 fire. My second thought was, “They could lose 
three or four times that many here.” In spite of the horror I was seeing, and even my 
inexplicable counting of the people falling down the face of those buildings, I, and the 
other hundreds of people heading towards that site, would have had to untie the bonds of 
civilization to imagine that the actual loss in emergency service personnel would be more 
than 30 times that previous record.  
Simultaneously with the events unfolding in Manhattan, other horrific scenes 
were occurring elsewhere over the United States.  At the Pentagon, just as in New York, 
there was no or scant warning of imminent crisis on that morning but once the incident 
occurred, hundreds of individuals responded as they had been trained to do and acted 
according to that training, instincts, or both, and were to come to the realization either 
on the spot, or years later, how much the decisions they made, many without long 
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consideration, would have life and death consequences. Those consequences were not 
only for others but for themselves too.  Unlike the World Trade Center where the  
responders came with a set of principles, methods, and ethos that framed their decisions 
and actions into a fairly consistent process, at the Pentagon people from different 
disciplines, the emergency services and the military, met at the scene of a common threat 
and with a common intention, saving lives. Their different disciplines however, would 
very shortly take them in different directions. 
Thousands of feet over western Pennsylvania a random group of airline 
passengers realized that they had a choice to make, a life-and-death choice.  They made 
a decision that selected life but had the opposite outcome.  What they did not realize at 
the time was that the choice had already been made for them in two places, the cockpit of 
their plane, and hundreds of miles away from them in the chambers below the White 
House.  They had been out-voted in both locations.  The terrorists at the controls had 
decided, just as the terrorists in those other planes had, that all the people onboard these 
planes were going to die.  What the passengers over Pennsylvania did not know was that 
in their case, government officials had also reached the same conclusion.  The risk to the 
country represented by the fourth hijacked airplane, in light of the events elsewhere that 
morning, had been carefully considered, and the passengers on that flight were to share 
the same outcome as the firefighter passing me mere minutes and blocks from his fate. 
That morning a handful were intent on taking lives, thousands were intent on 
saving them, but in both cases lives would be traded for lives, thousands would be lost 
and many more thousands would be saved, and in the polar opposites of that equation, 
decisions would be made that would eventually lead to the selected outcomes.  Thousands 
of people would become Considered Risk Casualties as a result of the intent to kill or the 
intent to save, and those of us who remain would be forced to consider how in the space 
of the next 90 minutes of September 11, 2001, a spectrum of events would forever change 
the way we think about life, death, and the relationship to both the simple and complex 
decisions that determine who lives, and who dies. 




Various homeland security directives and policies define the criteria for standards 
of ability and organizational process for response and recovery in catastrophic attacks and 
natural hazards. Those standards define capabilities required to successfully address a 
catastrophe, and the structural partnerships that enable effective command and control 
when committing the necessary resources to manage a crisis. They do not address the 
question of whether or not those resources should be committed to the crisis. In 
particular, they do not address the concept of “Considered Risk Casualties” in the 
decision-making process to commit such resources to circumstances where they are 
overmatched, or their use would be counterproductive on a risk versus rewards scale.  
In the military, the cost of achieving an objective in war requires an expenditure 
of personnel and materiel. Understanding the equation between achieving a campaign’s 
objective and the losses incurred to do so, is contained in the military concept commonly 
understood as “acceptable losses.” In planning military operations this issue is a 
conscious, if ill-defined, calculus that can be applied for military or civilian lives and 
property, or for both. 
Traditionally, in this country, the execution of that concept exists only with the 
military; there is no concomitant concept within the civilian population. The lessons of 
September 11, 2001, require a re-examination of that condition. A conscious decision on 
the part of government agencies or executives to take actions that expend lives or to 
restrict the application of critical, finite resources, even at the expense of life, in order to 
husband those resources for the benefit of the wider population over the course of the war 
on terror or other crisis circumstances, is a condition that is in need of analysis. 
Identifying the range of factors that could contribute to the homeland security/emergency 
managers’ depth of knowledge that forms the basis for making such decisions and 
determining the need for guidance at all levels of government to inform and support that 
decision process is the objective of this thesis.  
There are manifest examples of such decisions being made and applied at the 
government level to the civilian population, but not being described within the 
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framework of “Considered Risk Casualties.”1 This is an environment where the 
government has agreed to destroy occupied, hijacked, civilian airliners and has also made 
decisions prioritizing distribution of limited supplies of pandemic vaccines, both of which 
will inexorably result in the loss of life, albeit, with the clear objective of securing other 
lives. Thus, the “Considered Risk Casualties” concept has been, and is being, visited 
upon the civilian population, but the social, political, operational, and cultural influences 
associated with making such decisions appear to have scant or vague references for use in 
that process. This is also true for its potential extrapolation to wider crisis circumstances 
that such decision precedence will engender if the repeatedly anticipated terrorist threats 
to the homeland prove valid. If the catastrophic scale of the “all hazards” issue being 
discussed is likewise legitimate, then the full range of homeland security structures and 
entities, from prevention, security, and intelligence, to response, safety, and recovery, 
will potentially be faced with “Considered Risk Casualties” decisions. These conditions 
would be well served by a guidance process that can assist in making such decisions. An 
example of a cause and consequence condition and a consumer of that decision guidance 
process is described in the following. 
The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) has 11,400 firefighters in 511 
companies and units responsible for the safety of eight million residents, millions of 
commuters and tourists, and some of the most valuable infrastructures in the world 
(Griffiths, 2007, pp. 2, 3). Each of its five elite Rescue Companies is staffed on each shift 
by six of the most experienced and trained members of the department. On September 11, 
2001, these elite units responded to the World Trade Center (Griffiths, 2007, pp. 2,3). 
Approximately half of all the FDNY resources were committed there, causing a major 
reduction in the response capabilities for the rest of the city (McKinsey and Company, 
2002, p. 9). After the collapse, the elite Rescue Company resources responsible for over 
eight million people on that day were virtually nil. Every Rescue Company firefighter 
assigned to duty that morning perished. They died to a man. 
 
1 Note: Some interviewees have demonstrated a discomfort with the term “Acceptable Losses,” and 
have universally suggested finding an alternate term, particularly as the thesis will consider this as a 
condition for the civilian population. Hence, the author’s suggested terminology of “Considered Risk 
Casualties.” 
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Worldwide, it’s a hallmark of Al-Qaeda and its followers, to commit multiple, 
simultaneous attacks aimed at causing high casualties. If future, repeated attacks include 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the necessity for trained emergency services to 
manage and recover from those events will become critical. There are approximately 1.14 
million firefighters (823,950 volunteer) in the US (U.S. Fire Administration, 2008), and 
836,787 police officers (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004) to provide protection and 
response for approximately 300,000,000 Americans. In the war on terror these responders 
will be some of the most valued personnel in the country and represent a finite national 
resource. 
If one can anticipate additional future attacks, possibly on a larger scale that will 
again and repeatedly require similar resources, homeland security officials will find 
themselves having to consider a “Considered Risk Casualties” equation. For government 
management and entities that now find themselves in civilian circumstances that are 
threatened in ways that had previously only been known to the military, providing 
guidance for such decisions, which frequently involve a myriad of factors that must be 
considered and concluded in moments, could have considerable value. 
Similarly, public health officials currently involved in questions of resource 
allocation concerning personnel, medicines, equipment, and services if faced with 
anticipated disease epidemics, whether caused through natural occurrence or as a result of 
terrorism, will be tasked with similar decisions. Whereas Considered Risk Casualty 
command decisions involving the traditional emergency services will almost always 
involve dynamics that cannot be fully known at the time the decisions are made, public 
health does not necessarily function within the same void.  Public health officials know 
the quantity of vaccine available, the number of hospital beds, and the inventory of 
respiratory devices that can be applied when needed. They also know from historical 
perspective and clinical analysis what the probable demand for these services will be. The 




Unlike the traditional emergency services, public health therefore enters the 
decision-making process within generally defined parameters that will knowingly result 
in casualties, yet, as shall be seen, the metrics that influence and support those decisions 
are less defined than are the stated solutions. 
Homeland security can gain substantial value by obtaining a broad spectrum of 
theoretical experience and analysis from the humanities and/or social sciences (other 
disciplines) where there exists the necessary detachment to consider multiple facets of 
life and death decisions without the urgency of crisis conditions. Just as there is a 
significant chasm between the other disciplines and homeland security approaches to 
problems and questions of the same nature, there is also a lack of awareness of the 
knowledge and needs that both the academic and operational realms have or require.  
Also lacking is the realization of how each of these entities can benefit from the work 
environment and objectives of the other in advancing the purposes and professionalism of 
their individual fields of endeavor. The other discipline practitioner and the emergency 
worker can mutually benefit by seeking, obtaining, and sharing the knowledge of the 
other, and it is therefore a valid and worthwhile process to seek such an accommodation 
to share the knowledge and experiences that each has acquired. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
1. The Problem 
On September 11, 2001 the decision was made to shoot down occupied, 
commercial airliners that had been hijacked. Although events overtook that necessity, 
with that decision, the passengers on board those civilian airliners became “acceptable 
losses” within the normal understanding of the term as applied by the military. These 
individuals would have been expended to save others.  
Similarly, public health officials currently find themselves involved in questions 
of resource allocation concerning personnel, medicines, equipment, and services if faced 
with anticipated disease epidemics, whether caused naturally or as a result of terrorism. A 
national distribution plan for the limited supply of pandemic flu vaccines has been 
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published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While the intent of the plan, 
(to maintain the public health structure viability to serve the needs of the larger 
population) is manifest, this decision inevitably leads to the potential loss of some 
individuals in order to ensure that the objective of keeping the healthcare structure 
remains intact.  
A conscious decision on the part of government agencies or executives to take 
actions that expend lives to save lives or to restrict the application of critical, finite 
resources, also at the expense of life, and in order to husband those resources for the 
benefit of the wider population over the course of the war on terror or other crisis 
circumstances, is a condition that will be considered in this paper. In an environment 
where the government has agreed to destroy hijacked airliners, and decisions prioritizing 
distribution of pandemic vaccines exist, the “acceptable losses” concept has been visited 
upon the civilian population, and the decision process by which these conclusions are 
reached is worthy of review.  
It appears from the literature review and research that there is a wealth of 
awareness of the concept of Considered Risk Casualties, or more specifically, familiarity 
with the existence of the military tradition of “acceptable losses” in both academia and 
homeland security. In the environment where the concept is utilized, the use of that term 
rarely requires explanation, indicating recognition of the meaning contained in the 
phrase. However, there is a distinct lack of documentation of what elements may 
combine to define the term, and there is a virtual void of literature in homeland security 
circles about the thought process or “decision-tree” to apply in determining when such 
“losses” become “acceptable,” or if they are at all. Such literature as does exist is 
frequently a post-incident analysis of the propriety of a situational outcome in 
comparison to the original intention. 
Conversely, the literature of the other disciplines has abundant discourse with a 
nexus to this concept. The concept of “acceptable losses” while most frequently resident 
in military issues is, and has been, considered in all the above disciplines at various 
levels, with different intents and outcomes over time. An objective of this research was to 
gain insight into how each of the chosen disciplines views the topic, the circumstances 
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and standards under which acceptability is achieved, and the environments within which 
acceptability can be applied. They have examined the various dynamics and conditions 
that either conflict or aggregate to make the “losses” “acceptable” from multiple points of 
view. There is material on the comparative value of lives, i.e., the authority to exchange 
one life for another, with contributing elements that should comprise the decision 
sequence leading to such outcomes. These traditionally abstracted discussions within the 
humanities pivot around invented scenarios that are contrived to facilitate discussion of 
the issues the author intends to discuss. Compounding factors are added at will to the 
scenarios to make the issue either more granular or more expansive in order to serve the 
intended limits of the discussion.  
Evidence was collected from various, diverse disciplines such as, emergency 
services, theologians, philosophers, ethicists, bio-ethicists, the military etc. as regards 
their considerations and observations in Considered Risk Casualty situations. The 
purpose of this collection was to gain insight into how these various disciplines 
historically, and currently view the circumstances they believe to be pertinent in 
consideration of Considered Risk Casualty permissibility, use, and acceptance, if in fact 
such is the case at all. Selected evidence from each discipline indicated a common, initial, 
discomfort with the concept of Considered Risk Casualties, and each of them sought to 
define its elements and boundaries. Starting from that view, each of the disciplines 
eventually arrives at recognition that Considered Risk Casualties has a modicum of 
acceptability. However, as could be expected, they reach their conclusions through using 
a range of criteria that are germane to the core purposes, principles, and motivations of 
their individual disciplines. In order to appreciate their distinct observations 
appropriately, it was necessary to discern the separate belief systems or criteria each 
discipline used in order to identify the points of agreement or differences between and 
among their views on the topic. It should be noted that the research never intended to 




Through focusing this aspect of the research on a spectrum of professionally and 
intellectually accepted criteria, a pattern became discernable which collectively indicated 
a potential for the existence of acceptance, application, and performance considerations 
in Considered Risk Casualty environments.  
It also became apparent that an obvious void exists between the wealth of other 
disciplines’ observations on the topic of Considered Risk Casualty and the operational 
realm of the homeland security decision maker and operative. The other disciplines’ 
discussions center around artificial and contrived scenarios intentionally designed to 
foster an intellectual discussion in an academic atmosphere. The homeland security 
practitioners revealed no knowledge of another discipline’s discussions and relied on 
experiences within their own disciplines when making judgments about Considered Risk 
Casualty incidents. This void in and of itself appears to be an original research discovery, 
and homeland security managers could be benefited by making it known to them that a 
wealth of commentary is available in the other disciplines about this topic. This 
knowledge could prove invaluable in times of crisis decision making when the saving of 
lives is part of the considerations. 
Conversely, making the conditions and realities of the homeland security 
environment known to the other disciplines can also serve to advance the discourse in 
those disciplines and serve as an opportunity for original applications of their 
observations.  Moving the researcher’s excellent, cogent observations from the abstract to 
the pressures created by crisis situations of reality could stimulate new vistas for them to 
explore that have not previously been considered, albeit with a loss of the luxury of 
detachment. Also, creating a bridge for the interchange of theoretical ideas with the 
operational needs and experiences of homeland security practitioners can serve to create 
additional, original work among those who inhabit both sides of that bridge. The research 
with the greatest utility that may come from this present discussion is the codifying of 
select common factors that move throughout the other disciplines that can be considered 
and reviewed in making decisions in a Considered Risk Casualty situation. Identifying a 
range of factors that could contribute to the decision making considerations that form the 
basis for those decisions in crisis conditions may serve homeland security, the other 
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disciplines, and the civilian population as a whole. Determining the need for educational 
programs to assist in that decision process evolved as a possible objective of this research 
and thesis.  
If establishing a case for the creation of educational programs that serve to guide 
decision makers involved in Considered Risk Casualties is another desired outcome, then 
the analysis of the above disciplines’ observations and needs should inform the content of 
such programs.  
2. The Boundaries of the Study 
While it has been clear from the onset that there is a common awareness and 
history of use of the concept of acceptability of loss of life since antiquity, there is less 
literature about considerations prior to use of the concept as compared to the voluminous 
documentation on its subsequent effects. A majority of examples of awareness about the 
concept are within the context of warfare where the outcomes are viewed with a 
demeanor that might be described as a tolerance for the undesirable. Other examples 
wherein the knowing expenditure of life is equated to gaining a valued objective or in 
comparison to the securing of other life generates responses depending on incident 
motivation that range from consummate abhorrence to sympathetic understanding, which 
reflects the moral and philosophical basis of those other examples. Such a scale of 
responses provides a fertile ground for commentary by all disciplines with an intellectual 
nexus to such review. That commentary, however, largely addresses outcomes and 
influences rather than the deliberative process of decision making in a crisis incident 
involving Considered Risk Casualties. It is within that relatively narrow confine that this 
study is bounded, inasmuch as that is where an educational program that could come 
from this study would focus. 
The study crosses discipline lines to find various observations or to interview 
representatives acquainted with the historic and current positions on the concept, as well 
as those who have been practitioners of it. The thrust of the context is within the current 
threat environment as regards the civilian population, and the application of Considered 
Risk Casualties as opposed to the more traditional military references. However the 
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military experience remains within the study boundaries to utilize its knowledge of cause 
and effect relationships that are deemed invaluable in measuring the scale of the need for 
decision-making guidance. The same consideration applies to both the public health and 
emergency management and services domains in the civilian realm. Elected and 
government officials are also within the confines of the study due to crisis decision 
development frequently being within their purview. 
3. The Research Strategy 
This study was conducted in a manner and with the purpose of collecting 
information and literature to demonstrate an author’s capacity to provide comments about 
the concept of Considered Risk Casualties. The same purpose was applied in the choice 
of knowledgeable and experienced interviewees. Opinions on the Considered Risk 
Casualty concept are legion, and as can be reasonably expected, contain an element of 
emotion reflective of a condition that has so frequently surfaced in human history. The 
research effort recognized this dynamic and attempted to preclude any undue influence 
through a process of careful selection of materials and personnel that focused on the 
substantive issue: decision making. This however does not imply that the process was 
exclusionary. Opportunities for additional input, whether literary, documentary, or with 
individuals that surfaced during the research process, were pursued as they emerged and 
had a clear relationship to matters that address decision-making guidance. It was also 
anticipated that additional information would be forthcoming from those who have 
applied the Considered Risk Casualty concept, and know its outcomes and consequences 
as a balance to purely theoretical perceptions of decision validity. 
As may be surmised from the range of pertinent disciplines in this topic, there are 
multiple facets directly associated with the concept and practice of Considered Risk 
Casualties. These dynamics lent themselves to a cognitive sequence of questions that 
were individually rigorous, yet naturally interdependent. They also formed both 
milestones that needed to be addressed in selecting the subsequent questions, or deciding 
whether they were germane at all. For example, if there was a discipline or belief system 
that denied Considered Risk Casualties can ever have a utility, then further questions 
 13
concerning formatting guidance for its use would have been pointless. Conversely, if one 
discipline defined a condition that countered the position of another discipline, then 
questions adjudicating that diversity became applicable. 
Broadly, the initial series of questions investigated the status of the concept of 
Considered Risk Casualty within a discipline. That logically flowed to a series of 
questions concerning the issues used within the discipline to judge the level of acceptance 
or denial of the concept. Next, the inquiry examined the range of circumstances that 
pertained to the application and utilization of the concept. That was followed by a review 
of a loss/gain analysis consideration that influenced the decision-making process in 
Considered Risk Casualty determinations. These specifically in some instances, and 
through inference in others, collectively demonstrated the level of need for decision-
making guidance in this arena. It was recognized that such a line of questioning could 
either define or deny the need for such a program. Regardless, the outcome was 
instructive in either instance. 
The reader of this thesis will note that references for this paper appear to cite a 
limited number of sources. For example, in theology, only principles of Christian belief 
are addressed; in philosophy, one major philosopher is most frequently cited. This is not 
an oversight. During the course of the research, it became apparent that these and other 
disciplines advance their horizons through endless debate and discussion of the issues at 
hand, frequently identifying specific nuances to evaluate the observations of a colleague. 
In short, the methodology used to progress in these disciplines is that of continuous 
argument. The objective of this thesis is not to take sides in that debate, it is not to judge 
the value of an identified nuance, nor is it to determine the “right or wrong” of a 
particular individuals observations. By including multiple views and/or their ongoing 
discussion points, the thesis inevitably turned to being about religion, theology, or ethics 
rather than being about decision making in Considered Risk Casualty situations. This 
thesis strives to point out to the reader that there are disciplines outside  homeland 
security that have comments and information that can be relevant to an individual facing 
the most difficult of decisions, that of life and death. An objective has been to identify the 
fact that such sources of information exists at all in other disciplines, and that they have a 
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nexus to contemporary crisis management issues; it is not to participate in another 
discipline’s internal debate. Hence, including a wide range of debated nuances from those 
disciplines did not serve this thesis as much as noting the pertinence of the observations 
of a limited but representative sample of credible individuals that revealed the existence 
of that information. Conversely, in this thesis, the humanitarian, the social scientist and 
theologian will find that practical and actual examples exist within homeland security that 
can bring a measure of reality and application to their abstract observations, beyond that 
which is currently their normal arena for discussion. The reader is encouraged to explore 
the wider observations that are available in the cited disciplines, and any other 
disciplines, that may additionally support or limit the abilities of the homeland security 
decision maker. It is anticipated that there are significant opportunities for additional 
research in this venue. 
4. Information Types and Collection Methods 
In this instance, an analysis of what may be applicable to Considered Risk 
Casualties will, of necessity, be subjective inasmuch as there is no known “program” 
with a Considered Risk Casualty guidance policy in existence. That is not to say that a 
compilation of the understood theoretical principles, the objectives sought, the condition 
of the decision environment, and actual outcomes versus anticipated ones cannot be 
accomplished. In the absence of programs that can be drawn upon, any decision-making 
processes that involved any or all of the above considerations can serve to inform the 
researcher and also provide representative situations to identify the applicability of their 
use. In the additional absence of any documentation of a “decision tree” process 
contained in reviewed  Considered Risk Casualty events, an emphasis must be placed on 
collecting the observations and recollections of the participants and/or historic accounts 
of actual events that made success achievable, or failure inevitable.  
While standards of success or failure, or right or wrong, and what constitutes 
either in this venue, would be represented by arbitrary definitions, those types of 
conclusions were specifically not being sought in this research. Yet, inductive reasoning 
that revealed the common points of knowledge in the social sciences and/or the 
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humanities, and how they could relate to the decision-making process and the needs of 
that process in  homeland security revealed a distinct relationship between  these areas. 
C. THE CHAPTERS 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters. Chapter I (Introduction) identifies the 
incident that provided the inspiration for this paper; examples of current Considered Risk 
Casualty conditions stemming from governmental actions; and explanations of how the 
study was organized and progressed. 
Chapter II (Bioethics) builds on the Considered Risk Casualty example of the 
Pandemic Vaccine Distribution Plan mentioned in Chapter I. The chapter reviews factors 
of public understanding of the acceptability of death in the civilian context, the 
government recognition of the shortage of sufficient vaccine for such events as pandemic 
flu; the governmental distribution plan solution for the shortage; the stated plan 
objectives of ensuring the continuity of public health services during an epidemic; and 
alternate options to the plan and it’s consequences. It then turns to the Canadian public  
health experiences during the SARS epidemic and the lack of information about decision 
making over what Considered Risk Casualty issues were evaluated in arriving at the 
proposed distribution plan. 
Chapter III (Theology) presents a view of the moral and abstract issues that have 
been discussed for centuries about the conditions under which death of oneself or others 
is acceptable. This chapter describes a moral principle on which acceptance is 
understood; the distinction between “killing” and “letting die;” operational decisions 
involving death; what the limits of the requirements of duty are; and the factor of 
proportionality in risk situations. 
Chapter IV (The Military) considers the military concept of “acceptable losses” 
and its criteria; the development of the Geneva Conventions pertinent to losses; 
evaluating proportionality in military and homeland security actions involving losses; 
characteristics of decision makers in acceptable loss conditions; and preparing military 
decision makers for these situations.  
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Chapter V (Philosophy) presents a wide array of issues and considerations that 
relate to some of the factors that can exist in Considered Risk Casualty decisions. The 
matters addressed here describe multiple dynamics that the decision maker can be faced 
with such as: the rationing of scarce resources, the duty to rescue, the difference between 
“killing” and “letting die,” when it’s permissible to harm some to save others, and when 
giving aid is or is not required. Each of these points is also reviewed as being homeland 
security issues. 
Chapter VI (Considered Risk Casualty Incidents) studies a series of three actual 
emergency incidents involving the loss or potential loss of life and the Considered Risk 
Casualty decisions arrived at by the homeland security practitioners who made those 
decisions. The conditions they were operating under are compared to the issues 
previously discussed, and each philosophical, theological, etc. factor is reviewed for their 
relevance in terms of the actual decisions that were made. 
Chapter VII (Decision Making) analyzes the process of decision making under 
conditions of threat and risk. It compares the issues facing the decision makers in the 
previous chapter’s incidents, the importance of experience in decision making, and the 
military views on developing experience and preparing individuals for such decisions. 
Chapter VIII (Conclusions) discusses why it is important that homeland security 
decision makers be familiar with the above body of knowledge, and explains how the 
information contained in the humanities and social sciences can assist them. This chapter 
also recommends that educational programs be developed that draw upon the knowledge 
and experience of both these disciplines and homeland security practitioners to the 
mutual benefit of both, and suggests further areas of research. 
Chapter IX (Suggestions for Further Research) reviews the areas within the fields 
of the social sciences, humanities, decision making, and education that were found to 
have a nexus to Considered Risk Casualty decisions but which were not explored in depth 
during the development of this thesis. The topic can be so encompassing that viable 
avenues of research exist in each of these areas that, if fully developed, can serve to 




A. DEATH AND ACCEPTANCE 
The term “acceptable losses” generally conjures up an association with military 
matters. The understanding of the term has been one that creates a corollary between the 
importance of an objective in warfare and the amount of death and destruction that will 
result in the achieving of that objective. It is in effect a cost/benefit ratio analysis. The 
thought that an equation that expends lives for a described objective or purpose is, in this 
society, tolerated to varying degrees when speaking of military matters and warfare, but 
the application of such a concept to the lives of the civilian population appears to be an 
anathema to that population. (Kay, 2004)  
The country has always been aware that a varying number of deaths could occur, 
or do occur, from an array of threats and hazards through continuously being advised 
about the statistical annual death rate from such things as motor vehicle accidents, 
lightning strikes, house fires, cancer, accidents in the home, etc. For many years 
Americans have also been advised that a nuclear attack on this country would result in an 
estimated number of casualties and death. In short, Americans know that millions of 
people die each year due to multiple causes, and public health agencies are pivotal in 
bringing such statistics and warnings to the attention of all. (Statistics, 2008) 
However, knowing about those deaths, and accepting them are significantly 
different matters.  For example, while there is a common understanding that death can 
occur from riding in an automobile, that knowledge is mitigated by the concurrent 
understanding that certain measures are also applied by car manufacturers and the 
government to reduce that possibility and the number of deaths in vehicle accidents. 
There would be significantly less understanding for any concept that would suggest there 
are a certain number of deaths that are “acceptable” for the objective of having the 
continued convenience of using automobiles. Certainly, there is no appreciation for a 
concept that would knowingly permit a loss of life to occur for that same objective. Yet, 
people do understand that concept of expending lives for an objective as a factor in war. 
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(Kay, 2004) Thus, there is a dichotomy between the civilian and military circumstances 
within the population surrounding the military concept of “acceptable losses” and its 
companion concept in the civilian realm of “Considered Risk Casualties.” The concept is 
recognized for military matters, but there is no concomitant understanding for the civilian 
version; or is there? 
B. THE VACCINE SHORTAGE 
On the national level, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as 
well as state and local health departments annually provide the population with advice 
and warnings concerning the need for vaccinations.  In the past few years this issue has 
received substantially greater focus, and therefore public attention, due to the concern for 
epidemic diseases such as SARS, avian flu, and pandemic influenza. Of particular note 
has been the concern over an inability to produce and/or a lack of effective vaccines for 
these diseases, and where such vaccines do exist, their insufficient quantities has led to 
rationing and official plans for restricted distribution. 
Within the public health arena one finds multiple plans that pertain to the 
intentional distribution of limited supplies of vaccines to prioritized groups of individuals 
in the event of naturally occurring epidemics or terrorist induced afflictions. Almost 
invariably, that hierarchy of individuals to receive vaccines, consists first of members of 
the medical profession and emergency workers, and then moves through a sequence of 
diminishing priorities to conclude with the general population.  
Testimony of Janet Heinrich, Director of Health Care, Public Health Issues of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is indicative of the tone throughout a 
significant portion of the public health literature concerning the CDC plan. The common 
theme within this literature is to define the problem (a shortage of vaccine resources), 
(Heinrich, 2004) and then to move directly to the solution of distributing the available 
resources according to the above hierarchy of prioritized individuals and groups. While 
the logic of the process to ensure that the public health structure remains viable is 
manifest, the fact of the matter remains that comparative value is being assigned to lives, 
i.e., those who receive vaccines and those who must wait. Indeed, the CDC’s own reports 
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included such headings as, “Priority Groups for Influenza Vaccination, Other Vaccination 
Recommendations, Vaccination of Persons in Non-priority Groups, and Persons Who 
Should Not Receive Influenza Vaccine.” (Centers for Disease Control, 2004, pp. 1, 3) 
This inevitably leads to the potential expenditure of some individuals to ensure the 
objective of keeping others alive, which is the concept of Considered Risk Casualties 
being applied to the civilian population in order to achieve an objective or greater good. 
Both the testimony and the various plans’ authors are silent on critical analysis of the 
decision sequence or any discussion of that sequence at all as regards Considered Risk 
Casualties, and appear to accept the conclusion as a valid given. 
There are nuances within the public health response plans literature about the 
construct of the priority recipient listings, but scant issue about the propriety of the 
existence of such a list at all. This is not to suggest that there is a lack of justification, 
validity, or legitimacy to the distribution plan, but just that there is a noticeable gap 
between the statement of the problem, (a lack of vaccine), and the solution, (the 
distribution plan).  Information is not available about the decision process that took place 
between the recognizing of the problem and the acceptance of a solution. 
A former official at the Office of Planning and Emergency Response 
Coordination of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has 
confirmed that the policy level discussions on vaccine distribution included the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention and the first responder and medical communities. The 
focus of the discussions was to keep the American way of life, government, medical, and 
emergency management functioning by caring for those providers first. The official 
confidentially noted that the “acceptable losses” aspect of this issue were thoroughly 
discussed in developing the solution, but were not codified as part of the process. That 
official noted that any attempt to enhance the decision-making process in a Considered 
Risk Casualties situation is an area that would require extensive levels of discussion for 
policy managers, and that any such change in the cultures of the various government 
response agencies would require extraordinary training factors. (Confidential personal 
communication with author, 31 October 2007) This was not an objection to that need, but 
merely recognition of its importance, necessity, and requirements. 
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At the government policy level in public health, the public avoidance of the issue 
of Considered Risk Casualties is evident. As noted in the literature of the Government 
Accounting Office (GAO), “There is no mechanism currently in place to establish 
priorities and distribute flu vaccine first to high-risk individuals.” (Government 
Accounting Office, 2001) This statement is indicative of the thought pattern and 
approach in the announcements and publications of the public health officials (i.e., it 
assumes the propriety of a process that establishes a primacy of distribution), but only 
laments the lack of a procedure, or defined decision process in determining the priority. 
In short, there is no critical questioning whether establishing a hierarchy of life and the 
inherent Considered Risk Casualties contained in that decision is appropriate at all. It 
may well be appropriate, but the information to judge that issue is unavailable as part of 
that decision. 
C. ENSURING CARE 
As noted, the literature and the testimony about the plan fails to address the fact 
that some people will most likely die because of a decision which gives relative value to 
lives but ensures that the necessary vaccine distribution and delivery process is viable. As 
confirmed by the above Health and Human Services official, the obvious intent is to keep 
the public health structure and personnel functioning in order to continue a supply of 
personnel and medications to be of service to the population during a health emergency. 
In short, it could be said that the objective is to ensure a type of “supply chain” of 
professional responders and medications. The strength of that objective is noted in the 
literature by including the fact that the vaccine priority recipient status extends to those 
who support the above public health personnel, such that those workers will be free of 
ancillary concerns, in order to permit them to focus on their duty to care. (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, (HSS) n.d.) 
Thus, the literature reveals that in the absence of codified information about the 
decision process, there appears to be a singular propensity within the public health 
community to accept this issue primarily as a supply and distribution matter, rather than  
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to address the potential it creates itself for loss of life. Again, this is not to say the 
recommended solution is in error, but it does say, as noted above, that there is no 
information about the decision process.  
The CDC itself, in making recommendations on vaccination, may have revealed 
an awareness and concern about this and the consequences of prioritizing individuals 
when in the establishment of “Priority Groups for Influenza Vaccination” chose to state, 
“The following priority groups for vaccination with inactivated influenza vaccine this 
season are considered to be of equal importance...” (Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 
2004, p. 1) In effect, they continued to denote a ranking system, but within the system 
they chose instead to designate categories of individuals in a certain rank to be all equal. 
It is not possible to tell from the document the motivation for this subtle change, but it is 
significant by its uniqueness within the collected literature. By limiting the number of 
hierarchies within the group, the document came close to discussing the recognition of 
those who die, but the CDC paper failed to be analytical of the decision process itself or 
the outcomes directly. In essence, the critical analysis of the authors failed to be critical. 
There exist alternatives to the classifications of priority individuals, but it is to merely 
substitute other forms of criteria for selection to the hierarchy. 
Interestingly, the CDC has published a report that noted the contributions to this 
discussion made by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the 
National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), which was provided to HHS.  This 
report endorsed the hierarchy distribution plan and also provided a “rationale” for each of 
the tiers in the “Vaccine Priority Group Recommendations.” While there was no direct 
discussion of the Considered Risk Casualties within the rationales provided for each of 
the priority groups, the stated reasons for a particular groups’ inclusion in the priority list 
is identified.  In this “rationale” (HSS, n.d.); however, one finds some valuable insight 
into the types of considerations that must be included in the decision-making process in a 
crisis, but without specifically addressing the life and death outcomes inherent in these 
prioritized plans. Thus one sees that the CDC distribution plan reflected its mandate of 
identifying and containing the spread of disease, whereas this HHS plan is reflective of 
an ACIP and NVAC view that also includes managing the repercussions of the disease in 
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a broader societal spectrum.  Even so, there still remains an absence of discussion about 
the Considered Risk Casualties factor that stems from these plans. 
D. CANADIAN EXPERIENCES 
It is odd that such an absence of information exists in public health 
announcements. Among those governmental structures which in the event of a crisis 
would be part of the homeland security response agencies, public health is the one 
element wherein there exists significant material to inform the decision maker.  This 
material is reflective of the fact that public health could be considered as a subset within 
the context of the overall medical profession which is steeped in questions of ethics.  
There are a number of examples to demonstrate this material. 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) came to the world’s attention in the 
fall and winter of 2002-2003, and in the western hemisphere it was most prominent in 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  Health-care workers were among the number of people 
worldwide who contracted the disease and became sick or died.  Following the outbreak, 
the University of Toronto published an analysis of the ethical considerations and the 
lessons learned during the outbreak. The report noted that: 
Government and healthcare leaders need to make the values behind their 
decisions public.  They should discuss the values with people who could 
be effected, ranging from health care workers, who will find themselves 
on the front lines, to government officials, who are making decisions 
about the allocation of limited resources, to the public at large because 
people will be in many ways.(sic) [effected] (R. E. G. Upshur, 2005) 
A subsequent analysis of the report revealed ten key ethical values: “Individual 
Liberty, Protection of the Public from Harm, Proportionality, Reciprocity, Transparency, 
Privacy, Protection of Communities from undue stigmatization, Duty to Provide Care, 
Equity, and Solidarity.” (Green, p. 2) It also noted: 
There are times when the interests of protecting public health overrides 
some individual rights, such as freedom of movement…While health care 
professionals have a duty to care for the sick, this must be tempered by a 
duty to care for themselves in order to remain well enough to be able to 
carry out their duties... it is necessary for such hard decisions to be made 
in a fair manner, including appropriate access to limited resources. (Green, 
pp. 8, 9)  
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Clearly, these reports serve to both support and endorse the ethical basis for and 
the propriety of the CDC vaccine distribution plan. Equally importantly, it provides a 
series of criteria health officials can use to support their decision making, yet there are 
other cautions to be considered. Thus, as can be seen in the Toronto report and the above 
ACIP/NVAC report, there is an inclusion of factors that can inform decision making, but 
still, no discussion of Considered Risk Casualties. 
The CDC itself, in a report from the International Conference on Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, noted in a discussion of mathematical models that “...models can 
provide a means to systematically compare alternative intervention strategies, determine 
the most important issues in decision making, and identify critical gaps in current 
knowledge.” (McKenzie, 2004) However, they did warn that in decision making: 
...if only policy experts are engaged, they may concentrate on information 
that fits their opinions and interests.  The modeling most likely to help 
with bioterrorism preparedness and response will emerge from scientific, 
operational, and policy professionals who listen to and engage each other, 
with real respect and candor, on a continuing basis. (McKenzie, 2004) 
The Hastings Center, a Bioethics research center, was quite succinct on 
establishing a hierarchy of distribution: 
...but in a pandemic, rationing is inevitable because there will not be 
sufficient resources to go around.  And rationing, provided it is done in an 
ethical manner, will serve justice and save lives by conscientiously 
distributing scarce lifesaving resources in harmony with our nation’s 
deepest values, including fairness. (Hastings Center, n.d.)  
In this there is evidence that the Considered Risk Casualties issue is recognized 
by disciplines ancillary to and associated with  public health that serves to approach, if 
not occupy, the void left by the prioritized distribution plans on this all important issue. 
Lest the reader begin to presume that the criteria being applied in this situation 
that may lead to the deaths of some is universally accepted, Baumgarten and Insco, of the 
University of Michigan, noted in their discussion of various schools of philosophic 
thought about the relative value of lives, “You are not favoring each of the people whose 
lives can be saved; it’s just that there are more of those people, [who could be saved] so 
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considering each person equally results in ‘trading off’ one life in order to save fifty.” 
(Baumgarten and Insco, 2001, p. 12) Again, this reflects the need to step outside the 
distinct public health venue to locate discussions of the life and death consequences of 
plan making decisions. 
Decisions that have such outcomes will always have a wide range of 
considerations and complex influences that must be evaluated, and multiple disciplines 
have routinely added their voice to the discourse such as the above philosophic point.  
For example, Benjamin’s analysis, from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in 
Baltimore, introduced another tactic to the discussion by not addressing the influenza 
vaccination plan at all, but provided a discussion of the similar smallpox vaccine policy. 
By presenting the possibility that the vaccination process might fail in its objectives, he 
forces the consideration of alternate decisions. (Benjamin, 2002) While it is difficult to 
know if the influenza/smallpox diseases corollary is legitimate, he specifically rejected 
prioritization in favor of mass inoculation to save all lives, thereby highlighting the life 
value judgment through eliminating it in favor of inoculating everyone. Such a tactic 
forces the influenza decision makers to consider the possibility of failure of their plan and 
return to the life value issue rather than that of the survival of the health care system 
structure. However, this suggestion would require that a supply of vaccine sufficient to 
inoculate everyone is available. 
Emanuel and Wertheimer, from the George Mason University School of Law, 
suggested substituting a vaccine distribution pattern different from that of the CDC to one 
that is more in line with their preference (Emanuel and Wertheimer, 2007) of who should 
be vaccinated, and they, in effect, initiated an endless discussion about the credibility of 
the CDC decision, since anyone would be free to make a personal preference based 
observation about who should receive the vaccine first. 
Continuing outside the specific realm of public health but within the related 
discipline of bioethics, one finds a full spectrum of views about the loss of life and the 
factors involved in the issue. The ethical pattern of directly addressing the loss of life 
inherent in these public health decisions continues with other authors, in a wide-ranging 
analysis of multiple factors in both planning and response. Whereas public health avoided 
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advising the public about the losses aspect of their prioritization decision, it 
recommended the full participation of the public in each stage of the decision-making 
process. The authors’ method of moving the discussion through a series of traditional 
ethical contexts and philosophical principles and theories to judge the public health 
outcome was most beneficial in identifying the factors involved in each element of the 
decision process. (Lemon, Hamburg, Sparling, Choffnes, and Mack, 2007)  
What is seen in all the above is that there are many approaches and discussions 
about the “process” of any distribution plan, but scant discussion about the ‘who lives 
and who dies’ consequences inherent in any of the plans. 
E. ISSUES 
The value in these views, for the purposes of this thesis, may not be in their 
conclusions as much as serving to surface the myriad of considerations that must inform 
any decision involving life values. It appears that the combining of all the above pivotal 
observations and commentary provides insight into the complexity of decision making 
and the range of existing thoughts on the topic that are available to those who must make 
these life consequence decisions. 
Thus one can see that decisions have been made, and presumably, continue to be 
made, by government public health entities that can result in the expenditure of lives in 
order to protect the lives of others in the wider population. It is evident therefore that the 
answer to the original question of whether there is an understanding of the concept of 
Considered Risk Casualties among the civilian population is clearly yes, there is. 
However, the conditions under which it is tolerable and the level of that tolerance 
depends on the type of setting (military “acceptable losses” or civilian “Considered Risk 
Casualties”) as well as the conditions and influences present at the time the decisions are 
made. Hindsight is free to judge the outcomes and consequences of these decisions, 
which can be unknowable at the time they are rendered, but it is that very uncertainty that 
makes these decisions tortured moments. Hindsight observations are informative but not 
as valuable to the decision maker as would be prior knowledge of these insights.  
Multiple disciplines have spent centuries suggesting and analyzing the endless variety of  
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factors that can influence these decisions, and in that process have produced a rich body 
of knowledge and experience that can inform decision making in life and death situations 
today. 
This process of informed decision making would benefit by expanding it and 
giving it a structure that could assist those who may be suddenly faced with future 
decisions of similar proportions. Such decisions were, are, and will be exactly that: 
“decisions” that have been derived at the conclusion of a presumably deliberative 
process. Both the problem and the outcome are recognized, but what remains wanting is 
an advisory process that gives guidance to current and future decision makers who will be 
required to address similar and catastrophic issues under crisis conditions that deny them 




A theologian has described the following situation: A firefighter enters a building 
where there is a child trapped. Eventually that firefighter jumps from a window to save 
herself but without the child that could have been saved. Does that firefighter bear a 
moral responsibility for not having saved that child? There may be operational, 
procedural, philosophical, and legal issues involved in this situation, but for the moral 
aspects, one can also examine the view of theology.  
While there are multiple religions and forms of theology, this thesis will not 
examine the range of them that are available to address the above question. The author 
has chosen not to introduce other theological views because this thesis is not about 
theologies or the areas of debate or agreement that may exist between them. This chapter 
is concerned with demonstrating that the discipline of theology per se, has considered 
questions and answers that can be pertinent to the types of situations described above. 
Rather than join in a theological debate that must naturally ensue from an introduction of 
multiple forms of theology, for this thesis the author has chosen Christian theology as the 
representative form of the discipline to demonstrate the pertinence of thought present. It 
is reasonable for the reader to extrapolate that additional theologies would also contain 
observations on the topics contained in this thesis. As in other chapters, the author is not 
intent on surfacing opposing, or in some cases even supporting the views, contained in a 
discipline, since that would shift the locus of attention to matters that would be internal to 
a particular discipline, rather than merely demonstrating that there is useful content for 
homeland security within the discipline as a whole.  
One can examine the morality of the above contemporary firefighter scenario by 
starting with a Christian theological principle originating in the Middle Ages and 
continuing into today. 
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A. THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
The theological views on the concept described as “Considered Risk Casualties” 
have their basis in antiquity. In Christian context, it is based on the wider teachings of St. 
Augustine on “just wars” from 1500 years ago. (J. O’Connor, personal communicaion 6 
December, 2007)2 The particular issue in question is contained in the “Principle of 
Double Effect” postulated from the thoughts of St. Thomas Aquinas in the middle of the 
Thirteenth Century (Solomon, 2001) At its core, the principle generally states that “…in 
cases where a contemplated action has both good effects and bad effects, the action is 
permissible only if it is not wrong in itself, and if it does not require that one directly 
intended the evil result.” (Solomon, 2001)  
Moral theology defined numerous influences that affect the application of this 
principle, and philosophers and ethicists have likewise debated and written on its 
intricacies: 
Generally speaking [there are] four criteria for the use and application of 
the Principle of Double Effect, and it starts out with the idea that your 
initial action has to be itself a good action or what they call a ‘morally 
indifferent’ action, and that action is seen as having two effects, [hence] 
the name of Double Effect Principle.  The second criterion after you have 
the performance of this morally indifferent or good act, [is that] it has to 
be that your intention is also to achieve the good end and not what is 
called the bad end or the evil, so the intended effect is called the direct 
effect and what happens in terms of the evil effect is only permitted or 
tolerated but not intended.  The third criterion is that the evil effect cannot 
be the result of a good effect.  So in other words, the good and the bad 
have to arrive simultaneously as a result of the first action that you take 
and then the last criterion is that there has to be a proportion agreed for 
initiating that good or indifferent act in the first place. (V. Genovesi, 
personal communication, 9 July, 2008)3  
 
2 The Right Reverend Monsignor James O’Connor, Doctor of Sacred Theology, studied at the Vatican, 
and was for many years on the faculty of St. Joseph’s Seminary, Dunwoodie, New York. 
3 Reverend Vincent Genovesi, S. J., holds Master’s Degrees in Philosophy and Theology, and a 
Doctorate in Theology from Emory University. He has taught Christian and Political Ethics at St. Joseph’s 
University in Philadelphia for thirty-five years. 
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An additional theologian’s view was that of “... the principle is that in the service 
of a greater good, one may tolerate a lesser evil that may come about in the course of 
pursuing the greater good.” (D. Ruff, personal communication, 13 June, 2008)4 
From these three views of the principal it is clear that there is an agreed consensus 
at the core of the theory, but it is also obvious that the application of this principle could 
have a significant number of nuances and considerations, particularly in matters 
concerning life-and-death decisions. The primary element in matters of Double Effect is 
one of intent.  Another theologian, Grisez, reviewed that issue in detail by asking the 
question “Is it always gravely wrong to intend to kill the innocent?” (Grisez, 1993, p. 
469); and he made multiple points in describing the answer to that question and other 
issues. 
To resolve these issues, it is necessary first to understand what intend and 
innocent mean.  Then one must see why it is always wrong to intend to 
kill the innocent, why this matter does not admit parvity, and how 
subjective factors can reduce the guilt of an act of killing. (Grisez, 1993, p. 
469)  
As initially defined, the Principle of Double Effect described the issues of intent 
and that of “the innocent,” which Grisez described as follows: 
In the present context, though, innocent is used in a technical sense to 
refer to everyone but those who either have been found guilty of a capital 
crime or are carrying on an unjust war...  
It is clear from the preceding fact, in the Christian tradition on the morality 
of killing; the original core of the idea of innocence is immunity from 
capital punishment, not moral innocence...  
The preceding points clarify both the precise meaning of intending to kill 
and the very inclusive reference of the word innocent. (Grisez, 1993, pp. 
474, 475)  
 
4 The Reverend Daniel Ruff, S. J., has a Ph.D. in Religious Studies has been teaching for 
approximately twenty years. He has been a seminary professor, and for the last eight years has been on the 
faculty of Loyola College in Maryland. 
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With this explanation the definition of “innocent” is simply and directly presented 
and understood.  However, the dynamic of “intent” is a more complex issue requiring 
further examples and clarity particularly in regard to the act of “killing.” 
1. Homeland Security and “Intent” 
Just as will be seen in the analysis of the philosopher’s views, it is also true here 
that there is no suggestion being made that homeland security personnel are ever 
involved in the act of “killing” as a generally understood act with malicious intent. 
However, since the probability that many types of death can occur as a result of decisions 
made in homeland security circumstances (and “killing” remains a description of a 
distinct type of death) that frame of reference is worthy of being reviewed in the 
theological realm in order to assist the  homeland security decision maker. 
“Intend to kill” is the pivotal phrase in the above quote from Grisez, and St. 
Thomas appears to encompass this entire question of the relationship between intent and 
“killing” by noting: “Moral acts receive their species according to that which is 
intended.” (Grisez, 1993, p. 469) 
Grisez, considered by many to be conservative in his theological views, further 
endorsed the above comment he cited from St. Thomas by then agreeing with him (St. 
Thomas) through noting the association between intention and decision making:  
Intentions intrinsically constitute moral acts inasmuch as these acts are the 
carrying out of choices; but the acts constituted by intentions are either 
good or evil by their conformity or lack of conformity to right reason, that 
is, to practical reason, unfettered by non-rational factors, bringing to bear 
the truth about what is humanly good. (Grisez, 1993, p. 469)  
Thus one can see the complexities of Double Effect starting to develop in that 
intent, as one of its main elements, is itself also dependent upon “right reason” and 
practicality. That is to say, with actual decisions in the real world. In theology, it is 
recognized that there are also different types of intent as identified previously by Grisez’s 
comment that “intentions are either good or evil.” He defined intent further: 
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Intend sometimes refers exclusively to the will of an end, as distinct from 
the choice of the means, but sometimes it refers both to the willing of an 
end and the choice of the means, as distinct from accepting unforeseen 
side effects.  Here, intend is used in the latter, more inclusive sense. 
(Grisez, 1993, p. 470 
2. Decision Making: Dying Verses Killing 
In the above, Grisez indicated that there can be an intention to die that has good 
intent (entering heaven) but without any intention whatsoever of killing to cause that to 
happen. It is also true; however, that one can cause something to happen without 
intending it: 
...one also causes something nonintentionally [sic] when, in doing 
something else, one foresees and permits it as a side effect, which one 
does not cause properly and directly...  
One chooses as a means something in one’s power - some performance or 
omission - thought more or less likely to bring about the intended end.  
But it also is more or less clearly foreseen that, either possibly or surely, 
the performance or omission will have various good or bad consequences 
distinct from its intended end, and in making the choice these good or bad 
consequences are accepted, gladly or reluctantly as the case may be, as 
side effects.” (Grisez, 1993, p. 471) 
Here, the influences that can apply to Double Effect continue to expand. They 
include a wider range of factors that enter the decision-making process.  Indeed, what one 
sees is that decision process being described as a known “choice.”  One also sees that the 
ability and authority to act, or to not act, has a direct nexus to the production of “side 
effects.”  The principal issue added to the original one of “intent” becomes that of choice 
which is described as: 
...choice is the adoption of a proposal.  A person deliberates about doing 
something considered possible and interesting.... Adopting a proposal to 
do something is making a choice.... The doing (whether performance or 
omission) carries out the choice.... Carrying out the proposal has foreseen 
consequences neither included in the proposal nor sought for their own 
sake: these are the side effects that an individual or a group accepts.” 
(Grisez, 1993, pp. 471, 472) 
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It is also interesting to note that this theologian believes that matters of intent need 
not be positive actions, but in fact, can be omissions or simply the act of doing nothing; 
but even at that, the intent is the pivotal point in deciding whether or not such an act is a 
killing. “Someone can intentionally kill another by an omission.  If a person can do 
something necessary to sustain life, but deliberately omits to do it in order that death will 
ensue, that omission morally speaking, is a means of intentional killing.” (Grisez, 1993, 
p. 474) 
One is hard pressed to imagine any circumstance wherein a homeland security 
official’s non-action would be described as a case of “deliberately omits to do it in order 
that death will ensue.” Such an event would require “deliberate” multiple steps starting 
with intending that someone die and then forestalling preventive measures in order to 
ensure that the death occurs. However, during crisis, and certainly in its aftermath, a 
homeland security decision maker may have a personal concern that their actions, or even 
inactions, could result in deaths that might expose them to the moral accusation of killing. 
Whereas such individuals would normally conceive of killing as requiring some overt act 
and presumably therefore would be made uncomfortable by the possibility that even 
failing to act could result in the same moral consequence, this one statement above, could 
serve to insulate them from any such concern. 
3. Operational Decisions and Death 
Having previously examined the difference between “killing” and “letting die,” it 
becomes evident that in the homeland security environment (i.e., all those branches and 
capabilities of each level of government that apply to the protection and response to 
threats to the country, it’s infrastructure, and population) relative to the emergency 
services, there is a substantial chasm that exists between the types of death that can and 
do occur in that environment and the act of killing.  Those previous observations, when 
combined with the above theological views, establish an understanding that all but 
precludes killing as a recognizable event as part of the response pattern in homeland 
security, owing to its overriding requirement for the presence of “intent.” 
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With this knowledge of the descriptions of “innocent” and “intent,” one gains not 
only awareness of the principal terms used in Double Effect, but it is also imperative to 
begin to describe the variables and exceptions that would be recognizable characteristics 
in a homeland security environment.  In that regard, the theology has provided the 
following: “...exposition of the prohibitory part begins by listing kinds of killing not 
forbidden by the commandment: killing of animals, execution of criminals, killing an 
enemy in a just war, killing by accident rather than by intent or design...  and killing in 
self-defense.” (Grisez, 1993, p. 476)  
On first review, with the possible exception of “killing by accident rather than by 
intent” (accident being happenstance in crisis events), this list would appear to create 
difficulty for  homeland security personnel since it does not describe the traditional types 
of circumstances that emergency service personnel encounter in their decision making.  
However, a closer review revealed that the pivotal issue lies within the definition of the 
word “killing,” which has already been demonstrated as largely a matter of intent.  This is 
reinforced by the realization that if the word “death” were substituted for “killing” in the 
above, which the theologian/author could easily have substituted, one would be presented 
with a very different moral issue.  It must therefore be that the use of the word “killing” is 
intentional in order to ensure that the reader applies the issue of intent to the 
interpretation of the statement. Grisez alluded to that difference and reinforces the 
concept of the intent being involved by stating:  “For gravity is determined by what the 
agent wills (the object of the moral act), not by conditions and limits on the carrying out 
of a choice… For the gravity of the matter is determined by the harm the agent wills, not 
by the harm he or she is likely to effect.” (Grisez, 1993, p. 480)  
Therefore, a homeland security official is being advised again that “choice” (a 
decision) can be made within the imposed “conditions and limits” (emergency scene 
situations) under which a decision is called for, and still, the decision maker’s intent is 
the pivotal moral factor in matters of Considered Risk Casualties.  This is also true when 
those types of casualties are in fact a “side effect” of the decision, similar to that foreseen 
in the Principle of Double Effect: 
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So, even if one knowingly brings about someone’s death as a side effect, 
one is not responsible for intentional killing if one neither wants the death 
nor chooses to kill…. 
Accepting death as a side effect means making and carrying out a choice 
to do something other than kill and with a purpose other than death, but 
with the expectation that a death, one’s own or another’s, will result.  
Risking death as a side effect is similar, but the expectation is that 
someone’s death might result.... 
It always is wrong to accept one’s own or another’s death as a side effect 
of doing something that would be wrong in any case.  The instance in 
which it clearly is praiseworthy to accept death as a side effect is that in 
which one’s own death is accepted in the line of duty or in doing some 
work of mercy. (Grisez, 1993, p. 482)  
4. The Limits of Duty 
If one accepts the premise that  homeland security personnel are not motivated to 
do “something that would be wrong in any case” this observation not only continues to 
absolve them of moral concerns (under certain conditions) about the killing issue, but it 
also raises the notion of their own death in carrying out their assigned duties. Grisez 
provided a scenario that emergency service personnel can identify with, but that on first 
analysis appears to be contrary to the point he has just made: 
...Mary, a firefighter, jumps out of a window into a net to save herself, 
leaving to the flames a child whom she could and, given her duty as a 
firefighter, should have saved. She does not intend but only accepts the 
child’s death, and her self preserving act otherwise would be morally 
good.  But since the child’s death results from Mary’s dereliction of duty, 
she is guilty of it… 
Mary, the fire fighter should have accepted her own death, if necessary to 
save the child, for saving the child was her duty. (Grisez, 1993, p. 483)  
While the author’s intent may have been to identify a corollary between 
“accepting” another’s death and the requirements of “duty,” an analysis of this scenario 
by another theologian makes it clear that this scenario, as written, established its own 
non-sequitur which renders any discussion of the moral question of killing contained in 
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the scenario to be moot. The problem is one of practical reason in an actual or genuine 
situation, i.e., if Mary “could” have saved the child, then, there is no reason why she 
would have jumped from the window without taking the child.  If the conditions were 
such that she was required to jump from the window in order “to save herself,” then it is 
clear that those conditions would have prevented her from saving the victim also. 
Likewise, it begs the question of how Mary’s dying in the fire would have enabled her to 
save the child. Presumably, had Mary been killed, she would not have been able to rescue 
the child either (V.Genovesi, personal communication, 9 July, 2008). Hence, this 
scenario appears invalid for the moral issue in question. It does however surface another 
major issue, that of concern about the limits of the requirements of duty. 
Grisez addressed that issue with great clarity: “In many cases, one’s own life 
cannot be sacrificed without unfairness to others, such as dependents, or detriment to the 
common good” (Grisez, 1993, p. 484). He again referred to St. Thomas for an 
endorsement on this point by quoting him:  “...because one has a stronger duty to take 
care of one’s own life than another’s” (Grisez, 1993, p. 485).  
These views specifically reinforce and coincide with that of the philosophers 
about the element of “duty” in the making of Considered Risk Casualty decisions. Grisez 
noted not only the duty to survive to “serve the common good” but also that of the 
emergency service personnel’s responsibilities to their own families.  These are highly 
significant issues that force the decision maker to look beyond the immediacy of a 
situation where there is risk in a localized circumstance to that of the requirements of the 
wider society that they are also charged with protecting, including their own families.  He 
further refined this point: 
Sometimes one’s responsibilities to others make it clear that it is unfair to 
accept a risk of death to them or even to oneself.... High public officials 
whose death would be detrimental to the common good take unfair risks if 
they [fail to take necessary precautions to protect themselves]…   
If someone doubts whether it is fair to risk his or her own or another’s 
death, and has no moral responsibility to take the risky alternative even if 
it is permissible, it’s riskiness is reason not to take it, and so it is wrong to 
do so… 
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However, if someone doubts whether it is fair to risk his or her own or 
another’s death, yet would have a clear moral responsibility to take the 
risky alternative assuming it is permissible, the risk should be accepted... 
Physicians, nurses, police officers, lifeguards, firefighters… and so on 
undertake important duties towards others.  At times they must risk their 
own lives to fulfill those duties...” (Grisez, 1993, p. 486)  
Even without concurrence from other disciplines, the homeland security 
practitioner and decision maker can find sufficient reason in both observations of this 
theologian to husband and secure the lives of their personnel. This is due them not only 
because of the intrinsic value they represent as individuals, but also as the resource that 
they are to the community at large, being responsible for its protection also. While the 
sense of duty clearly requires that such personnel engage in risks that would be beyond 
that expected of an ordinary citizen, there is no moral requirement that they sacrifice their 
lives needlessly to honor that duty. 
Another theologian has provided additional examples that are pertinent to 
concerns about such decisions and the requirements of duty: 
For example, [if] I can’t swim….  I have no moral obligation to jump into 
a raging river to try to save somebody who’s in that river, but if I were a 
person, healthy, standing by a small creek and were to see a child in that 
creek, I would be morally wrong to not save that child, to allow that child 
to die ... it’s morally wrong for me to do nothing in the presence of that 
child and allow the child to die.  Now that’s a situation where allowing to 
die is immoral but allowing to die in other situations would be moral... if 
I’m a ...fire official, and I don’t take any risk I would have a problem with 
that.  So maybe the answer is...we need to put somebody in [the dangerous 
setting] just to explore the possibility of doing [what is necessary]....We’re 
not just going to say ...’we’re not going into the building.’ We’ll at least 
make an initial attempt to evaluate, get in there and see what the situation 
is and then make the decision [if] we go further or not go further. (V. 
Genovesi, personal communication, 9 July, 2008)  
This comment clearly identified situations that denote the limits that exist in 
balancing risk-taking with the requirements of duty.  On the one hand, as homeland 
security personnel, it is expected by the society that risk-taking be a part of their duties, 
but they are not expected to extend that duty to the point of their own death.  At some 
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point in the process one reaches a level of risk that ends the commitment to duty. 
Response scenarios can envision a significant number of other factors that could be 
considered when trying to determine that balance point.  Not the least of these issues is 
the one alluded to above about preserving lives of emergency personnel on the basis of 
their commitment to, and requirements of, a wider population they also have an 
additional duty to protect.  The theologian addressed that specifically as follows: 
...if I’ve got finite resources, I don’t want to put them all, obviously, in one 
place but I don’t want to precipitously say we’re not committing any one 
to [this dangerous situation, because] there are other more important 
things for us to attend to...we’d have to say the question of how much 
good can you accomplish given the enormity of the demand right now? 
(V. Genovesi, personal communication, 9 July, 2008)  
This observation would permit the decision maker to evaluate emergency 
personnel and resources in a calibrated manner that would serve to both address their 
safety and simultaneously conduct an evaluation of the risk level that is acceptable for the 
immediate situation as compared to the anticipated outcome.  Without question, the level 
of risk and the possibility of an ongoing threat to others are going to be one of the 
elements evaluated by the individual charged with making the decision.  However, this 
should not be construed to mean that there is a comparative life value per se, being 
established between the responders and the victims: 
...I don’t think we want to dispose human life...unscrupulously or 
cavalierly because the life of your fire personnel, obviously, has value and 
so you can’t ask them certainly to throw your life away.  You can’t do 
that, but it’s not the same as saying you can’t be exposed to risk?  No...by 
their profession they expose themselves every day to risk, or 
theoretically…. They’re exposing their lives to risk every day and they 
know that.  They have taken on that responsibility.  It’s like saying, is this 
a calculated risk or is it a foolish risk? And I would say you can’t avoid 
risk in most of our lives, we can’t avoid risk, but I think we have the 
responsibility to avoid foolish risks.  That’s why... I think their 
professional training should enable them to say this is a calculated risk, 
and we have to live with that.... So they make a judgment.  Does this 
building look as though we can do something or not?  So it’s almost like 
saying... before we get to the moral question, we have got to have 
information of a different nature.  What is facing us in the building?   
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Before we can get to the decision about do we commit firefighters here or 
not commit firefighters here. (V. Genovesi, peronnal communication, 9 
July, 2008)  
5. Duty and Proportionality 
Theological views on the concept of life loss in this context frequently pivot on 
the issue of “proportionality” (i.e., lives expended, versus lives saved) (J. O’Connor, 
personal communication, 6 December, 2007). Many of the influences considered in their 
discussions establish significant nexus to warfare, healthcare, and also to what would be 
homeland security actual conditions. Their considerations include: given knowledge, 
level and frequency of threat, duties of personnel, time availability, and physical distance 
at the time a Considered Risk Casualty decision is made. As will be seen, philosophers 
focused their analysis on many of those same influences, and there is both concurrence 
and differences with the theologians, contained in the nuances of those discussions; yet 
proportionality is a key factor. 
...if we were looking at the teaching of the Church on care of the dying, 
the church says we have to use ordinary means to keep people alive, but it 
becomes an option to use what they call extraordinary means, but the thing 
is this, both of those terms, ordinary versus extraordinary means, they now 
use the word sometimes ‘proportionate means’ versus ‘disproportionate 
means”…these are relative terms and really you need to make a decision 
in light of each case.  What’s ordinary means for one person may be 
extraordinary means or disproportionate means for another person and you 
can’t predetermine what should be done morally until you know what is 
the situation of the person and therefore it’s not a question of...technology, 
because we could have very advanced technology and still say in that 
particular case, if we use that technology its disproportionate given the 
stage of health of this person…. I’m thinking comparably there…with 
respect to the situation of using personnel. Is this risk what’s called a 
proportionate risk or calculated risk, prudent risk, or is it really foolish, not 
prudent at all to use personnel in this particular case? (V. Genovesi, 
personal communication, 9 July, 2008)  
It would appear from this that the sense of duty is neither absolute nor 
independent of other influences.  The amount of resources (technology) would certainly 
be a factor in determining where that previously mentioned balancing point between duty 
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and risk-taking exists.  If a well-equipped entity has the technology available to match a 
particular level of threat, then it seems that the weight of duty lies heavier on the decision 
to extend the risk to emergency personnel.  However, even in that circumstance a 
mitigating factor might be the proportionality of the response, i.e., is it prudent to risk ten 
to save one? The theologian’s views were: 
...I think this allocation of resources is a real factor in what we’re talking 
about and in health care and so on and so forth... should we spend millions 
and millions of dollars to keep someone alive?  That’s a very valid 
question.  I would say no. You made your point when you say this has 
become prohibitive and so we stop… I would say you come to the 
conclusion that we really cannot accomplish our intended goal so there’s 
no point in having people go into a situation where their life could be 
thrown away. Nobody can... risk a life...needlessly...I can’t do that. So in a 
situation like this, we can’t throw our lives away, they have value. On the 
other hand...aren’t you a professional? [Yes] I’m a professional. But 
there’s still that calculus that says I shouldn’t throw my life away... nor 
should I stand by idly when chances are good that I can save you. So what 
we are saying is that there’s a need for... some kind of situational analysis, 
it’s kind of hard to use the word calculus because we’re not saying any life 
is worth more than any other life... should we try to save life that can be 
saved? I would say, yeah, we should try to save a life that can be saved. 
Have you reached the conclusion honestly, have you honestly reached the 
conclusion that this life cannot be saved? If so, then I cannot and should 
not commit personnel. (V. Genovesi, personal communication, 9 July, 
2008)  
The theological principles involved here can clearly inform the decision-making 
process, and it is important to note that while the discussion has been about the 
emergency services situations within homeland security, the decision-making skill sets 
are not confined to them alone as regards the theological advice.  Referring to the 
previously discussed public health issue, one can note the parallel effect of the 
observations of the theologian: 
...we know that I have a limited supply and...have to make some kind of 
hierarchical distribution... there’s a general moral principle that says you 
cannot be held to what is impossible. So without even getting into a 
Double Effect Principle, you would simply say no one is obliged to do 
what is impossible and if it is legitimately established that it’s impossible 
to give everyone a vaccine, and all you can do is to try to make sure that 
you’ve had an honest distribution according to the potential of service to 
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the greater good or the common good, and that’s why if you take the 
analogy, if you take the hierarchy beginning with healthcare professionals 
and so on, you’re assuming that that is the idea of allowing those people to 
be of service to the rest of the population as best they can. (V. Genovesi, 
personal communication, 9 July, 2008)  
The parallels are unmistakable. The “limited supply” is akin to the finite resources 
represented by the emergency responders. “To do what is impossible” matches the 
demand of duty, and the “honest distribution” and the “service to the greater good” 
equates to the proportionality concept in the decision-making process. 
For homeland security decision makers and practitioners the overarching 
theological guidance was provided in an interview with a theologian as follows: 
...and I think it’s safe to say generally that sound theological principles 
depend to a large extent on sound philosophical principles and that when 
you make the theological and moral decision, you can’t do it apart from 
philosophy, but you also can’t do it in a vacuum that doesn’t take into 
consideration what we might call empirical facts and the empirical facts 
are provided by an in-house... social analysis, circumstantial analysis, or 
what have you, but you need to know the facts to make a moral decision 
and we begin with general acceptance of the position of the dignity of life 
and the obligation we have to preserve that, but we do that within the 
context that this is the real world and so you deal with it as best you can.” 
(V. Genovesi, personal commication, 9 July, 2008) 
As noted previously, Considered Risk Casualty decisions will invariably result in 
injury and/or death for some. Such circumstances can create moral dilemmas for the 
decision maker at the time of the decision, but it almost certainly will in its aftermath. 
When and where such concerns are a factor for the decision maker, the above theological 
observations (whether it is the difference between “killing” or “letting die,” 
proportionality, the requirements of duty, etc.) can be measured within the context of 
their comments. It is obvious that “intent” is a pivotal factor in determining the questions 
of morality that can arise from these situations. Recognizing that the saving of lives is at 
the core of homeland security practice, the types of circumstances that can be imagined 
for the decision maker can find some of their moral concerns assuaged by the above 
observations. Certainly there are other theologies and belief systems that can be 
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examined, and the decision maker is urged to do so in order to satisfy any concerns. The 
purpose of this chapter has not been to debate the merits of different theologies, but 
merely to demonstrate to the decision maker that the field of theology is flush with 
commentary that can be accessed to support and define the moral framework within 
which such decisions can occur. The decision maker is free to draw upon that body of 
knowledge as may be required. 
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IV. MILITARY 
A. THE CONCEPT OF LOSSES 
Acceptable losses. Upon reading or hearing these words most people recognize 
and are familiar with the concept connected with the term. It is generally interpreted to 
mean destruction, injury, or death, while not intended, does exist as an outcome of some 
other event or activity capable of producing such results. As noted previously in this 
thesis, the concept is normally found in association with a military frame of reference.  
During the research and development of this thesis it became evident that while the term 
enjoyed a reasonably common understanding, it by no means enjoyed a common 
acceptance.  That is not to say that the type of situations it describes were always 
rejected, but it does admit to a frequent discomfort with the terminology itself since 
colloquial interpretation would normally consider “acceptable” to mean permissible, 
allowed, or at least, tolerated. When speaking about death and/or destruction on a 
possibly large scale, it is not surprising that the expression makes many people ill-at-ease. 
It is the nomenclature of the term from which the general discomfort is derived.  
Governor George Pataki, who was the Chief Executive of the state of New York on 
September 11, 2001, during interview stated, “No loss of life is acceptable” (G. Pataki, 
personal communication, 19 March, 2008).5. Fire Chief Michael McNamee of the 
Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department also said in interview, “There are no 
acceptable losses.” (M. McNamee, personal communication, 23 July, 2008)6 While both 
these men and many others understood the concept being referenced, they were 
adamantly opposed to the suggestion that there was any level of acceptance of 
destruction, injury, or death within their professional experience. 
 
5 The Honorable George Pataki is the former three term (1995-2006) governor of the State of New 
York. During his tenure he oversaw the managing of major responses to multiple natural disasters in the 
state, the crash of TWA 800, and was governor during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center. 
6 Michael McNamee is the District Fire Chief with the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department. He 
has been in the Fire Department for thirty-six years and been the District Chief for the last fourteen years. 
He has lectured nationally about the fire described in the thesis. 
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There are synonymous terms used in the military to frame the same concept and 
are described as follows, resulting in similar concerns about them: 
The... choice to use ‘collateral casualties’ or ‘civilian casualties’ in 
conjunction or instead of ‘collateral damage’ also requires explanation. 
‘Collateral damage’ is a term often used for the group of undesired 
consequences resulting from a military attack involving either people or 
property.  For those individuals who have lost family members or friends 
in incidences of ‘collateral damage,’ or who have been injured themselves, 
the term ‘damage’ does not seem to acknowledge the fact that there has 
been a tragic loss of health or life.  While the United States Military has 
used this term in the past, the Department of Defense frequently used the 
term ‘civilian casualties’ during... press briefings.  In its published 
guidance to its legal advisors, the United States Air Force uses references 
similar to and including ‘collateral casualties and damage.’’ Similarly, and 
out of respect for those civilians who have tragically suffered and in 
deference to potential sensitivities towards the use of anodyne language to 
describe their travail... [we] will refrain from using the term ‘collateral 
damage’ to refer to instances of civilian deaths or injury.  (Roblyer, 2005, 
p. 3) 
In addition to sharing the same sensitivities expressed in the above, there is also a 
concern with its inherent inaccuracy, in that it fails to describe any aspect of the decisions 
required in the situations resulting in these outcomes.  The descriptive phrase that is 
being used is one that was developed for this thesis: “Considered Risk Casualties.” As the 
author described it, and will continue to note, this is a more accurate term to describe not 
only the process known to the military decision maker but also, and more specifically, the 
homeland security practitioner in reaching decisions in such matters. These individuals 
give great consideration to all the risks involved in making decisions that may, or will, 
result in casualties.  Hence, any destruction, injury, or death that ensues after such 
decisions have been contemplated, are more accurately described as Considered Risk 
Casualties.  This term describes not only an event outcome (casualties), but, unlike the 
above military terms, it also describes an element of the intellectual process that preceded 
the decision (considered risk).  It is therefore a more encompassing and accurate 
description.  
Within the experience and practice of war throughout history, the concept of 
“acceptable losses,” and conversely that some losses must therefore be “unacceptable,” is 
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actually a relatively recent phenomenon. In many, but not all cultures throughout history, 
even some considered highly civilized, it was not an uncommon practice to “put to the 
sword” entire enemy populations, thus demonstrating a widely held belief that there were 
no losses that were “unacceptable,” at least as it pertained to the opposition. “In the Old 
Testament, Israel seems to be enjoined to kill its enemies in war.  Indeed, the command 
to kill appears to embrace the whole populations of nations Israel displaces” (Grisez, 
1993, p. 474).  
Similarly, the term “rape, pillage, and plunder” has not been unknown even in 
modern times, including the Japanese invasion of Nanking, China, the German drive 
through Russia, the subsequent Russian capture of Berlin each during the Second World 
War, or the more recent events referred to as “ethnic cleansing” in the Balkans, or 
Rwanda and Darfur in Africa. Clearly, none of these casualty causing activities could 
ever be conceived of as “acceptable.”  
So where and when did this differentiation implied in the word “acceptable,” as 
opposed to “unacceptable” come from?  It could logically be presumed that the 
conceptual dividing line between them is established in some calculus. Understanding 
that the military has such vast experience with casualties of all sorts, it would then seem 
plausible that they possess a wealth of knowledge about the topic and have a finely 
crafted metric for decision making in such circumstances. 
Given that presumption within the realm of military science and tactics, it is odd 
that there is so little written that would serve as a calculus or about the type of specifics 
such a calculus would contain. While it is a major consideration for all military 
commanders, such documentation as does exist is frequently weighted on the basis of the 
validity of the outcomes, rather than the decision process leading up to it and a significant 
amount of that is within matters of law. This is not to say there are no guides for the 
military, indeed, with the possible exception of the medical and law enforcement 
professions, few operational entities have as many defined rules that they must operate by 
in life and death conditions as does the military.  This is demonstrated by the existence of 
the Geneva Conventions. What is absent though is any specific metric that might be 
applied to decision making when faced with Considered Risk Casualty situations.  This is  
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not necessarily an omission, but may reflect the enormous complexity of the 
circumstances that can be attained in war which would make any such metric overly 
cumbersome, if not entirely inoperable. 
However, similar to other disciplines, the profession of arms recognizes that there 
are multiple influences manifest in considering these decision issues. Dissimilar to the 
civilian experience though, the risk-versus-rewards thought dynamic resident in the 
military decision process is not a balanced equation of values wholly transferable to the 
civilian realm.  
For example, the destruction of life and property is a virtual objective (intent) for 
all military entities in combat, and therefore enemy soldiers in an opposing army do not 
occupy equal status to one’s own forces at the start of the calculation. The objective is to 
save one’s own forces while destroying the enemies’ troops. This is distinctly different 
from what has been reviewed previously about the need for the intent to be “indifferent.” 
As seen in preceding chapters, particularly in theology with the Principle of Double 
Effect, “…your initial action has to be… a good action or… a morally indifferent action.” 
(V. Genovesi, personal commication, 9 July, 2008) A defined objective of killing and 
destroying cannot be considered as an “indifferent action.” In the civilian homeland 
security realm there is never a malicious intent to kill (thereby liberating the homeland 
security decision maker from the influences of that burden in decision making), but with 
the military the specific purpose is to kill and/or destroy as may be necessary to achieve a 
specific goal (the morality of which is addressed within theological discussions of “just 
wars,” which is not a part of this thesis).  Thus, analysis of military literature or 
experience may not be compared as an equal with civilian reviews of situations and 
outcomes even when discussing similar events. On the surface that would appear to 
preclude any possibility that military experience in this area could be translated to 
homeland security matters, but that is not always the case. 
1. The Geneva Conventions 
The targeting of individuals, locations, and structures outside the specific military 
forces and support systems of the enemy is proscribed by convention, international law, 
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and professional ethics within the military in a process that has been the evolving since 
the nineteenth century.  The initial intent aside, the considerations that the military 
commander is faced with in decision making with regards non-combatants, is very 
similar to the issues discussed in the context of civilian homeland security circumstances, 
and there appears to be much that can be derived from that military evolution.  
Conversely, as the type of events that homeland security and emergency service 
personnel can now find themselves preparing for and responding to are in fact acts of 
war, the type of decision making circumstances that are familiar in military conflicts are 
the very types of events that these civilian forces can gain benefit from reviewing.  
Additionally, for both the military and the homeland security practitioner, it is probable 
that they will again be working concurrently on the scene of emergencies and disasters 
that will require they appreciate and understand each other’s analysis of the immediate 
conditions in which they are operating in order to more effectively work together, such as 
at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 
Dale Stephens and Michael W. Lewis have reviewed the analysis of dozens of 
writers concerning the plethora of issues that are involved in The Law of Armed Conflict 
(Stephens and Lewis, 2005, p. 1) and in view of their aggregation of so many 
observations; their analysis will be cited frequently in this chapter.  Two of the prime 
legal and moral influences concerning warfare are found in the Latin terms: Jus ad 
Bellum (the right to go to war) and Jus in Bello (rights during war) (Stephens and Lewis, 
2005, p. 2) will not be addressed in this paper. The moral and legal views concerning the 
requirements of going to war are likewise not discussed, inasmuch as the homeland 
security decision maker in the emergency services does not typically participate in those 
decisions. This thesis will however discuss the modern requirements of how war is 
permissibly fought, particularly the limits upon it, for therein lies the concomitant issues 
between the military and civilian decision makers. These authors advised that: “The ‘just 
war’ tradition, as understood within European Christian theology, usually accorded a 
level of civility in the conduct of warfare between Christian antagonists... the ‘just war’ 
tradition was informed by the perceived justness of the cause...” (Stephens and Lewis, 
2005, p. 3).  
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While this evolves from the type of theological tradition previously reviewed, 
those traditions eventually became a more substantial and codified legal process defining 
the proper conduct of war: 
The 1863 Lieber Code and the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration ... focused 
upon regulation of methods and means of warfare... [and] expressly  
recognized that the methods and means of warfare were not 
unlimited…This order was manifested through the development of finite 
rules and found expression in the modern law of armed conflict as it 
developed in the mid-19th century.  The numerous Hague Conventions 
concerning warfare, and the nascent customary law which began 
developing during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, have been 
correctly characterized as constituting the first ‘human rights’ oriented 
treaties in their recognition of soldiers, sailors and (to a lesser extent) 
civilians as the beneficiaries of state-centered rights.  (Stephens and 
Lewis, 2005, p. 3) 
Thus one can see that humanitarian interests started to have a place in warfare that 
continued to evolve over time into a doctrine familiar today, the Geneva Conventions. 
...the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Conventions [35] and the subsequent... 
1977 Additional Protocols [36]... were incorporated into the modern law 
of armed conflict and the broad principles propagating ‘balance’ between 
military and humanitarian goals were subsequently enshrined in the 
resulting Conventions [38]....  
It is here that we find emphasized the reassuring central principles of 
‘distinction’ and ‘proportionality’ which are the bedrock’s of the modern 
law of armed conflict. [40].... In essence, the principle of distinction 
stipulates that only military targets may be attacked. [41] Proportionality 
requires that any incidental civilian injury or damage to civilian property 
arising from such an attack be proportional to the military advantage 
anticipated. [42] (Stephens  and Lewis, 2005, p. 4)  
Specifically, Michael Schmitt provided a definition of “distinction” which is 
recognizable as similar to the theological concepts and issues previously reviewed as a 
question of “intent:” 
The core principle of distinction is found in Article 48 of Protocol [sic].  It 




population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against 
military objectives. (Schmitt, 2002, p. 1) 
Noting as discussed previously that “intent” (or distinction) has mutually 
exclusive connotations between the military and homeland security personnel, the point  
will not be addressed further. Rather, the focus will be on that which provides the greatest 
similarities and lessons for these two disciplines, “proportionality.” Schmitt also provided 
a definition of proportionality:  
Set fourth in Articles 51 and 57 of Protocol I, and unquestionably a 
component of customary international law, proportionality is a principle of 
distinction that prohibits any attack expected to cause a loss of civilian life 
(or injury) or civilian property damage that is “excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”  The principle applies 
when civilians or civilian objects are not the intended target, but injury or 
damage to them is likely during the course of an attack on a legitimate 
military objective. (Schmitt, 2002, p. 5)  
Having reviewed the philosophical and theological observations of the 
dynamics in play in these crisis situations, one should immediately 
recognize their similarity with the military dynamics.  They may have 
different names, but the concepts are remarkably familiar. 
a. Homeland Security and Proportionality 
From the above it becomes immediately manifest that the issues 
concerning the military commander are not substantially different from those already 
reviewed for the homeland security decision makers. The authors identify multiple other 
writers in supporting and clarifying the types of influences that exist in military decision 
making. The similarities are seen below: 
...concepts such as distinction and proportionality are notoriously broad 
and susceptible to wide degrees of interpretation. [47] The broadness of 
these principles creates intractable dilemmas concerning the assessment 
and execution of each mission....  
The test of proportionality necessarily requires an assessment of the 
military value of a particular target, balanced against the expected loss of 
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life resulting from an attack.  Accordingly...[the decision maker] is 
confronted with the questions of how to value human life and how to 
ascribe relative values to enemy lives, both civilian and military.  In 
addition, the planner must also determine the acceptable level of risk for 
one’s own forces and the degree to which that risk should vary to 
potentially decrease civilian casualties…. When incorporated into 
operable rules of engagement, difficult choices need to be made, choices 
that vigorously test the limits of the concepts... commanders will often 
conclude that it is a ‘judgment call’ [49] that needs to be made when 
deciding the cost of an attack.  A commander is certain of the obligation to 
protect soldiers, sailors and airmen within his or her command, but must 
grapple with this obligation when directing an attack and must make 
crucial decisions regarding these lives as well as those of the opposition. 
(Stephens and  Lewis, 2005, p. 5)  
With scant effort one can transpose the word “attack” into “rescue,” and 
the two designations of the lives of friendly forces and that of the “enemy,” into that of 
the emergency services and trapped civilians that was alluded to in previous chapters, and 
will surface again subsequently. With such a change one immediately recognizes that a 
military decision situation has similarities to the circumstances facing a fire chief who, 
when ordering an “attack” (rescue), must weigh the cost of accomplishing the mission to 
the rescuers, as compared to the value of the objective (being rescued) to the trapped. 
One can see this as homeland security “proportionality.” However, there is a difference in 
the scale of the scenarios and the related decisions made by the military personnel in that 
they can be substantially greater (at least to date), based on scale than is that of their 
civilian counterparts. This is evidenced by findings of the Justices of the International 
Court of Justice; one of whom observed the following: 
It must be that, in order to meet the legal requirement that a military target 
may not be attacked if collateral civilian casualties would be excessive in 
relation to the military advantage, the ‘military advantage’ must indeed be 
one related to the very survival of a state or the avoidance of infliction 
(whether by nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction) of vast and 
severe suffering on its own population; and that no other method of 
eliminating this military target be available. (Stephens and Lewis, 2005, p. 
7)  
This finding concerning the use of nuclear weapons describes how 
permissible or impermissible attacks must be related to the value of other acts in a way 
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that is similar to the Principle of Double Effect, and also meshes with the philosophical 
and theological concept of proportionality noted above.  That concept is so pervasive 
within the condition of this military decision making that it has been codified as part of 
the previously described Geneva Conventions: “Upon ratification of Additional Protocol 
I, certain states made declarations regarding the determination of an acceptable loss of 
civilian personnel within the proportionality equation” (Stephens and Lewis, 2005, p. 8).  
While being less pervasive in the civilian context, the circumstances under 
which the military decision maker and the homeland security practitioner operate comes 
even closer together as can be demonstrated by introducing the homeland security frame 
of reference into an issue raised within the military context below: 
The law of armed conflict does not require that a nation needlessly 
sacrifice its own military members [rescue personnel] in order to minimize 
incidental civilian injury [112].... One obvious area of intersection 
concerns the rights of the nation’s own military members [rescue 
personnel] and the risks to which they must be exposed [the duty 
requirement] to preserve the lives of civilians of the enemy nation [trapped 
victims]... the ‘security of the attacking force’ [responding rescuers] will 
indeed be factored into the proportionality equation. (Stephens and Lewis, 
2005, p. 10)  
This is virtually the identical argument, as seen previously in the theology 
chapter and will be re-visited in the philosophy chapter, concerning the extent to which 
duty can be a factor as regards the increasing risk to rescue personnel.  However, even if 
one grasps the concept of proportionality, in the absence of a defined calculus, the 
judgment as to what in fact is “proportional” still remains with the individual decision 
maker.  This is a critical and pivotal issue and is approached in the military literature as 
follows: 
The modern commander is compelled to weigh the loss of all lives 
(enemy, civilian and own forces) when planning an attack and, under the 
prevailing law, must apply requisite values to both lives and military 
objectives when deciding whether the proposed attack meets the 
proportionality criteria.  These values are shaped by both the cultural 
background of the officer as well as the significance of the military 
objective and the broad cost of securing it.  This is not to imply a 
mathematical certainty, but does require that a decision actually be made 
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and values ascribed to what losses are justifiable.  Discretions are broad 
and the factors which apply to determine these respective values are a 
product of judgment….  
To the extent that decisions concerning target selection under the principle 
of proportionality are based upon value judgments, they will necessarily 
reflect the values of the military commander making those judgments….  
Different military commanders from different cultures bring their own 
moral compass as well as their own sense of value regarding ‘military 
objectives’ to the target planning process. (Stephens and Lewis, 2005, pp. 
10, 11, 12)  
b. Personal Characteristics and Decisions 
Thus, here one arrives at one of the most consequential issues in both 
military and homeland security decision making, and that is, in the absence of a defined  
calculus that can be used to evaluate proportionality (“a mathematical certainty”), one 
must rely on the nature and experience of the individual charged with making the 
decision.   
As will be described in the chapter on philosophy, the value systems and 
structure of individuals’ vary widely from person to person. This is what is being alluded 
to in the above comment about “judgment,” “values,” and “different cultures bring their 
own moral compass” to the decision-making process.  This effectively informs one that 
even given relatively similar situations, the decision to act, how to act, or not to act at all, 
can be made in such a way as to result in dramatically different outcomes.  All other 
things being equal, the cost in lives can be minimal or significant based on the moral 
views (values) of the decision maker.  It is an open question how this pivotal variable can 
be overcome to the benefit of those in need and to society as a whole.  There is no 
question that in lieu of a defined calculus, a military, even one as advanced as that of the 
United States, relies heavily on the judgment of the individual commander.  This was 
specifically addressed in an interview at West Point with an Army officer and professor 
of philosophy concerning the basis of decision making in a military context. 
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...there’s no kind of slide rule you can pull out or work at.  It’s going to be 
much more [a situation of] depending on ideally, the good character, the 
experience, and the judgment of that person on the ground who, as a 
military professional has hopefully taken on and internalized the idea of 
the military ethic and carries out those things in a moral manner....  
Clearly people who enter into the military already come in with a 
worldview of their own.  We all come in with our worldview shaped by 
our culture and our parents and our religion or whatever other things we 
believe in... so when faced with a situation like that, a person of good 
character, which we hope as officers and gentlemen we’d all be, would 
then... understand and know what to do ...In the Army I think we like to 
think more in terms of that person’s good character being in the forefront, 
and... understanding what to do rather than be bound by some kind of rigid 
set program, particularly when one understands that there’s so many 
different formulations that any checklist seems to be one that would 
somehow be incomplete with all the strange things that could perhaps 
happen in the real world that we couldn’t even imagine, so I think in that 
case what comes to the forefront is the person’s training experience and 
character and the hope there that that person is a good person, and a moral 
person, and does the right thing and makes the right decisions.  (B. Imiola, 
personal communication, 19 May, 2008)7  
Of course it must be noted (and the professor stressed) that institutions like 
West Point go to great lengths to inculcate a professional ethic and a value system 
supported by numerous types of operational experiences to gain an education in 
command. This dramatically reduces the potential for great variables in outcomes through 
reliance solely on an individual’s character.  Unfortunately, such education is not a 
universal experience for all the militaries of the world.  Indeed there are overwhelming 
examples throughout history of military organizations inculcating value structures that 
could never be considered as moral. Some of those locations and outcomes were listed 
earlier in this chapter.  Nevertheless, it still remains that the moral character of an 
individual decision maker is a consequential factor in making decisions about Considered 
Risk Casualties. Later in this thesis it will be shown that the exact same condition exists 
in the civilian emergency services. 
 
7 Lieutenant Colonel Brian Imiola, United States Army, holds a Doctorate in Philosophy from the 
University of Buffalo. He is a faculty member of the United States Military Academy at West Point where 
he teaches philosophy. 
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In discussing the definition and legal requirements of proportionality, 
Schmitt addressed the difficulty of the decision-making process required by 
proportionality that would seem to suggest, as Imiola at West Point alluded to, that while 
moral character is a significant element in arriving at “right” decisions, it is not in and of 
itself sufficient to guarantee that outcome. "This balancing test is extraordinarily difficult 
to conduct because it requires quantifying and comparing dissimilar values.... The 
“value” of an object depends on many varied factors – the circumstances of the conflict, 
one’s culture, one’s historical and experiential base, etc.” (Schmitt, 2002, p. 5)  
In his 2003 paper concerning decision making and collateral casualties, 
Robyler supported the value of the multi-pronged approach such as that being applied at 
West Point and, noted above by Imiola, to support the morals based decision maker by 
advising that: 
Operating within this setting of conflicting principles and potential biases 
and working to oppose breakdowns in moral resources are three related 
mechanisms: the professional military ethic within each military member, 
the law of war training provided regularly to them and the counsel 
available from military legal advisors. (Roblyer, 2005, p. 28) 
Roblyer further emphasized the difficulty of decision making by 
referencing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia committee 
charged with reviewing the bombing campaign over Serbia and quoting the committee 
thusly: 
The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or 
not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied.... It is much 
easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than it 
is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the comparison is 
often between unlike quantities and values.  One cannot easily assess the 
value of innocent human lives as opposed to capturing a particular military 
objective.  (Roblyer, 2005, p. 12) 
He then went on to provide a list of questions the committee identified 
“...that remain even after one has decided to apply the principle of proportionality.” 
(Roblyer, 2005, p. 12) Reading them with the type of military to civilian homeland 
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security transposition of terms used above makes them an excellent description of the 
emergency service decision maker’s issues. The committee’s questions were: 
1. What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage 
gained and the injury to non-combatants and or the damage to civilian 
objects? 
2. What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums? 
3. What is the standard of measurement in time or space?  
4. To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own 
forces to danger in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian 
objects? (Roblyer, 2005, p. 12) 
He advised the reader that ultimately, “...the committee acknowledged that 
answers to these questions would necessarily vary from case to case and could differ 
depending on the experiences and the values of the decision maker.”  (Roblyer, 2005, p. 
13)  
c. Assistance in Decision Making 
One might suppose that given all the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and the continuous worldwide legal analysis that the Conventions and their 
implementation are subject to that there would be a metric established for proportionality, 
or what Imiola referred to as a “checklist” that would simplify the decision-making 
process. Robyler relieved the reader of that hope by noting, “... Just War moral principles 
and doctrine provide few, if any, specific guidelines to help military decision makers 
value and weigh alternative choices in the very chaotic environment of war.”  (Roblyer, 
2005, p. 10) In fact, rather than pointing in an alternative direction to find such 
assistance, he further made his point by stating: 
...the “decision environment” in which these public servants find 
themselves is a very complex one with regard to the guidance and 
considerations they must weigh.  It is also an environment filled with 
physical, mental, and emotional stress, in addition to what the military 
calls the “fog of war” – the uncertainty that results from the lack of 
adequate, correct information.  (Roblyer, 2005, p. 23) 
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In his chapter on Moral Decision Support for the War Fighter, Robyler 
started to search for assistance for the decision makers: “Given the difficulties of the 
proportionality decision that are still left unanswered... it seems clear that military 
decision makers could benefit significantly from additional decision support targeted at 
these issues.”  (Roblyer, 2005, p. 27)  
In a subsequent chapter he returns to this theme about the benefit of 
acquiring additional support: 
Decision makers can and should be better informed of which moral 
conflicts exist in their decision environment, why they exist, and how their 
associated biases can be minimized.  They should also be alerted to the 
potential of other traps in their moral thinking.  This information will not 
alter the military members’ accountability under international law, but will 
better prepare them to address important moral issues within and beyond 
the legal dimensions of the dilemmas they must face. (Roblyer, 2005, p. 
33)  
It is reasonable to ask why seeking this additional and possibly external 
advice is necessary. One would opine that a cursory review of both the World War II and 
more recent “ethnic cleansing” activities in the world would provide sufficient reasons 
for seeking additional information in military decision making.  There is no suggesting 
that there is a parallel between those enumerated crimes and the types of activities that 
the United States military is continuously faced with and/or operate within. Of course, 
this is even truer in the homeland security environment.  What this thesis is emphasizing, 
though, is that in the Considered Risk Casualty circumstances that both military and 
civilian decision makers currently, and in the future, will find themselves, both mutual, 
internal, and, importantly, external input can serve to assist them with these most 
troublesome burdens. Lest one focuses only on his articles’ past examples to describe the 
need, it is noted that Schmidt offered advice about the future possibilities that not only 
the military, but also homeland security personnel will be faced with as a result of the 
changing style of warfare: “I expect to see a growing tendency to directly target civilians 
and civilian objects, both due to the spread of terrorism and as a result of capability gaps 
that will drive the “have – not” forces facing advanced militaries into asymmetrical 
strategies and tactics”  (Schmitt, 2002, p. 7). 
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In light of this changing battlescape and the demands that it will place 
upon the decision makers, Schmidt noted that there can be a benefit gained for them 
through the following means: 
Although it is not my purpose to comment on the ethics of future war, I 
would suggest that ethical precepts could prove invaluable in assisting 
humanitarian lawyers, policymakers, and combat leaders to interpret the 
existing law in the context of new methods and means of warfare.  
Moreover, ethics can assist them in determining how best to fill normative 
lacuna in humanitarian law that will become increasingly apparent over 
time. Thus, I enthusiastically welcome... [an]... initiative… to create a 
dialogue between the legal and ethics communities.  Such a dialogue is 
essential as we contemplate, and prepare for, 21st century conflict. 
(Schmitt, 2002, p. 8)  
In this, one can see the author suggested and endorsed the belief that these 
military (and therefore homeland security) situations will involve such complex decision-
making requirements that it will be beneficial, if not necessary, to draw on the knowledge 
of other disciplines to make valid and sustainable decisions. It appears that Robyler has 
independently reached a similar conclusion. 
Principles and cautions from ethics and judgment and decision making 
provide different and important lenses through which to view the very 
difficult issues posed in the targeting process.  More fully incorporating 
these concepts may contribute to better moral preparation of the United 
States military decision makers and, in the final analysis, may contribute 
to making wars of the future less costly in terms of innocent lives. 
(Roblyer, 2005, p. 35)  
By extrapolating from the historic and current military experience with 
Considered Risk Casualty circumstances over many years and in many locations 
throughout the world, it is quite clear that for their civilian counterparts, there is much 
that can be learned from military history and methodologies.  This is particularly true in 
the current asymmetrical warfare environment that exists, since the line between what 
constitutes a military operation and a civilian one is no longer as well defined as it has 
been previously. While neither the military nor the homeland security professional have 
any “checklist” to assist in their decision making, it could be suggested that due to such 
things as the Geneva Conventions, the military has more guidance available to them than 
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does the homeland security practitioner.  If, therefore, the above noted military experts 
and writers recommend additional assistance for military decision makers in that task, 
how much more necessary might it be for the emergency service managers who do not 
have a document concomitant to the Geneva Conventions, nor do they have a wealth of 
experience to draw on in the environment of asymmetrical warfare that is being visited 
upon them?   
As one can see in this chapter, the issues that have for all too long been 
considered to be exclusively within the purview of the military are, in fact, directly 
parallel to the types of the decisions made by the first responders throughout the country, 
albeit of a different scale.  One would be wrong to imagine that the scale could ever make 
the decision and its outcomes any less tortured for the local fire chief than it does for the 
military commander.  Ultimately, however, the decisions required of both those 
individuals, inevitably occurs in an environment that is described by Robyler thusly: 
The combination of the pressures and high-stakes of the wartime decision 
environment, the moral-legal tensions and the resulting conflicts, and the 
well-trained, but fallible, human beings making the decisions are 
unavoidable factors.  It is precisely because these factors are inextricable 
that the human decision makers deserve the highest quality decision 
support that can be made available to them.  (Roblyer, 2005, p. 30)  
As one considers the visiting of Considered Risk Casualties upon the 
civilian population and the propriety of responses to it, it is instructive to note the above 
rapidly changing dynamic and realize the influence that a plethora of factors, or even just 
one, can have on the decision process. Conversely, an array of solutions, or just one, 
derived from seeking other observations and information as suggested by the above 




A. PHILOSOPHICAL SCENARIOS 
There are multiple branches or schools of philosophy such as, deontology, 
consequentialism, and non-consequentialism, to name a few, but the focus of their 
individual inclinations within the wider discipline of philosophy is not particularly 
germane to this paper insofar as the thesis objectives are concerned. It is more important 
to be aware of some of the types of issues they address among themselves.  
A methodology that is traditionally used by philosophers to advance their 
discipline is done through a process of discussion of problems presented in various 
scenarios.  In essence, a philosopher wishing to present a point of view contrives a 
scenario wherein the situation they intend to discuss is presented and analyzed.  The 
philosophers’ main point and variations upon it are described through creating an 
unlimited number of modifications or contrivances to the original, artificially crafted 
scenario.  The ensuing debate, through which the thought process is advanced, is given as 
commentary, contrasts, support, comparisons, variations, and opposition by other 
philosophers in the form of wide-ranging arguments and/or the addition of other points of 
view to the original philosophers’ statements and scenario. 
Harvard’s Dr. Frances M. Kamm, a noted philosopher, has for decades written 
extensively on a wide range of topics that are pertinent to this thesis.  Her numerous 
articles, papers, and books have examined such topics as: Does Distance Matter to the 
Duty to Rescue; Moral Issues in Rationing Scarce Resources; Moral Intuitions, Cognitive 
Psychology, and the Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction; Killing and Letting Die: 
Methodology of Comparable Cases and Conceptions of Moral Equivalence; Harming 
Some to Save Others; Morality, Mortality, etc. Dr. Kamm’s observations and scenarios 
are frequently inclusive of, and responsive to, a large number of other philosophers and 
commentators. In that sense, a review of her literature provides a reasonably 
comprehensive analysis of the contemporary material with a nexus to the topic of 
Considered Risk Casualties. Due to the pertinence of her material, the author frequently 
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noted her thinking in this chapter. That reliance commences with her description and 
purpose of this scenario methodology, and is as follows: 
...philosophers use intrapersonal, not interpersonal, testing of cases, so the 
errors resulting from the latter need not threaten their results. Indeed, 
when a philosopher relies on her intuitions, she typically begins with one 
case, and then the same philosopher automatically considers whether she 
would have the same response in another case in which certain factors are 
modified from the original. The basic requirement of moral rationality, 
that we universalize the maxims of our conduct, itself embodies the 
requirement that one person consider many cases in which an act would be 
performed and not just one.  However, the fact that philosophers do not 
respond to one case without thinking of another, and the possibility that 
they get different results by checking through a set of cases than if they 
had responded to one in isolation, would threaten an assumption about the 
purity of the intuitions.” (Kamm F. M., 1998, p. 1)  
In order to participate in the debate, it is mandatory that each philosopher be fully 
conversant with the original scenario. That will not be required here, since this thesis is 
not about philosophy per se, nor is it attempting to add to a debate.  Likewise, this is not 
about the scenarios created by the philosophers to make their point, and it is most 
certainly not about the “right or wrong” inherent in the debates between philosophers or 
different schools of philosophy.  The purpose of this chapter (and this thesis) is to 
demonstrate the range of issues and dynamics that can be present in individual decision-
making situations for  homeland security personnel, particularly where those decisions 
concern matters of life and death, and to familiarize the reader with the range of 
philosopher’s comments about those issues. Throughout this thesis one will see that other 
disciplines have observations that can have a relationship to homeland security issues, but 
this thesis will not be entering into their debates either because it is not examining the 
merits of their internal debates, rather, the author of the thesis is noting that within the 
discipline there can be found matters useful to homeland security decision makers.  
In previous chapters two selected homeland security situations for the issues 
being considered in this thesis were presented. Those same situations will serve as the 
vehicle through which the observations of the above described philosophical thoughts 
will be presented, with the addition of a third situation of the author’s creation. In short, 
three situations will serve as homeland security “scenarios” and the terminology germane  
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to them will be substituted in brackets where necessary, to transpose parallel observations 
about, and from the philosopher’s original artificial scenario into a homeland security 
one. 
The homeland security “scenarios” (S), are as follows:  
S1) The order is given to the military to shoot down a hijacked commercial 
airliner on the morning of September 11, 2001. 
S2) The creation by public health agencies of a prioritized list of vaccine 
recipients in the event of a pandemic disease is established as a national recommendation. 
S3) A circumstance involving decision making by authoritative individuals in 
homeland security agencies, at any level of government, to expend or not expend 
emergency personnel and resources to assist and/or rescue individuals trapped in life-
threatening situations. 
Each of the above situations (S1 through S3) involves decision making that 
includes a Considered Risk Casualties outcome. S1 is a terrorist based situation, and S2 
and S3 can be terrorist initiated or as a result of a natural or “all hazards” emergency. 
As seen in the chapter on theology, the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) serves 
as a primary consideration in western culture for issues of acceptability of the conditions 
under which intentional, and particularly, unintentional deaths can occur. The 
philosophical observations referenced to scenarios S1 through S3 can, for the purpose of 
this thesis, be understood to trace their genesis to PDE, however, it should not be 
considered as an exclusive source or continuum for the philosophers. 
The philosophical observations being considered herein are: 
A. The rationing of scarce resources. 
B. The duty to rescue. 
C. The difference between “Killing” and “Letting Die.” 
D. Harming some in order to save others. 
E. The distinction between harming and not aiding. 
The matrix of homeland security scenarios (S1 through S3) to philosophical 
observations (A through E) being discussed are presented below in Table 1. Not every 
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observation has a scenario associated with it in the chosen examples. However, in actual 
events, a full range of combinations could be possible.  
Table 1.   Philosophy Issues in Homeland Security Scenarios 
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In this chapter, and through the above matrix process, one can begin to bridge the 
gap between the abstract and real-life. A series of three examples will be stated and 
various categories of abstract, philosophical discussions will be linked to the examples to 
reveal that there is a nexus between them. Following each example and it’s categories of 
philosophical commentary, a statement of pertinent issues will encapsulate the 
discussions. By this process it becomes clear that homeland security and other disciplines 
have mutual areas of concern; the shared knowledge of which can be beneficial to all 
parties.  
B. PHILOSOPHY AND THE RATIONING OF SCARCE RESOURCES 
1. Issue A / Scenario 2 
(The creation by public health agencies of a prioritized list of vaccine recipients 
in the event of a pandemic disease, verses] the rationing of scarce resources.) 
As seen in the chapter on bioethics, multiple views exist about the propriety of a 
hierarchy of recipients for the distribution of a limited supply of vaccines, and even in 
those cases where such a prioritization is accepted, there exist different views on who 
should be considered as having priority status. Kamm proceeded through a series of 
questions and responses to these same types of issues but also added to the discussion the 
matter and importance of anticipated outcomes, and she thereby demonstrated an array of 
issues that can be informative for the homeland security decision maker. 
A fundamental issue is whether we should think that we are allocating 
resources or rather the benefits that may come from resources.  (In 
“benefit,” I include prevention of harms.).... I assume that we are 
concerned with the allocation of resources, though as we shall see, 
sometimes concern for benefits that come of the resources must come into 
the picture. 
Sometimes, when we do not have enough resources to help everyone, 
some of our resources will go to waste if we help some people.... Hence, 
the best allocation of resources is not necessarily the one that uses up all 
the available scarce resource (Kamm F. M., 2007, pp. 263, 264)  
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Even a cursory examination of the CDC vaccine distribution plan made it evident 
that its system of application and benefits aspect were the prime drivers of the plan.  
However, the question of the volume of available vaccine was not directly addressed, and 
one is left to presume that the distribution will continue through the prioritized list and 
cease at whatever point the available vaccine supply is expended.  In the event there was 
only enough vaccine to inoculate the health and emergency workers, then there would be 
no benefit in doing so, inasmuch as the reason for their being inoculated (to maintain 
their health to treat others) would become a moot point if there were no vaccine 
remaining to treat the rest of the population.  Thus, immediately one is presented with an 
example of how the observations of the philosopher can assist the “agent”, as Kamm 
frequently referred to a practitioner, and for the purposes of the thesis, the author will use 
to also mean the homeland security decision maker, in making real-world decisions 
through the introduction of a valid, additional issue (the volume of vaccine) that may 
have not been previously considered. Kamm provided further examples as follows: 
...someone who does not have and will not have any [vaccine] has greater 
need for [vaccine] than someone who has and will have many 
[vaccines]… Someone who has had many [vaccines] in the past, though 
she now has none and will have none in the future, does not necessarily 
have a greater need for [vaccine] than someone who has and will have 
some but not as many [vaccines] in the future (other things equal between 
them).  It seems reasonable to think that past access to resources should 
affect our decision about neediness…. It is possible that not all differences 
in need are morally relevant.  For example, someone who has had one 
[vaccination] is slightly less needy of [vaccination] than someone who has 
had none, for he can already [have some immunity]. (Kamm 2007, p. 265) 
She also brought up other aspects that the policy did not discuss such as 
“urgency:” 
It might be thought that how we allocate scarce resource should depend on 
urgency.... But if a resource is truly scarce, a less urgent person will never 
be helped.  So, why should it matter that he could wait to be helped by 
contrast to the more urgent individual?  Where life is at stake, being able 
to wait for treatment means that one will get more life than someone else 
will, even without our help....  The less urgent person can wind up just as 
deprived if not helped as the more urgent person. (Kamm, 2007, p. 267)  
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Kamm also addressed the aspect of “responsibility” as follows: 
What if some are causally and morally responsible for being in need or for 
the fact that they will have a poor outcome if given resources?  Typically, 
one thinks of such cases as involving some moral defect: for example, 
failure to take precautions, or self-indulgence. (Kamm, 2007, p. 267) 
It is clear from these few examples and multiple others she makes available that the 
philosopher introduces a number of decision-making considerations and dynamics that 
may have been examined in developing the vaccine distribution plan. However, since 
complete details are not available about the vaccine distribution planning process, the 
reader must view the plan as presented and combine its elements with Kamm’s 
observations to imagine the type of complex environment that could result in a 
Considered Risk Casualty situation whether or not it was considered in the evolution of 
the plan. The above are not negative commentaries, but observations about various 
influences. Indeed, there are multiple endorsements of the plan as it is currently 
constituted.  The distribution plan, once the health and emergency workers needs are 
addressed, went on to identify other individuals with high risk and high consequences to 
disease as the next most important recipients of the vaccine. Kamm recognized the 
appropriateness of this decision through use of the following generic observation: 
Even if someone is in greater need of [vaccine] he may not be as [healthy] 
and hence there may not be a very great increase in his abilities per unit of 
resources.  By contrast, someone who does not have as great a need may 
produce a much bigger outcome per unit of the resources. (Of course, 
these predictions are subject to error, so that they are really views about 
expected outcome ... but it could be relevant to allocation that we are more 
certain of outcomes in one group then in another, even though the latter 
has the potential to achieve better outcomes.)  Sometimes, differential 
outcomes should be relevant in allocation...  (Kamm, 2007, p. 265) 
If one presumes that  health and emergency workers are healthier than others and 
are able to perform to their professional abilities and therefore do not have “as great a 
need” as other groups mentioned in the plan, then their ability to inoculate many others 
will result in that “much bigger outcome” intended. Similarly, the differentiation of high-
risk groups for a sequence of vaccine allocation is obviously a parallel to Kamm’s 
observation about “potential to achieve better outcomes.” In this observation one sees the 
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philosopher endorsing a policy decision outside her discipline area; public health. She 
did, however, note certain cautions that must be calculated in the agent’s decision 
process. In her chapter, Equal Numbers with Different Characteristics, she noted: “The 
decision that it is better morally to produce more in some people than an absolutely 
minimal benefit in everyone may be based on the significance of indirect benefits to the 
very people who would be deprived of the resource in question.” (Kamm, 2007, p. 268)  
Kamm continued to emphasize this point further by stating: 
...sometimes (though not necessarily always), the loss of a small good 
could be morally significant when it is occurring to the neediest, especially 
if they are very much needier than those we would aid.  Hence, we must 
be aware of the mechanism by which our allocating to one-party results in 
the absence of a small benefit to another party before we can ignore the 
level of need of each party... (Kamm, 2007, p. 271) 
a. Issues 
The above appears to endorse the current distribution plan, and in fact, it 
recognizes those most at risk (neediest). It does, however, place a requirement on public 
health to ensure that those priority health and emergency workers are in fact performing 
their duties in a manner that required and permitted them to receive the vaccine first.  
Therefore the usefulness one sees in the review of the philosophers’ observations not 
only can be beneficial in the decision-making process, but, in some cases, the operational 
application of the decision can then serve to validate that same decision. At a different 
level, it is also clear that these abstract observations can have a direct relationship to 
actual homeland security issues.  
2. Issue A / Scenario 3  
(A circumstance involving decision making by authoritative individuals in  
homeland security agencies, at any level of government, to expend or not expend 
emergency personnel and resources to assist and/or rescue individuals trapped in life-
threatening situations to include the rationing of scarce resources.) 
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The above scenario is based on actual, identifiable conditions that have been 
reviewed with the philosopher’s observations from an abstract context in order to 
demonstrate the nexus that can exist between the real and the abstract.  In S3, one is 
presented a contrived scenario that is based on a full spectrum of events that emergency 
managers and practitioners are presented with on a daily basis.  These events could range 
from miners trapped in an underground tunnel to a driver caught in a burning car, to 
firemen caught in a warehouse fire, to hundreds of people trapped in a skyscraper in 
danger of collapse. 
While these descriptions may remind one of circumstances that have actually 
happened, the author presents them as generic to note the fact that an emergency manager 
in each of these cases must make a decision to use the personnel, equipment, and other 
resources that are available to go to the aid of the victims.  Recognizing, as noted in the 
introduction, that emergency service personnel (fire, police, EMS, etc.) are a valuable and 
finite resource, and the conditions of greater hazards and threats under which they are 
tasked has increased, it is manifest there are now additional considerations that can apply 
when allocating these resources.  Traditionally, the emergency manager has always been 
required to consider the safety of the emergency service personnel before committing 
them to a potentially life-threatening condition.  That requirement is still true.  However, 
in an age of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism there are additional factors that 
can be at play in these emergency situations that involve the dynamic of “intent.” It might 
be possible that the emergency workers themselves are the target of terrorists or it may be 
that the type of incident that has been created has been intentionally designed to 
overmatch the emergency response capabilities of a community.  It is also possible that 
additional, more severe, and/or more frequent or simultaneous events can befall a locality 
placing excessive demands on the finite response resources.  This change and the increase 
in the threat environment that translates into a level of increased risk for response 
personnel will of necessity add additional considerations to the emergency managers’ 
decision-making responsibilities as regards the allocation of scarce resources. Philosophy 
has provided observations and insights that can be useful in this area. 
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Is it a question of deciding between individuals here and now by persons 
who have certain professional responsibilities for the resources?  For 
example, is a [fire chief] deciding who should get [rescued] when not all 
can get [rescued]? This is a case of what I call “microallocation.”  By 
contrast, is it a question of deciding for populations in existence now or to 
come, where the decision is how much to invest so that certain resources 
will or will not be available for microallocation and the decision is to be 
made by someone who was charged with this microallocation problem?  
What factors it is permissible or obligatory to consider may vary with the 
context.” (Kamm, 2007, p. 264) 
Kamm has identified a problem described in the above scenario, in that both 
conditions she questions can be present. The fire chief clearly has a professional 
responsibility for the resources and must make a decision about who is to be rescued (a 
traditional concern) and now may be required to consider the immediate circumstance in 
comparison to future and/or other additional situations. 
First, let us look at principles for allocation where the choice affects an 
equal number of people whatever we do and all the people in any given 
non-overlapping group in competition for resources are relatively identical 
in need and outcome, but the groups differ between them in these respects.  
(For example, each group has five people, but one group’s members are 
needier than another group’s members.) 
(a) If the resources in question are divisible between groups we do not 
have to choose to give to some and not to others, for we can give everyone 
a bit.  Divisibility, however, should be constrained at least by producing 
some good outcome in each person, even if it is minimal.... Deciding not 
to divide the divisible good to the point of minimal benefits represents a 
concern for outcome in each person as an individual.  That is, even if the 
very minimal benefits in everyone when aggregated would create an 
enormous sum of benefits, this might not be as morally important as some 
individuals getting substantial changes in their lives.” (Kamm, 2007, p. 
268) 
In other words, how and where does one choose to assign the emergency 
personnel based on probable benefits or outcomes? 
The philosopher proceeds through a series of questions and conditions relative to 
allocation of resources and comes to the below noted observations titled Different 
numbers of people among others: 
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These cases suggests that we owe each individual something in addition to 
pairwise matching, namely to balance and silence them only when the 
nature of the need of the additional persons is serious enough relative to 
their own need.  This really means that we should balance and silence 
them only when the additional people on one side would themselves have 
a complaint if their need were not taken into account, given the context.  
This is one reason why I think it is misleading to describe the balancing 
argument as a tiebreaking argument (as Thomas Scanlon does), for when 
we must break a tie, our focus is on the individuals tied, not on how the 
refusal to use someone else’s need or right as a tiebreaker will wrong the 
tiebreaking individual. (Kamm, 2007, p. 274)  
Kamm credited another philosopher’s (Temkin) view on this point under the 
heading “Helping a few of the neediest greatly or many of them to a lesser degree:”  
...suppose we could [help] one person for ten years or each of ten thousand 
people for one week.  It seems clear that it would be better to do the 
former, if this is a one-time decision.  But, as Larry Temkin (2005) has 
argued, often allocation decisions are repeated (iterated) and at least some 
of the same people can be affected in multiple allocations...  (Kamm, 
2007, p. 275)  
The observation from Temkin, in turn, clarified Kamm’s view: 
...organizations are often in a position to trade-off between helping or 
burdening a few people a lot, or many people a little.  When this occurs 
such organizations must pay close attention to the nature and possibility of 
iterations.  If an organization can help a few people a lot or many people a 
little it makes a great difference whether they will face similar choices 
many times, and also whether it will be the same or different people who 
are affected each time.  If the choice-situation is rare, it may be morally 
imperative to help a few a lot.  Similarly, if the choice-situation is 
frequent, but different people will be involved each time, it may again be 
morally imperative to choose on each occasion, so as to help the few a lot, 
rather than the many a little.  But if the choice-situation is frequent enough 
and the opportunity obtains to help the same large group on each occasion, 
but it may be imperative to help the large group repeatedly, even if one is 
only helping the members of that one group a little each time.  In such a 
case one must look at the combined effects of one’s actions as a complete 
set, as in fact one would be helping a large group of people a lot, over 
time. (Temkin, 2005, p. 225) 
Kamm’s reference to Temkin is particularly pertinent, as is Temkin’s quote, to the 
emergency managers’ decision process.  While the original reference is to competing 
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groups of potential victims and it would be an applicable dynamic if it were that situation, 
however, the seriousness of the consideration increases if the one of the groups in 
apparent danger were the rescue personnel themselves.  If there are many “iterations,” or 
repeated use of these finite resources (“few people”), then this would seem to suggest that 
the rescue personnel would receive the benefit of safety over that of the victim more 
often inasmuch as the victim can constantly change according to the type of attack; 
whereas the responders are the same group that is always present.  Conversely, if the 
number of victims is anticipated to be continuously less than the amount of rescue 
resources available, then the status of whom they (“few people”) are can change unless 
one aggregates the number of victims over time. It is also clear that the number of 
“iterations” is not defined, and what may be a small number of incidents in a large 
community might be viewed as an overwhelming series of events in a small one.  
Regardless, the discussions and observations of philosophers concerning the issue of 
allocation of resources has a manifest utility in increasing the awareness of  homeland 
security and emergency managers in their decisions involving Considered Risk 
Casualties. 
a. Issues 
For the homeland security decision maker, as seen in the above, the 
amount of resources available has significant implications to a wide range of operational 
issues.  Indeed, it is the limitation of resources that is the very reason for the existence of 
a prioritized vaccine distribution planned for pandemics.  Similarly, in crisis situations in 
homeland security, the manager may be required to use prioritization to mitigate the 
impact of limited response capabilities.  The resource distribution decision can be 
influenced by the urgency of the need, which can be partially addressed by the traditional 
emergency response methodology of “triage,” but that demonstrated example of victim 
need will not always be the dictating factor.  In a terrorism and/or pandemic environment 
the resource distribution decision must be tempered by the amount of risk that exists for 
homeland security personnel themselves.  Also, the possibility for large numbers of  
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additional victims in such environments also places the burden on the decision maker to 
maintain sufficient resources in reserve to address other potential responsibilities, current 
ongoing conditions, and future expectations. 
C. PHILOSOPHY AND THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
1. Issue B / Scenario 3  
(A circumstance involving decision making by authoritative individuals in  
homeland security agencies, at any level of government, to expend or not expend 
emergency personnel and resources to assist and/or rescue individuals trapped in life-
threatening situations verses the duty to rescue them.) 
The process of “rescue” is at the heart of the issue of Considered Risk Casualties. 
It is also one of the most complex of decisions in homeland security since there are so 
many factors that influence the decision.  The status of the threat, the level of risk, the 
number of people to be rescued, the number of available rescuers, the amount and type of 
equipment available, the type of environment, the amount of time that has passed, the 
time of day, the age of the victims, the expertise and professional status of the rescuers, 
etc. are just a small sampling of the dynamics that can be involved in one of these 
decision situations.  Some of these issues will surface again later in this thesis, but an 
additional one (out of many) that we could choose to speak about, and that arises 
frequently for the emergency services, is one that Kamm has chosen to provide views 
about, that of distance.  In this case distance means the proximity of the rescuer to the 
victim(s). She started with an explanation of the Standard View, “The Standard View 
holds that this is the problem of whether we have a stronger duty to aid strangers who are 
physically near to us just because they are physically near than we have to aid strangers 
who are not physically near ...  all other things being equal.” (Kamm F. M., 2000, p. 655)  
She immediately started to notice additional factors that the Standard View failed 
to observe and she thereby recognized the above mentioned complexity issue: 
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...if I can help more strangers at a distance or fewer who were near, the 
difference in numbers might be a reason to help the group of distant 
people. If the distant people are members of my own community, and the 
near people are not, I may have a stronger duty to aid the distant.  
Furthermore, to say that distance matters is not to say that we need do 
nothing to help distant strangers; nor is it to say that we must do 
everything to help strangers who are near.  There may be an upper limit on 
how much we must do to aid strangers....  
I maintain that the Standard View is not an accurate description of the 
[problem] and that the Standard Claim – if distance matters morally, we 
have a stronger duty to aid a near stranger than a far stranger, given their 
equal need – it is also not correct. (Kamm, 2000, p. 655)  
While she may not have agreed, she did start to surface those additional 
complexities such as: “strangers” verses “own community,” and a question of the “upper 
limit.” The term “own community” can apply to many levels of descending rings of 
association from national to state and local, to local hospital staff, fire department, or fire 
company. Clearly, “upper limit” is an arbitrary point that strikes a balance between 
available resources (and the possible wider responsibilities requiring the use of those 
resources) and the size/value of the immediate objective as compared to the commitment. 
These are serious and highly consequential considerations for homeland security 
professionals and for the public in general.  
She provided additional considerations with the following: “We must distinguish 
the possible moral importance of absolute proximity (nearness) from relative proximity 
and from just any difference in distance. We must also give an operational definition of 
proximity. (Kamm, 2000, p. 2)  
She continued with this theme: 
In the [near] case we may be assured that our efforts will be efficacious; in 
the [far] case, perhaps we cannot be sure that our efforts will pay off...  
...it is the point of some contexts to make distance a morally irrelevant 
feature.  So if we are government officials who must aid citizens, the fact 
that one citizen is near and another is far is irrelevant.  The role of 
government officials and the status of citizens are intended to make some 
other sorts of considerations (e.g., distance) morally irrelevant. (Kamm, 
2000, p. 7) 
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In this one recognizes additional complications being suggested for the 
government decision maker, including expected outcomes, and the mandated duty of 
emergency workers. It should also be remembered that these issues are not independent 
of each other but are highly interrelated in such a crisis situation, which she began to 
describe with the following observation: 
Similarly, we may see the difference that distance can make only as we 
vary the size of the cost required to provide equal aid in a near and a far 
case, or as we vary the seriousness to an individual of not being aided.  It 
may be that high costs must be born in the near cases but not in far 
cases….It may be that even less serious problems must be taken care of in 
near cases but not in far ones. (Kamm, 2000, p. 8)  
Kamm’s reference to the “size of the cost required” is a major consideration in 
these types of events.  While on the surface cost may in fact be a monetary issue, it is also 
legitimate to consider the cost as lives, injuries, and the loss of equipment and resources 
(as a descending level of concerns) for those rescuers who would be dispatched to assist 
the citizens.  Obviously those same factors would need to be considered, as she noted in 
her reference to “the seriousness to an individual of not being aided.”  The judgment 
concerning seriousness and its relative levels, which are described by Kamm as “less 
serious problems,” points directly to the process of on-scene triage and the timely 
transmission of that estimation to the decision maker as a pivotal part of a homeland 
security manager's consideration: 
It is not just equal contexts that is important, but different equal contexts.  
We could also vary the probability of success of the aid equally in both 
cases to see, for example, whether we intuitively believe that we are 
obligated to aid in the Near Case but not in the Far Case when the 
probability of success is low in both.  We could see whether we think we 
must do as much to make us able to help those who are far as we must do 
to make us able to help those who are near... (...but we should also make 
ourselves be able to help) (Kamm, 2000, p. 8) 
This observation identified a specific Considered Risk Casualty condition, i.e., 
“when the probability of success is low in both.”  This described a choice being made 
between two separate cases that will in all probability leave one group to their fate, while 
bringing benefit to the other as result of a conscious decision. This also suggested that 
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“be able to help” would mean that the emergency services prepare themselves with all the 
required personnel training and equipment necessary to do their tasks. It is interesting to 
note that the principal discussed here would also be applicable in the public health venue 
with regards the production of vaccine and the existence of a hierarchy of recipients. 
Kamm’s most pertinent observations for the emergency services when faced with 
simultaneous or repetitive attacks by terrorists were addressed in what she observed as 
part of a discussion about “A Succession of Cases.” 
Then if we aided in one case, what reasons could we give for not-aiding in 
the next case, and then the one after?  But the aggregation of all the aid 
would consume much of our life.  We are not required to give up so much 
in order to aid, it might be said.  So perhaps, it might be said, we are not 
required to aid in any of these cases.  (In real-life cases, aid to those who 
are far (at least from affluent countries) may involve issues of basic 
economic justice that should be societal and institutional concerns.  This is 
an additional factor, besides, aggregation, that may be held to account for 
our refusal to aid in even one case.) (Kamm, 2000, p. 11) 
In this one sees that while on the one hand it suggests that if there are in one 
jurisdiction sufficient personnel and resources as compared to another jurisdiction which 
may not have sufficient numbers of them, one is obliged to give assistance while that 
other jurisdiction, with a similar circumstance but without the resources, is not obliged to 
act as the first one is. It does, however, clearly present the possibility that regardless of 
capability, and depending upon the “aggregation” of the demands, that the emergency 
services may not be required to respond at all. While this is not currently a condition that 
the emergency services would probably honor (and would be directly contrary to their 
ethos and traditions), Kamm here introduced that as a new factor in the response 
calculation for the emergency manager to consider.  She defined the issue further as 
follows: 
Even if there is no distinction between the cases taken individually, the 
cumulative effort or cost is different in aiding one versus many.  Even if 
there is no magic cutoff point such that the difference between aiding ten 
and aiding eleven, for example, will involve making more of a total effort 
than is required, we can set an arbitrary cutoff so as to aid some but not to 
go on aiding when the aggregate total will clearly be more than required. 
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Furthermore, it is not true that the problem of aggregation only arises 
where there are potentially many cases needing aid.  We can imagine one 
near accident case that would require many small bits of aid over time, so 
that we would start off giving a certain amount but, as time went on, more 
and more would be required to make the rescue a success. We could in 
this case also set an arbitrary cutoff point so that we do not wind up doing 
more than we are required to do through the inability to say why, at any 
point, one small additional bit of aid should make any difference.  If we 
can stop the aggregation in this way in one near case, we could stop it 
where the potential for providing more aid than is required arises through 
many cases.  Hence, the threat of future obligation need not be a reason for 
deciding how we act in the first case at the beginning of the potential 
series. (Kamm, 2000, p. 11)  
It must be understood and what is being discussed in these observations is not the 
abandoning of the victims, but rather the amount of assistance being applied to the rescue 
effort to include equipment.  But what about the issue of distance previously discussed 
when added to the amount of resources being applied?  Again, Kamm addressed that 
point: 
The question in this case is whether, intuitively, if I am not totally 
efficacious with what is near, I have an obligation, in virtue of being near 
the victim, to do what I can to activate the tools of rescue that are still far.  
If I am near the victim with my [valuable rescue tool], which is also near 
to me, and its destruction would save someone’s life, intuitively I have to 
destroy it.  But if I am near the victim, do I have to...  transport my far 
[valuable rescue tool] for destruction if this is necessary? Intuitively, I do 
not think so” (Kamm, 2000, p. 18) 
Thus the rescuer is required to expend the means immediately available, but the 
calling in of additional resources is not the same type of decision. 
At this juncture, Kamm chose to introduce another factor concerning the 
relationship of the victim to the rescuer, that of “salience.” With this, the philosopher 
introduced what may be the most important factor in Considered Risk Casualty 
circumstances, which is what the decision maker knows about the conditions of those 




decision, “The salience of need refers not only to the obviousness and inescapability of 
noticing need, but also to the continuing imposition of this knowledge on us.” (Kamm, 
2000, p. 20) 
It is relatively simple to accept that distance, resources, salience, etc. are all 
legitimate factors in a rescue effort, but the relationship between and among them and 
how that might affect the decision-making process is an area that seeks guidance. Kamm 
addressed that thusly: 
A sign that I intuitively believe that it is nearness that obligates me to help 
is that once I am near someone who needs help, I do not think I am 
permitted to move myself from him to a greater distance merely in order 
to avoid being near.  Contrast this with my sense that I am permitted to 
change the salience ...  of need, if no other factor obligates me to provide 
aid.  If I intuitively thought that such salience obligated I would think that 
I am not permitted to change it to avoid being obligated, as I believe that I 
am not permitted to change nearness, once it is in place, to farness merely 
in order to avoid being obligated. (Kamm, 2000, p. 23) 
This presents an interesting situation for the rescuer in that on the surface it 
appears that once one is in proximity to a victim; the rescuer is required to stay with that 
individual(s) but that the salience or importance of the victim is a variable.  Presumably 
since the victim is in need of rescue and “trapped,” the question of distance is entirely 
under the control of the rescuer.  This begs the question, who controls the salience?  For 
example, if during the rescue of one individual, ten are discovered elsewhere, which 
group is more important?  Do their individual conditions translate to salience, or can the 
rescuer maintain a presence and resources with the single victim while dispatching 
greater resources to the larger group as recognition of their condition being more salient? 
Kamm noted the following. 
Obligations do, at least intuitively, seem to vary with the near and non-
near in some cases; near things should be salient if this aids us in meeting 
the obligation that nearness generates.  The obligation can be avoided by 
staying far rather than being near, but it cannot be limited merely by 
reasoning based on the mutual self interest of the agent and in the stranger. 
At least, I claim, this is the report of our intuitive judgments. (Kamm, 
2000, p. 25)  
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While one would be hard pressed to imagine emergency service personnel 
intentionally avoiding gaining proximity to a victim solely to avoid providing assistance, 
there could be circumstances under which such proximity might be delayed, such as site 
contamination, barriers that must be overcome, inadequate equipment, etc., but the 
introduction of self interest is an important consideration.  Contamination would certainly 
be a matter of self-interest, as would approaching suspected suicide bombers, deranged 
individuals, or those who have positioned themselves in a way to intentionally threaten 
emergency personnel.  Inasmuch as what is being discussed are “victims”, these 
circumstances of approach should be substantially different; however, the issue of self-
interest is a valid one. 
In general, it may be that, at least intuitively, costs that (roughly) are 
upfront to helping someone can defeat obligations, even when the same 
costs as further effects cannot. If this were true, then we would expect 
only upfront costs to defeat an obligation to the distant more easily than 
they would defeat an obligation to the near. Why, it may be asked, is the 
upfront/downstream distinction morally significant, if the outcome in 
terms of harm to the agent and the victim would be the same? It represents 
the difference between what an agent must do and what he will suffer as a 
result of what he will do.  If the distinction matters, presumably it has 
something to do with how people should be treated, both victim and agent, 
in bringing about an outcome.  One sort of treatment (not paying upfront) 
is not disrespectful of the victim; another sort of treatment (not doing what 
is easily done because of downstream payment to come) is disrespectful of 
the victim...  
...its flipside is that requiring that an agent to do something is disrespectful 
of the agent, but requiring that he ultimately pay downstream is not. 
(Kamm, 2000, p. 28)  
If injury and death is a “cost” to the rescuer, then it is clear from the above that 
that situation supersedes obligation, at least until such time as the risk to the rescuer 
changes to an acceptable level.  This also sets up a consideration over when the “cost” is 
incurred.  A homeland security manager is being advised here that committing rescuers to 
a situation wherein it is recognized “upfront” that they will suffer injuries and death will 
generate one type of decision, but the likelihood of that happening “downstream” may 
produce a completely different type of decision.  Clearly, there are numerous other 
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factors such as time, a variable level of threat, amount of other responsibilities, etc. that 
would be a factor in this thought process.  Another issue may well be the nature of the 
victim; “The strength of the duty may vary with social membership – stronger to one’s 
own society, weaker to other societies (other things being equal) – even if it does not vary 
with distance, as the individual’s duty rescue seems to” (Kamm, 2000, p. 31).  
This significantly sets up a hierarchy of obligation, and raises the possibility that 
rescuing and/or securing the emergency personnel as part of an “own society,” changes 
the duty to rescue.  The consequence of this thought has great significance for the 
homeland security emergency manager in making Considered at Risk Casualty decisions 
as will follow: 
Having performed a strenuous stringent duty can make it permissible to 
refuse to do a strenuous supererogatory act or a less stringent duty, if what 
was involved in the stringent duty depleted the resources also needed for 
those other acts.... Can having performed one strenuous duty of one type 
relieve one from performing another of the same type, for example, saving 
the next person [trapped]?  Only if there is a limit to the costs one must 
incur to perform such duties.  Hence it is not merely that one has aided in 
the past that is relevant to future action.  Whether one’s aid was 
supererogatory, whether it was a different type of dutiful act, and how 
costly it was can affect what one must do in the future. (Kamm, 2000, p. 
32)  
a. Issues 
Thus the reader is informed about the aggregate consequence of distance 
and other factors with regards to the duty to rescue. If the ability to reach a victim is a 
factor of distance, then the previous issue of resources can have a direct effect on 
minimizing that, but the reader is also told about the volume of the demand for services 
and/or those other resources being a combined decision-making factor.   The agent is also 
provided with the concept of there being a limitation on the services rescuers are required 
to provide due to costs, the potential outcomes, or the burden of additional 
responsibilities. There are unforgettable examples of the “costs” to emergency service 
personnel that occurred on September 11, 2001 which, according to the above 
observations by Kamm indicated that subsequent circumstances that present risks of 
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similar possibilities for rescue personnel would permit a decision to preclude their use at 
all.  However, that would contravene the very reason for the existence of emergency 
services and such a decision, while worthy of consideration in extreme matters, would 
most probably not be entertained in situations of substantial but lesser risk.  It is entirely 
possible, though; that a form of modified response that reflects the risk to the responders 
could be considered for homeland security personnel that would concede the cause for 
such a change and still be acceptable to the public as a whole. 
This would naturally mean that civilians and the actual victims, under 
certain circumstances, would need to rely on their own resources to an extent in times of 
difficulty. While a changed response pattern in New York City and the Washington, D.C. 
areas might be understandable to the public, it is less clear that other locations around the 
country would be as willing to accept such a concept.  What the philosopher failed to 
define is if the “loss” suffered in past experience can inform a present decision. In short, 
when affecting current levels of performance or commitment, must it be a direct and 
personal experience, or can the losses on September 11, 2001 be an object lesson for the 
entire country? This author suspects it is the latter rather than the former.  This becomes 
not only a matter of “salience” or importance of those to be rescued, but also now 
includes the importance of the rescue personnel themselves. 
Thus far in this chapter it has become manifest that the philosophers have 
provided a plethora of examples and analysis that can have utility outside their discipline.  
Through a series of increasingly complex additions to her scenarios, Kamm has 
unequivocally demonstrated that just in the area of the “Duty to Rescue” there are useful 
examples ranging from the rescuers proximity to a victim to the different responsibilities 
of responding to the needs of a fellow emergency worker as compared to the average 
citizen, to foregoing the duty to rescue at all, based on past personal experiences and 
possibly those of others.  These are significant and profound lessons that can only serve 
to benefit homeland security decision makers in a full range of high-risk situations, but 
particularly in those that involve Considered Risky Casualty conditions. 
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D. PHILOSOPHY ON “KILLING” AND “LETTING DIE.” 
1. Issue C / Scenario 2  
(The creation by public health agencies of a prioritized list of vaccine recipients 
in the event of a pandemic disease, and the distinction between “killing” and “letting 
die.”) 
A previous section examined the issue of “distance” in the decision to commit 
personnel and resources to rescue trapped victims.  In the course of that discussion it 
became obvious that there are multiple other issues that call out for attention before a 
homeland security official can make an informed decision in such a situation.  All of 
these scenarios being examined have the potential for resulting in Considered Risk 
Casualties which makes them daunting decisions, but for the sake of this thesis the author 
will presume that death will occur for a certain number of individuals or victims who find 
themselves in these situations. Since it can be said that as on September 11, 2001 
thousands of people were “killed;” it is reasonable to ask if there is a difference between 
dying at the hands of terrorists and dying as a result of a decision to not provide rescue in 
terrorist incidents or at some catastrophic natural hazard.  In short, the difference between 
“killing” and “letting die” in a homeland security context must be discussed. 
Death can ensue from a number of direct actions such as bombing of military 
installations (the intended killing of an enemy) located in a civilian neighborhood (the 
unintentional death of non-combatants), but it can also occur as a result of the opposite 
circumstance, i.e., taking no action (letting die). Along this spectrum of possibilities the 
philosopher presented a number of opportunities for introducing pertinent questions 
including several about the difference between “killing” and “letting die.” While there is 
no suggestion that the public health policy about the distribution of vaccines in any way 
equates to “killing,” it does suggest, of necessity, the examination of how philosophers 
view “letting die:” 
 
 81
It seems to matter how we die, not simply that we do ... there are strong 
constraints, for example, against killing, that limit our right to bring about 
the greater good, constraints by which we may be required to abide even at 
great personal cost.” (Kamm, 1993, p. 17)  
This suggests that an agent’s decision making that may lead to loss of life, and the 
agent needs to be cognizant of what constitutes “killing” before the agent can conclude 
that an action is appropriate to support a “greater good.” It also suggests that “killing” is a 
consequence of some action created by the agent and that issues surrounding it can be 
significant. Kamm described certain elements of the difference by noting: 
The victim in a letting-die case ...  need not have been killed either by the 
non-saver or by any other person. He could die accidentally or of natural 
causes. The victim in a killing case... is killed. This difference... has the 
following significance: Suppose the letting-die case involves a natural or 
accidental death.  Then it is possible that a moral difference between my 
killing and my letting die may result from the difference between a 
person’s dying a natural rather than a person-caused death, not from a 
difference between my letting him die and my killing him. (Kamm, 1993, 
p. 22)  
The difference between these two outcomes (killing and letting-die), as can be 
noted from the above, has a great deal to do with both action and intent on the part of the 
agent, but it is also significantly impacted by the type of relationship that exists between 
the agent and the victim: 
Once someone else already stands in a saving relationship with [a victim], 
or [the victim] is independent of my assistance and dependent on no one 
else, my interference takes from him something he already has.  It 
prevents his having it and continuing into the future as it otherwise would.  
When I prevent someone from initiating aid to him I do not, in the same 
way, prevent the continuation of some state that already existed and would 
continue in the future.  It is in the former, not the latter, type of case that 
we speak of killing. (Kamm, 1993, p. 26)  
It is evident from this statement that the establishment of a hierarchy of vaccine 
distribution, which, if adhered to by health-care workers is not the equivalent of “prevent 
someone from initiating aid” and is not therefore a “killing,” but would come under the 
latter, i.e., “letting-die.” There is an obvious variation though that can easily be imagined 
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that surrounds the pivotal point of initiating aid and that would be one of stopping aid that 
is already underway.  Nowhere in the vaccine distribution plan is there a discussion of 
stopping the administration of vaccines, but the distinction between the two events is 
worthy of a comment since it is the type of understandings that can help inform homeland 
security personnel in a wider range of Considered Risk Casualty circumstances. 
The view being proposed here about a killing is that, in a killing, the 
Agent’s action is either (i) the original cause of death, whether the victim 
is dependent or independent of him, or (ii) the removal of a defense from 
someone independent of him (this includes independent of his defenses).  
The view being proposed about letting die is that, in letting die, the agent’s 
action is (i) not the original cause of death, but maybe (ii) the removal of a 
defense the Agent provides from one dependent on him...  (Kamm, 1993, 
p. 30) 
a. Issues  
In this example, the vaccine distribution plan is neither the “original cause 
of death,” (the disease itself would be the cause), nor is a “defense,” (the vaccine) being 
removed since it has never been issued.  The difference between “killing” and “letting 
die” not only involves the type of “intent” issues previously reviewed in theology, but 
also the relationship that is established between the rescuer and the victim. Again, there 
appears to be a matrix of values under consideration here, but that of “intent” remains 
pivotal. It is recognized that many of these philosophical observations are subtle and 
nuanced; however, the clarity of the observation is not the goal of this chapter.  Rather, 
the purpose is to make recognition of the fact that this discipline has a depth of 




2. Issue C / Scenario 3  
(A circumstance involving decision making by authoritative individuals in  
homeland security agencies, at any level of government, to expend or not expend 
emergency personnel and resources to assist and/or rescue individuals trapped in life-
threatening situations verses. the difference between “killing” and “letting die.”) 
As might be expected, this is a topic fraught with debate, nuances, and definitions. 
Kamm again addresses the research on this topic and the “Conceptions of Moral 
Equivalence” that lie at the core of the difference between the two situations: 
...what I believe is the implicit traditional view about how killing and 
letting die can differ morally per se.  That implicit traditional view is that 
killing and letting die differ morally only if, other things equal between 
them, one of the terms has definitional properties that have moral 
significance (sometimes or always) and those properties are never present 
in an instance of the other term.  (The obvious factor here is creating an 
original cause of death, which is definitional true of killing.) (Kamm, 
1993, p. 33)  
Similar to what earlier discussions of PDE, where the pivotal issue was one of 
intent, Kamm infused the reader with the realization that in this type of instance, the 
pivotal issue is that of causality, “An example is when someone removes the asbestos 
cover surrounding a person, so that an approaching fire can consume him.  A killer acts to 
alter a causal chain; a non-saver does not.” (Kamm, 1993, p. 22)  
She further refined it with the following observations: 
The victim in a case of letting die was already facing a cause of death 
independent of any that the non-saver produces....In contrast, when a 
person kills in standard cases by producing an original cause, his victim 
does not face a cause of death produced independently of the killer...  
Notice that losing only life he would have had if the agent had aided is not 
the same as losing life he would have had only if the agent had aided.  The 
former is consistent with several people being able to aid but refusing to 
do so; the latter is not.  A killer may introduce an original cause to 
someone who is (causally) independent of him, and if death is bad for the 
person, he introduces an original threat to a person who is independent of 
him. (Kamm, 1993, p. 23) 
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What Kamm pointed out here is that the threat and/or the cause of death is 
directly introduced by a killer, whereas if any individual who was already facing a cause 
of death, (for example, an imminent building collapse) and another individual chooses to 
be a “non-saver,” then that individual is not a killer since he did not introduce the cause 
of death: 
In letting-die cases one refuses to make efforts that would provide life to 
someone already under threat of death.  Efforts made to avoid killing in 
standard cases are not efforts that would provide someone already under 
threat of death with continued life.  Hence the functions of the efforts 
refused by the non-saver and by the killer are different. (Kamm, 1993, p. 
24)  
The “refuses to make efforts” statement can be construed as a description of what 
was raised as a possibility in the previous section about deciding not to respond to 
trapped victims and is specifically described as a “letting-die” situation. Having 
established that point, Kamm went on to provide its properties: 
...the following properties...  are conceptual components of letting die: 
...Letting die does not itself create an original cause or an original threat of 
death. 
...The victim of letting die faces a cause of death independent of any the 
nonsaver produces in virtue of non-saving. 
...The victim loses only life he would have had via the agent. 
...Efforts made by the agent could have provided the victim with continued 
life. 
...The non-saver exercises control over what is his.”  
(Kamm, 1993, p. 31) 
This is not suggesting that individuals involved in homeland security decision 
making are ever involved in situations of “killing” since that would involve the direct 
introduction of a cause of death to the victim.  Given the fact that the very nature of this 
scenario (and the others) that an incident capable of causing death has already occurred 
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demonstrates that emergency and rescue personnel are responding, or for that matter are 
involved at all, exactly because there is a life threatening circumstance already present.  
That is to say, that the victim, for all intents and purposes, is already in a situation where 
he can die unless the rescuer comes to his aid.  Once that circumstance is satisfied, absent 
the rescuer actually introducing a new cause of death, the decision to not give aid or a 
decision to remove the aid that is under the control of the rescuer and thereby permitting 
the original cause of death to continue is not a killing but rather letting die. 
a. Issues 
While in this section philosophy has provided a number of variables to 
consider, in essence, the discussion has revolved around the question of “intent” in 
determining whether a circumstance is one of “killing” or “letting die.” It is not 
foreseeable that a homeland security practitioner would be faced with a decision to “kill,” 
but there are numerous circumstances where there may be an unavoidable condition that 
results in people being permitted to die.  By prominently discussing the factor of “intent,” 
the decision maker can be insulated from the follow-on concerns that generally are 
contained in the thoughtful questions, “Did I do the right thing, and did I do all I could 
have done?” In and of itself, that makes this review useful. 
There is no need at this juncture to revisit the issues surrounding duty, 
resources, and amount of effort that distinguish the homeland security rescuer from the 
average citizen as regards that status’s influence on decision making, since it has been 
discussed previously and will be reviewed again.  However, it is useful to note that once 
these decisions are made, the types of considerations iterated in this section can serve as a 
method of evaluating the validity of that decision. 
E. PHILOSOPHY AND HARMING SOME, SAVING OTHERS 
1. Issue D / Scenario 1  
(Shooting down a hijacked commercial airliner that is being used as a weapon 
by terrorists to kill many others verses harming some to save others.) 
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...if actively causing a death that is not intended, but merely foreseen to be 
a side affect of the means used to save [others] is not permissible, it would 
follow that just passing by a dying person on the way to saving [others] 
should also be impermissible.  But this makes it impossible ever to save 
some rather than others in situations where we cannot save everyone...  
The explanation I propose to account for the various permissible and 
impermissible killings we have so far considered (and others as well) is 
based on... the Principle of (Im)Permissible Harm (PI/PH):..  
It is permissible to cause harm to some in the course of achieving the 
greater good of saving a greater number of others from comparable harm, 
if events which produced the greater good are not more intimately causally 
related to the production of harm than they are to the production of the 
greater good (or put another way, if events which produced the greater 
good are at least as intimately causally related to the production of the 
greater good as they are to the production of lesser harm.) (Kamm F. M., 
1989, p. 232) 
The corollary to PDE in the above comments is unmistakable in that it shows the 
harming (or death) of others has legitimacy in relationship to a greater good. The PI/PH 
also inherits that concept but adds an additional dynamic for the homeland security 
decision maker to consider, that of the relative intimacy of the causative factor as a 
balance between the intended good and the amount of harm produced. Clearly, the 
removal of the threat presented by the use of a commercial aircraft as a weapon in a 
heavily populated environment must be seen as a “greater good” for the large number of 
those who would have died in such an attack, in comparison to the “lesser harm” that 
would befall the smaller number of people on board the plane. 
Kamm addressed this point directly in the following:  
The PI/PH allows us to introduce new threats as we remove the old ones - 
a homeostasis of threats - so long as the events which produced the greater 
good are no more intimately causally related to the lesser harm that the 
new threat produces than they are to the greater good.  For example, an 
event which removes a direct threat to the greater number may cause a 
comparable direct threat to the lesser number, but may not itself be the 
direct threat. (Kamm, 1989, pp. 232, 233)  
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Thus one can see that the agent is not only permitted to direct situations that result 
in Considered Risk Casualties, but may also introduce new factors that make that 
outcome inevitable, rather than merely being passive to the external conditions that 
created the initial situation.  It denotes that the agent has significant latitude in his 
considerations. It is noted, however, that there are limits on that latitude, as in the need to 
judge the relationship of the intimate causality to the greater good and the lesser harm, 
but even in that, the philosopher provided options: 
The PI/PH also permits us to do something to produce a greater good 
when the greater good itself will produce a lesser harm.  In such a case, 
the greater good causes the lesser harm, so there is no need to worry about 
a cause of the greater good being more intimately related to the harm than 
to the good.  When the lesser harm is a side effect of the greater good, the 
greater good does not occur by way of the lesser harm to others, according 
to the analysis of ‘by’ provided by the PI/PH. In these cases what we do, -- 
or any other event that helps to cause the greater good – is more directly 
related to the greater good than to the harm, since the greater good either 
is the direct cause or indirect cause of the lesser harm. (Kamm, 1989, p. 
235)  
With this observation, one can envision a situation wherein had the ultimate target 
been known and evacuated by homeland security officials, thereby causing the terrorists 
to destroy the plane and its passengers without achieving the killing they intended or 
adding further benefit to their cause, it would likewise have been an alternative 
acceptable outcome, in short, removing the value of the terrorist’s target 
Similarly, the actual events onboard the hijacked aircraft that morning, which 
were initiated by the passengers rather than an external agent, is also addressed by Kamm 
as an observation in one of her philosophically contrived scenarios. 
So long as what produces the causally useful lesser harm is either the first greater 
good itself, or a means to this greater good which is at least as intimately related 
to the greater good as to the lesser harm the fact that the lesser harm is causally 
necessary to the maintenance of the greater good is not a reason against acting. 
(Kamm, 1989, p. 241) 
This would imply that had an agent decided to contact the passengers on the plane 
(as their family and friends did)  to advise them what had happened elsewhere in the 
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country that morning and thereby instigating them to respond as they did, would also 
have been an acceptable set of circumstances.  
There is a further list of criteria that the agent can use in making the decisions 
such as described above, by Kamm’s enumerating the following: 
...components of the PI/PH, which summarize ideas of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the permissibility of causing the deaths of 
nonthreatening innocents in particular cases: 
(1)It is acceptable that greater good have lesser harm as one of its aspects 
or as its direct or indirect effect. 
(2) It is permissible that a mere means to a greater good have  
(a) lesser harm as an indirect effect, if it has greater good as a direct effect 
or as an indirect effect achieved by a causal route independent of the lesser 
harm, or  
(b) lesser harm as a direct effect, if it has greater good as a direct effect.   
(c) lesser harm as its aspect, if it has greater good as its aspect also...    
The greater good and lesser harm should branch off from a common point, 
though they need not be equidistant from the point, given that it is 
acceptable that the greater good be more intimately related to the cause 
they both share than the lesser harm is.  The PI/PH, therefore, (only) 
comes close to involving a principle of symmetry of good and harm. 
To repeat, an event that is causally involved in producing a greater good is 
permissible if it has no more (it may have less) intimate a causal 
connection to the lesser harm than it has to the greater good (where it is 
understood that something that is an aspect of an event is more intimately  
 
connected to it than something that is a direct effect, and something that is 
a direct effect is more intimately connected to it than something that is an 
indirect effect.) (Kamm, 1989, p. 242) 
While the above criteria are useful, it is important to emphasize the issue of 
symmetry of good and harm, or more correctly, the lack of symmetry.  It is not so much a 
matter of a balanced ratio between the two as much as it is an issue of intent.  This is 
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reflective of PDE although PI/PH can be seen as less restrictive:  “…we concluded that it 
was permissible to intend that the [passengers] be killed because what we did to remove 
the [plane] was not more intimately related to the lesser harm than to the greater good” 
(Kamm, 1989, p. 245). 
The key issue for the agent to consider is contained in the word “intend.”  While 
one is hard pressed to imagine a circumstance where the homeland security agent would 
“intend” any killing, the PI/PH does consider that possibility. The shooting down of this 
plane would have been a single act that caused both the greater good and the lesser harm 
and apparently cannot be differentiated as causally either/or for both of them.  Since it is 
clearly the causative factor for both, then this is then a matter of the intent of the agent, 
and on the basis of intent alone should be tolerated by both PDE and PI/PH. While the 
individual agents’ moral values would come into play in any such decision, the above at 
least provides a wide set of parameters within which the agent can operate in crisis 
situations. 
Similarly, at first glance the above criteria may cause one to think that it is 
possible to establish a distinct calculus or policy for performance in these issues, but 
Kamm corrected that notion with the following: 
It is important to see that it is the permission to kill, not any killing, that 
eliminates the right not to be killed from the moral system. If the PI/PH is 
violated many times over, this does not involve our endorsing any such 
violation; though many people may die, we do not say that it was correct 
that any of them died, which is what an endorsement would involve. 
Accordingly, the constraining effect of the PI/PH derives not from its 
resulting in fewer rights violated or from its moral consequences (it does 
not make rights come to exist as part of moral reality), but from its 
illumination of truth, leading to our understanding of, and acting in accord 
with, moral reality. (Kamm, 1989, p. 254) 
Thus, rather than searching for a defined list to assist in decision making, the 
agent is better served by taking on board the concepts contained in all the above as a 
means of being informed about the range of views available in these events and using 




In this section we see the need for the decision maker to be aware of the 
relationship between elements of greater good and lesser harm when the decision maker 
brings about those circumstances, and the importance of intent in the causative event. 
While the decision maker is permitted to introduce factors that change the dynamics of a 
situation, that individual must be mindful that when alternative factors are introduced to 
impact outcomes, it is best if one of the objectives is to reduce the level of the lesser harm 
that will be created. 
2. Issue D / Scenario 2  
(The creation by public health agencies of a prioritized list of vaccine recipients 
in the event of a pandemic disease and the permissibility of harming some to save 
others.) 
This public health issue is not exclusively confined to the matter of scarce 
vaccines.  Taking into account the original premise that this is in fact a matter of 
Considered Risk Casualties, a number of the observations about S1/D are also fully 
applicable here.  This is particularly true of the PI/PH considerations and observations 
because in both cases there is a greater good objective resulting in a lesser harm.  
However, there are certain nuances that make the situation  different that should be noted: 
“It seems that stopping a threat from reaching people does not ...  involve as intimate a 
relation to the good of their being saved as moving them to safety.” (Kamm, 1989, p. 
236) 
This observation can encompass the population as a whole and could be viewed 
as the need to consider the use of quarantine and/or vaccinating the entire population as 
an adjunct to, or a substitute for, the distribution plan.  However, that is not the condition 
of the scenario. The scenario takes the scarcity of the vaccine to be a given.  
Kamm further noted:  
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PI/PH... allows that a lesser harm to be an indirect effect of the means 
which directly produces a greater good, e.g., the [decision] which moves 
[the threat] may  
cause death by [another means].  This alternative principle, in essence, 
requires that one have a more intimate relation to the greater good than to 
the lesser evil. (Kamm, 1989, p. 249) 
In other words, this reveals that those who may die due to rationing are essentially 
having “their” share of the vaccine redistributed in order to supply the greater good, 
which as the objective of the plan, is the more “intimate relation” required by PI/PH. The 
sensitivity of this relationship is not lost on PI/PH adherents by Kamm: 
PI/PH is essentially concerned with preventing the agent from violating 
appropriate relations between moral equals, some of whom will be victims 
and others beneficiaries in the choice of who will live and who will die.  
This concern is part of a wider concern about how the qualities of being a 
person limit what it is permissible to do to victims. The PI/PH is thus what 
I would call “victim-focused,” concerned that victims be treated 
appropriately relative to beneficiaries, and simply in their own right. By 
contrast, the objections to [taking actions] which directly saves and harms, 
I believe, are founded more directly on concern for the agent.  These 
concerns are what I would call “agent-focused.”   
One way to express the agent-focused concern is to say agents must not do 
harm ... though they may sometimes bring about harm... (Kamm, 1989,  p. 
250) 
In this, Kamm introduced another aspect that the public is uninformed of by 
public-health of the rights of the individual as part of and consideration in the decision-
making process and, again, the issues of balance between the greater good and the lesser 
harm as well as its application in real circumstances. Such observations can bolster the 
experience levels of homeland security managers in times of life threatening crisis. 
a. Issues 
The above sections revealed that there is no metric that can be used in 
Considered Risk Casualty circumstances.  While it is clear that harm can come from a 
good action such as establishing a hierarchy of vaccine distribution or the terminating of 
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a terrorist threat, the dynamic of “intent” on the part of the decision maker is again a 
driving force.  Since few homeland security practitioners have the ability to end a 
terrorist threat and in natural disasters, even less, it is clear that the agent has an 
alternative through the removal of the victim and/or target among other opportunities and 
means, to reduce the impact of the harm.  This section has initiated an awareness of the 
experience based self-reliance that is required of a decision maker. 
F. PHILOSOPHY AND HARMING VERSES NOT AIDING 
1. Issue E / Scenario 2  
(The creation by public health agencies of a prioritized list of vaccine recipients 
in the event of a pandemic disease, and if it relates to the difference between harming 
verses not aiding.) 
As seen from the preceding, there are multiple dynamics and issues that can be 
elements of a decision to control the distribution of vaccine in a life-threatening situation.   
One of those questions would naturally be if the public health decision to control the 
distribution of medication is  in fact, harming some people, or is it just a matter of not 
aiding them?  
To consider the question properly as an example of influences on decision 
making, it is important to realize that public health officials are not actually declining to 
aid anyone, but are only establishing the sequential protocol through which that aid will 
be eventually provided to all.  However, the time period over which this protocol would 
naturally extend inherently suggests that some people will be put into a situation whose 
consequences could be identical to that of not being aided in fact, which could result in a 
direct harm to them although such a situation was never intended.  It is worth saying that 
it is in that area of unintended outcomes that the decision maker must give consideration.   
It is therefore beneficial to examine whether or not there is a corollary between harming 
and not aiding and/or the circumstances under which they differentiate. “...it is not 
ordinarily permissible to take from someone what he is entitled to in order to prevent a 
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loss to oneself of that to which one is entitled (For example, I cannot take someone’s 
property to compensate for a theft of my property.)” (Kamm, 1998,  p. 472). 
The distinctions for the vaccine decision maker in the above observation are that 
the distribution plan does not (a) “take from” individuals who already have the 
medication, (b) there has not been a suggestion that individuals are “entitled” to a 
vaccine, and (c) public health does not experience a “loss to oneself” because of the  
distribution plan. Nevertheless, the above quote from Kamm did start to establish some of 
the moral underpinnings and that would need to have been considered in developing a 
plan protocol. 
Should the decision maker also evaluate whether the individual who is not given a 
priority position on the distribution list is actually suffering a loss or is merely in a “no 
gain” condition?  Presumably, the individual is part of one of the sub-groups that will 
eventually receive their allocation of vaccine.  While different schools of philosophy 
propose theories about these issues, Kamm addressed them directly: 
Is [one schools’] theory’s loss-versus-no-again distinction the same as 
[another schools’] harm-versus-not-aid distinction? I believe that the two 
are not the same and that the loss-versus-no-gain distinction does not 
explain the harm-versus-not-aid distinction.  I have already noted that 
imposed loss is different from loss in that imposed no-gain is different 
from no-gain…First, the harm-versus-not-aid distinction is about what the 
agent does or doesn’t do (as well as what the victim undergoes), and the 
loss-versus-no-gain distinction is only about what the victim undergoes.  
Second, given the way [the first school] theory describes a loss; it is 
possible for one to suffer a loss as a result of someone’s not aiding.  For 
example, according to [the first school] theory, if one frames facts in a 
case so that the baseline state of someone is alive and well, then if we do 
not take action to save him from an upcoming threat (as in one of the 
Asian flu cases), there will be a loss of life…  
If [the first school] theory emphasizes that the crucial distinction is 
between suffering losses and not getting gains, it should predict that 
people would be as disturbed at our not preventing someone from loosing 
life as at our causing him a loss by killing him.  This is just what the thesis 
of the moral distinction between harming and not aiding denies.  The 
thesis claims that losses caused by an agent’s act will often violate 
negative rights and that this is morally of a different quality than failing to 
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help someone avoid what is identified as a loss.  The harming-versus-not-
aiding distinction is often present in cases in which there is a distinction 
between someone loosing what he would have continued to have [life] 
independently of our help (when we harm) and his losing what he would 
not have continued to have [life]  independently of our help. (Kamm, 
1998,  p. 473) 
It is interesting to note that the philosopher directly addresses this discussion to 
matters of public health (Asian flu cases) which is a direct scenario. As seen from the 
above, the distinction of “imposing” on the agent can mean the level of dependency of 
the individual who is ultimately the victim, and both are pertinent factors in decision 
making.  It is unknowable from the available literature about the establishment of the 
vaccine distribution plan how many, or to what extent, these factors influenced the 
establishment of the described hierarchy.  It is, however, worthy of note for the homeland 
security decision maker to realize that determining and understanding nuances contained 
in a problem may be the pivotal factors in judging if there actually is a problem for the 
decision maker or none at all.  The discipline of the philosopher which continuously 
requires nuanced issues in both determining the core of a problem and the most 
appropriate solution for it, can serve as a guide and be a critical educational experience 
for those who are charged with managing critical circumstances in real-life conditions. 
a. Issues 
In this section the reader sees a relationship with factors in the earlier 
section concerning “killing verses. letting die.”  However, what can be understood from 
this section is that there is a relationship of dependency between the rescuer and the 
victim that either commits or insulates the homeland security practitioner from taking 
certain actions. For some of those practitioners the concept that under certain 
circumstances “not aiding” is a viable consideration may be both an original and useful 
thought as opposed to that of suspending an effort after it has been started. 
G. PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES SUMMARY 
Through the above comparison of five abstract philosophical observations among 
three  homeland security type activities involving Considered Risk Casualty potential, it 
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is manifest that the abstract principles discussed have applicability across a range of  
homeland security scenarios. A summary review of the decision issues that that these 
observations can serve to inform are as follows: 
Past and current “need” for assistance and the “urgency” of that need can have 
pertinence in the decision process, but methodologies for intended outcomes must also be 
considered in decision making. In short, the decision maker has a responsibility to judge 
the current state of conditions but must also know and define the end-state desired to 
ensure that the means necessary to result in that outcome exist and are properly applied. 
The decision maker must also be mindful of the amount and type of resources that 
will be expended in a Considered Risk Casualty effort and see to it that the resources are 
being applied on a judicious and prioritized basis according to current and future 
requirements. 
Such additional factors as the distance/difficulty to reach a victim, the “costs” 
involved, and the knowledge gained through past experiences in providing assistance can 
aggregate to the point of outweighing such traditional concepts as the “duty” to act. This 
can be a significant departure from the traditions of many homeland security agencies 
and from citizen expectations. A decision to not provide aid or assistance to individuals, 
who subsequently die, does not routinely mean that the decision maker has “killed” those 
people but, rather, has permitted them to die, which is a very different circumstance 
generally pivoting around a question of the decision makers “intent” towards those 
people. 
Through the above reviews, one comes to understand that for decision makers 
there exists an important issue of their personal, moral sensibilities in these matters. 
Unfortunately, there is no formulaic solution for these solutions, but they can be largely 
based not only on the decision maker’s knowledge and integrity, but also on alternative 
choices that may be available at the time of the decision. Part of those alternatives could 
depend on the level of relationship that exists between the decision maker, the available 
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VI. CONSIDERED RISK CASUALTY INCIDENTS 
This thesis has reviewed the thoughts and observations of a number of different 
disciplines concerning the types of events that can be broadly associated with the concept 
of Considered Risk Casualties.  With the exceptions of the discussion of the CDC 
pandemic vaccine distribution plan which demonstrates that the field of bioethics can be 
directly related to a planning process, and the discussion of decision making within a 
military context, both of which have a direct connection to Considered Risk Casualties, 
the principles that have been discussed remain within the realm of academic context and 
intellectual thought. 
It is possible to add additional disciplines to those that have been reviewed and 
that are concerned regularly with life and death situations.  For example, the practice of 
medicine and the law enforcement profession both have these types of events occur on a 
daily basis.  They were not included in this review, however, due to the fact that each has 
long-standing and well-defined parameters within which their practitioners make life-
and-death decisions.  Legal requirements, administrative controls, professional standards, 
and extensive education and training all serve to define, limit, and guide the professionals 
in those two fields when making such decisions during life and death conditions.  In 
effect, such established strictures may actually diminish the range of factors considered in 
decision making through disallowing of an action or actions that may have otherwise 
been contemplated and led to a need for an original or independent decision. 
In homeland security circumstances, however, there are limitless opportunities for 
situations to arise that do not have any codified process for determining the limits of 
tolerance or permissibility for loss of life. Decision makers finding themselves in such 
circumstances, often in moments of great crisis and stress, must rely on their own 
personal resources to make decisions that will result in both professional changes, and in 
many cases, life-changing events for them personally. 
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With scant effort, it is possible to visualize how the previously presented concepts 
could have utility in a homeland security setting, particularly as regards the decision-
making process that homeland security executives at all levels of government can 
encounter in managing a wide array of crises.  The range and scale of these crises could 
vary; they could be terrorist-related, or also within the type of accidents and naturally 
occurring events that are included in the concept of “all hazards.”  They could include a 
circumstance involving a single individual caught in a burning vehicle to that of 
thousands of people engulfed in a toxic gas plume, to a naturally occurring flood or 
earthquake.  In all these events, the common denominator can be the requirement for a 
decision to be made that may result in casualties. Typically, the individuals who must 
make these decisions do not have the benefit of a practiced set of strictures, as do the 
above mentioned medical and law enforcement professions, to aid them in finding a 
solution for their immediate crisis.  It is unfortunately and frequently true that the most 
critical and seemingly chaotic moments where many life and death decisions need to be 
made are in the conditions that the first arriving emergency response personnel are 
presented with.  The personnel available at that moment are not always those in senior 
positions who have the requisite experience to address complex life and death decisions.  
It is always possible that any such event can grow and magnify to become 
increasingly more difficult to manage over time. That time however might also allow for 
more experienced individuals to arrive at the crisis and accept the burden of decision 
making. The review of three such examples follows. 
This thesis describes three chosen incidents that have been described by the 
decision makers themselves who had to address the crisis circumstance that had been 
presented to them.  While each of these scenarios has the common denominator of being 
a Considered Risk Casualty condition and requiring the necessary life and death 
decisions, they each have different dynamics associated with them.  Whether it is a matter 
of scale, type of threat, resources, time, or the myriad of other circumstances that were 
present, it is safe to say that the decisions present object lessons for other decision makers 
and for those who think about such matters in the abstract. This thesis has already 
revealed that there is a connection between abstract observations and real-life examples. 
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It is now time to discuss actual incidents of Considered Risk Casualties that have 
occurred in order to examine the decision-making process contained in those incidents. 
By continuing to tie the observations of the other disciplines to the actual operational 
requirements of  homeland security decision makers it becomes abundantly clear that 
gaining the knowledge and experience in both the other disciplines and  homeland 
security can be mutually beneficial to both. 
The three events that will be reviewed are all situations found in the fire service.  
Clearly, as noted above, there are a number of other professions that have had, and do 
have incidents requiring life and death decisions that would be worthy of review also. 
However, the absence of examples from other professions is in no way an oversight nor is 
it a slight to them. Just as in previous chapters where the differences between disciplines 
or even differences within disciplines were not presented, a similar condition exists here. 
This thesis is not about the debates within, or between particular disciplines or a 
comparison of all possibilities. The purpose of the scenarios presented here is to use them 
as demonstrative examples of the corollaries that can exist between the concepts 
contained in the other disciplines and homeland security conditions.  
What is particularly worthy of note is that none of the decision makers being 
described below had any knowledge of the existence of the principles or observations 
contained in the previous thesis sections at the time they made their decisions.  That is 
not to say that these fire service professionals were devoid of the value structures that are 
derived from the previously observed principles; far from it.  It is to say, however, that 
they had no formal education in the problems, principles, or solutions that have already 
been examined in this thesis. 
Each of the following examples will be summarized to convey the essential 
conditions that created the life-threatening situation presented, and to focus on the 
decision-making factors that needed to be considered.  It would be impossible to 
sufficiently convey and include the pressures and emotions that weighed on the 
individual decision maker being described, but unquestionably, that must be seen as a 
dynamic that needed to be addressed at the time on both a professional and a personal 
level. 
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Following each summary below and the decision factors involved, a selection of 
various categories of observations from some of the disciplines reviewed in previous 
thesis chapters will be presented in order to demonstrate their nexus to the actual crisis 
conditions encountered and the decisions that were made. Following each observation, a 
list of numbered analysis of the relationship between the observations and the conditions 
at the scene of the scenario will be included. Key words or phrases noted from the other 
disciplines will be repeated within the analysis description to highlight the direct 
corollary between the observation, the condition, and the decisions that were made. 
Through this means, the abstract observations of the other disciplines will be directly 
combined with actual occurrences and the specific decision factors that were considered 
at the time in order to demonstrate the mutually beneficial nexus between the collected 
body of knowledge in other disciplines and the Considered Risk Casualty conditions 
facing the homeland security decision makers. 
A. CONSIDERED RISK CASUALTY EVENT A 
There’s something wrong here. 
Chief Vincent Dunn8 
Vincent Dunn spent 42 years in the New York City Fire Department, retiring as a 
Deputy Chief.  He is a nationally and internationally recognized author and expert in fire 
ground tactics and operations and command and control of fires.  Among the assignments 
he had during his career was that of chief of the fire department’s division that included 
midtown Manhattan. 
Upon arriving at a significant fire in a two-story commercial building in 
Manhattan, the chief found several fire companies actively engaged in advancing on the 
fire from both the front and back of the building.  Ladders had been placed against the 
 
8 Vincent Dunn is a retired Deputy Chief of the New York City Fire Department. He is the author of 
“Command and Control of Fires and Emergencies” and is a nationally and internationally recognized 
expert in fireground tactics and operations, and building collapse. Chief Dunn was an expert witness before 
the 9/11 Commission and has provided commentary to the national media. 
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building and firefighters were climbing them to gain access onto the roof.  The chief 
noticed the presence of a large number of police officers surrounding the building 
wearing bulletproof vests, helmets, and carrying shields and shoulder weapons, and saw 
a shooting victim being removed from the building.  The chief questioned the police 
officer in charge about these circumstances and was informed that an armed individual 
had taken a number of hostages in the building and had already killed at least one of 
them.  The chief entered the building that was approximately 75 by 100 feet in size to 
determine the fire conditions and to receive reports of firefighting progress from the fire 
officers and personnel already engaged in the firefighting effort. Another chief on the 
scene told him that they were going to force open a cellar door and move a hose line into 
the fire from there.  
Upon hearing that, he had what he described as an “ah-ha moment.” He told 
himself “There’s something wrong here.” On leaving the building he again took notice of 
the police presence.  
What was wrong was that he realized his personnel were operating within a 
potentially active field of gunfire where there had already been shots fired and people 
injured. The shooting could commence again at any moment with his firefighters caught 
in the field of gunfire between the gunman and the police.  He immediately ordered fire 
department personnel to withdraw from the building and to cease internal firefighting 
operations, although he did order that hose lines continue to direct water onto the 
building from external aerial ladders at a safe distance. He further instructed that 
additional fire companies respond to the scene to be available to address any situation 
created by an expanded fire, resulting, therefore, in a more difficult rescue condition, 
should the situation with the gunman eventually be brought under control. 
Under normal conditions the saving of lives, the extinguishing of the fire, and the 
protection of property would be the chief’s primary duties and responsibilities.  This was 
a type of environment that the fire department had operated in previously during periods 
of civil unrest, and the chief recognized the similarities with his current situation. 
However, under the unusual life threatening circumstances that existed, Chief Dunn 
decided that his personnel were under a serious threat from the gunman and that the  
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saving of their lives was a primary responsibility for him. He had no ability to control, or 
even impact, the hostage situation, but by withdrawing the firefighters, he was securing 
the lives that he could save. 
The external hose streams could have some effect on the fire, but without his 
firefighters actually being inside the structure there would be no search for the hostages. 
Eventually the external hose lines extinguished the fire in what remained of the building, 
and during that time there had been no additional shooting or police action. Once the fire 
was out, the police entered the building and determined that the gunmen had committed 
suicide at some unknown point during the hostage situation. The firefighters then entered 
the building and in doing a search found seven people in the basement who had died from 
the effects of the fire (V. Dunn, personal communication, 26 June, 2008). 
Some of the factors that one can recognize in making the decision to have the 
firefighters exit the building were as follows: 
a) There existed a threat to the lives of the firefighters created by the 
potential for gunfire. 
b) The continuing fire operations could bring the firefighters in proximity to 
the gunman. 
c) The police department, which otherwise would have been able to affect a 
rescue of the hostages, was unable to do so due to the fire. 
d) There was a demonstrated threat to the firefighters presented by the 
gunman’s willingness to shoot and kill others. 
There are issues in this scenario that demonstrate the following observations or 
principles from philosophy and theology:  
1. The duty to rescue. 
2. Harming some to save others.  
3. Killing as opposed to letting die. 
4. A good action having a bad consequence (the Principle of Double Effect). 
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1. Philosophy 
a. The Duty to Rescue 
Clearly, the fire department members had commenced their rescue 
attempts prior to Chief Dunn’s arrival at the scene as evidenced by the firefighting efforts 
that were already underway.  Although the spatial distance between them and the people 
to be rescued was not great, the temporal distance established by the fire conditions and 
the threat represented by the gunman superseded the spatial distance. Due to the threat 
from the gunman, as well as the fire, it was highly doubtful that the firefighters would 
have been able to successfully reach the people in the building. The people in the 
building were part of a wider group of citizens that the fire department had a duty to 
protect, but they were not part of the fire department “community” itself. Not only was 
the equipment to rescue those in the building from the fire being utilized already, but 
additional equipment and resources were brought in from a further distance to be used in 
a subsequent rescue attempt. 
The scenario represents an unusual rescue condition in that the chief found 
a situation on arrival that clearly demonstrated that the fire personnel were also in need of 
rescue. The threat was from the condition that existed (the gunman), which would not 
have been mitigated by the distance between the firefighters and the gunman, since the 
ability of the bullets to collapse the spatial and temporal aspects of the threat placed them 
in an immediate life-threatening situation.  
Granted, under normal circumstances there would have been a duty to 
rescue the people in the building, but with the existing types of threats, gaining access to 
them in the presence of the gunman would have been a “superogatory” effort and an 
immediate or possibly “downstream cost” to the firefighters that went beyond the 
expectations or requirements of duty. 
There are multiple philosophical observations and comments that have an 
influence or direct nexus to the above summary as regards the duty to rescue: 
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a) We must distinguish the possible moral importance of absolute 
proximity (nearness) from relative proximity and from just any difference 
in distance.  We must also give an operational definition of proximity. 
(Kamm, 2000, p. 2) 
1.) The chief had a duty to commit personnel and resources to both 
fighting the fire, and if possible, to rescue the civilians trapped in the fire. In this case, 
those individuals were also hostages of a gunman, which presented a barrier greater than 
physical distance. The relationship between the duty to rescue and the proximity of the 
victim is also understood to mean that distance is not only measured by proximity but by 
the time it would take to reach a victim.  Due to the barrier presented by the gunman, the 
chief understood that there was no legitimate “proximity” evaluation to consider. 
b) But perhaps nearness is then mostly a function of the length of time it 
takes to traverse a physical distance. (Kamm, 2000, p. 15)  
2.) The conditions faced by the firefighters in the building, i.e., the threat 
from the gunman, effectively placed the time/distance factor under the gunman’s control 
or potentially under that of the police to remove the threat, but, in either event, “nearness” 
was not a factor the chief was in a position to control. 
c) In... [the firefighter’s case], we may be assured that our efforts will be 
efficacious; in the [people in the building’s case], perhaps we cannot be 
sure that our efforts will pay off. (Kamm, 2000, p. 5) 
3). The chief had the responsibility to extinguish the fire and also to 
maintain the safety of his firefighting personnel.  By ending the presence of the 
firefighters in the building, he was certain that his efforts in their behalf were  
“efficacious,” whereas continuing to commit more personnel to the building would not 
have provided that assurance due to the presence of the gunman. 
d) For when costs to reach or to aid people are high and people with 
whom one is not interdependent (“strangers”) are involved (even when all 
other factors are equal), we may have a duty to pay the costs only for those 
who are near. (Kamm, 2000, p. 9) 
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4. The chief realized that the “costs to reach or to aid people” in this event 
would have potentially included injury and possibly death to the firefighters, not only 
from the fire, but, more specifically, from the gunman. Therefore, the people 
(“strangers”) were not practically “near,” thereby dissipating the requirements of “duty.” 
e) The strength of the duty may vary with social membership – stronger to 
one’s own society, weaker to other societies (other things equal) – even if 
it does not vary with distance, as the individual’s duty of rescue seems to.) 
(Kamm, 2000, p. 31) 
5. Considering the chief’s responsibility to protect and save the lives of the 
firefighters, who were “near” in the sense that he could affect their outcome, but had no 
means to directly affect the hostages, it could therefore be expected that he would focus 
his life saving efforts on his “own society.” 
f) Even if there is no distinction between the cases taken individually, the 
cumulative effort or cost is different in aiding one versus many.  Even if 
there is no magic cutoff point such that the difference between aiding ten 
and aiding eleven, for example, will involve making more of a total effort 
than is required, we can set an arbitrary cut off so as to aid some but not to 
go on aiding when the aggregate total will clearly be more than required. 
(Kamm, 2000, p. 11)  
6.  The chief could have continued to commit additional firefighters to the 
firefighting and rescue efforts.  However, he recognized that the “aggregate total” cost 
involved could include the injury or death of firefighters (since there had already been a 
hostage killed), thus he established a “cut off” point for the ongoing situation and ended 
the effort in order to “aid” the firefighters. 
g) Having performed a strenuous stringent duty can make it permissible to 
refuse to do a strenuous superogatory act or any less stringent duty, if what 
was involved in the stringent duty depleted the resources also needed for 
those other acts. (Kamm, 2000, p. 32)  
7.  The firefighter’s initial firefighting and rescue efforts, in the face of an 
armed gunman, could be considered a “superogatory act.” There was no requirement to 
potentially “deplete” the personnel resources that would have been required to continue 
such acts. 
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b. Harming Some to Save Others 
In this scenario there were two groups that needed to be saved: the people 
in the building and the firefighters; and both groups were under the same pair of threats: 
the fire and the gunman.  While the chief had the means to reduce one of the threats (the 
fire) to both groups, he had no means of reducing the other threat (the gunman).  In fact, 
to continue to reduce the threat he could address (fire), he would have created a situation 
of automatically increasing the other threat (the gunman), certainly to one group (the 
firefighters) if not to both groups simultaneously.  In order to save the “others,” in this 
case the firefighters, he had to permit the remaining harms (fire and gunman) to continue 
for the people in the building. By removing the firefighters, the fire would have had an 
opportunity to expand, but the chief did not “intend” the harm to the people. While one of 
those harms (fire) would have been that which duty would have required that he address, 
there was not an expectation that he place his firefighters in a position of any type of 
threat that they were not normally expected to endure.  In fact, to have caused them to 
enter into any situation where the threat to them from the gunman would have increased 
could have created an issue of additional moral responsibility for the chief in and of itself.  
The philosopher’s observations that specifically relate to the type of events 
represented in this situation are:  
a) Even if there is no distinction between the cases taken individually, the 
cumulative effort or cost is different in aiding one versus many.  Even if 
there is no magic cutoff point such that the difference between aiding ten 
and aiding eleven, for example will involve making more of a total effort 
than is required, we can set an arbitrary cut off so as to aid some but not to 
go on aiding when the aggregate total will clearly be more than required. 
(Kamm, 1989,  pp. 11, 12)   
1.  While the firefighters had any necessary resources available to rescue 
trapped individuals in a normal fire situation, the threat posed by the gunman at the scene 
did not make this a “normal” condition. Continuing to extinguish the fire, and thereby 
come closer to the hostages, also would have also brought the firefighters closer to the 
gunman, which would have potentially increased the “cost” to the firefighters to an 
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unacceptable level or “more of a total effort than is required.” The chief, therefore, set a 
“cut off” point and gave aid to the firefighters rather than others. 
b) It is permissible to cause harm to someone in the course of achieving 
the greater good of saving a greater number of others from comparable 
harm, if events which produce the greater good are not more intimately 
causally related to the production of harm than they are to the production 
of the greater good (or put another way, if events which produced the 
greater good are at least as intimately causally related to the production of 
the greater good as they are to the production of the lesser harm.) (Kamm, 
1989,  p. 232)  
2.  By ordering an end to the firefighting operation, the chief redirected the 
life threatening condition created by the gunman away from the firefighters through 
which he created a direct and good “causal relationship” to them. The harm that had 
been present with the hostages had already occurred, and the chief’s decision to evacuate 
the building, therefore, did not have more an intimate relationship to the harm that 
continued than it did to the good that came to the firefighters. 
c) ... an event which removes a direct threat to the greater number may 
cause a comparable direct threat to the lesser number, but may not in itself 
be a direct threat… in [this case] therefore, the [redirecting of the threat], 
our  means to the greater good, has at least as intimate a causal relation to 
the greater good [firefighters saved] as to the lesser harm [building 
occupants dead]....The conclusion is that the redirection [in this case the 
removal of the firefighters from the gunman threat] is permissible. 
(Kamm, 1989,  p. 233)  
3. The chief did not cause any of the deaths that occurred.  The cause of 
death was the fire itself and the gunman’s decision to hold them hostage in the fire 
building.  At the time he made his decision, the hostages were already under a threat to 
their lives from the gunman.  His decision to save the lives of the firefighters foresaw the 
condition under which they could have been injured or killed, and therefore he made the 
decision to secure their safety 
d) The PI/PH also permits us to do something to produce a greater good 
when the greater good in itself will produce a lesser harm.  In such a case, 
the greater good causes the lesser harm so there is no need to worry about 
the cause of the greater good being more intimately related to the harm 
than to the good.  When the lesser harm is a side effect of the greater good, 
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the, greater good does not occur by way of the lesser harm to others 
according to the analysis of “by” provided by the PI/PH . In these cases 
what we do, -- or any other event that helps to cause the greater good – is 
more directly related to the greater good than to harm, since the greater 
good either is the direct cause or the indirect cause of the lesser harm. 
(Kamm, 1989,  p. 235)  
4. In this instance, the hostages were faced with parallel threats, the first 
was from the gunman and the second was from the fire.  The chief acted to remove his 
firefighters from the gunman’s threat (“a greater good”), which then permitted the fire to 
expand (“a lesser harm”). Thus, the greater good resulted in being an indirect cause of the 
lesser harm rather than the inverse; and, therefore, the firefighters were not advantaged at 
the expense of the hostages. 
c. “Killing” verses “Letting Die” 
Those in the building were already under multiple life threatening risks at 
the time when the chief first arrived.  Those risks were the possibility of being killed by 
the gunman (a civilian had already been) and from the fire conditions.  Neither of these 
threats had been created by the chief nor any of the rescue personnel present.  The 
“imposition” (the need to be rescued) by the people upon the firefighters represents that 
they had what they had (life) only through the continuing efforts of the firefighters to 
reach them.  The chief’s decision to remove the means (the rescue effort) from them to 
maintain what they only would have had because of those efforts (life) is a clear example 
of the philosophical description of “letting die” since the firefighters did not introduce the 
direct cause of death (the fire).  In this example, it is made even more obvious by the fact 
that there was a second completely independent life threatening situation (a gunman) that 
was functioning independently of the chief’s decision or the firefighters’ actions. 
The pertinent philosopher’s quotes are as follows: 
a) The size of the effort that must be made rather than kill or let die should 
be equally great or small.  Not killing often requires no effort.  Saving a 
life, however, usually requires some action, and hence effort. (Kamm, 
1993, p. 18)  
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1. While there is absolutely no suggestion being made that the emergency 
services were in any way involved in the “killing” of the hostages (the gunman was the 
force that retained them in the building and exposed them to the effects of the fire), the 
chief made a decision and took action that precluded his firefighters being caught in a 
situation for them of “letting die.” He could have continued to permit them to operate 
under threat from the gunman without any additional effort on his part to change the 
operation, but that in all probability would have changed the circumstance and resulted in 
a firefighter’s death. 
b) The victim in a letting-die case... need not have been killed either by 
the non-saver or by any other person.  He could die accidentally or of 
natural causes.  The victim in a killing case... is killed. (Kamm, 1993, p. 
22)  
2.  The victims (the hostages) did not die because of the decisions of the 
emergency services (“the non-saver”) since the threat posed by the gunman was the 
factor that prevented them from leaving the building, and conversely, also kept any 
rescuers from entering.  It was the bad intention of the gunman that led directly to the 
causative factor for their death, and, therefore, they were killed by the gunman rather than 
by any other individuals at the scene. 
c) The victim in a case of letting die was already facing a cause of death 
independent of any that the non-saver produces. (Kamm, 1993, p. 23)  
3.  The threat to the lives of the hostages preceded the existence of the fire 
which, once started, became a second source of threat to them.  The chief’s decision to 
withdraw the firefighters from the building came subsequent to the existence of both life 
threatening conditions, and was therefore “independent” of the chief’s order. In that 
sense, they could be thought of as in a “letting die” condition with regards to the fire, but 
they were in fact “killed” by the actions of the gunman. 
d) In letting-die cases one refuses to make efforts that would provide life 
to someone already under threat of death.  Efforts made to avoid killing in 
standard cases are not efforts that would provide someone already under 
threat of death with continued life.  Hence the functions of the efforts 
refused by the non-saver and by the killer are different. (Kamm, 1993, p. 
24) 
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4. The chief’s decision was one of protecting the lives of his firefighters 
rather than one directly related to the safety of the hostages, who were already “under 
threat of death,” because the chief had no means to overcome the gunmen’s threat. On the 
other hand, the killer’s “efforts” were designed to keep the hostages in the building and is 
therefore directly related to their being killed. 
e) Essentially, removing a defense against a potential cause of death – this 
could be a cause that had at one time already threatened the person or 
something entirely new – is a killing if the person who dies was not 
dependent for the defense on the person who terminates it.  If an agent 
terminates aid and so allows a potential cause of death actually to kill 
someone, but it is aid that the agent himself was providing, or aid that 
belongs to the agent then we have a letting die. (Kamm, 1993, p. 28)  
5. The hostages died from the effects of the fire; they were entirely 
dependent upon the fire department for their “defense” against it. Thus, when that 
defense was removed, under normal circumstances, it would have been a case of “letting 
die.”  However, in this instance the overriding and preceding threat to their life came 
from the gunman, and it was his holding them as hostages in a burning building that 
eventually led to their death.  Therefore, they were killed by the gunman, rather than 
permitted to die by the firefighters. 
2. Theology 
a. The Principle of Double Effect 
The chief originally had a good intention, to put out the fire and thereby 
save the people in the building. However, the second threat from the gunman was more 
immediate and uncontrollable, and, therefore, it needed to be addressed.  Withdrawing 
the firefighters from the building in order to protect their lives from the gunman was an 
action with good intent, but there was an unintended bad effect in that the people in the 
building were subsequently found to have died from the effects of the fire. It should be 
noted that the location of the people in the building was unknown as was whether or not 
they were still alive at the time that the evacuation order to the firefighters was given.  
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Regardless, the continuation of external water streams represented a second good intent 
on the part of the chief to contain the fire threat as best as the conditions would permit. 
The theologian addresses such a condition thusly: 
a) ...one also causes something non-intentionally when, in doing 
something else, one foresees and permits it as a side effect, which one 
does not cause properly and directly.... One chooses as a means something 
in one’s power – some performance or omission – thought more or less 
likely to bring about the intended end.  But it also is more or less clearly 
foreseen that, either possibly or surely, the performance or omission will 
have various good or bad consequences distinct from its intended end, and 
in making the choice these good or bad consequences are accepted, gladly 
or reluctantly as the case may be, as side effects. (Grisez, 1993, p. 471)  
1. The chief used his authority (“power”) to remove his firefighters from 
the building in order to save their lives (“the intended end”) which allowed (“bad 
consequences distinct from its intended end”), the expansion of the fire that contributed 
to the death of the hostages.  Theologically this would be “...accepted... as side effects.” 
b) Sometimes, too, the very same sort of performance or omission could 
belong to two acts that could cause another’s death, but which have very 
different moral significance, depending on what choice of performance or 
omission executes, that is, depending on whether the death is chosen as a 
means or only accepted as a side effect of choosing something else. 
(Grisez, 1993, p. 471)  
2. The chief made a decision intended to save the lives of the firefighters, 
the subsequent death of the hostages was a “side effect of choosing something else.” 
c)...if one knowingly brings about someone’s death as a side effect, one is 
not responsible for intentional killing if one neither wants the death nor 
chooses to kill. (Grisez, 1993, p. 482)  
3.  As noted above, there was never any intention or act of killing on the 
part of the emergency services, and nor did they want nor choose for the hostages to die. 
d) In many cases, one’s own life cannot be sacrificed without unfairness to 
others, such as dependents, or detriment to the common good. (Grisez, 
1993, p. 484)  
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4. The firefighters, who were involved in this event, including the chief, 
had a responsibility and duty to also protect the wider community. The chief’s decision to 
protect the lives of the firefighters was therefore also supporting the “common good.” 
e) ...I think this allocation of resources is a real factor in what we’re 
talking about…I mean, should we spend millions and millions of dollars to 
keep someone alive?...I would say no.  You made your point when you 
say this has become prohibitive and so we stop…I would say you could 
come to the conclusion that we really cannot accomplish our intended goal 
so there’s no point in having people go into a situation where their life 
could be thrown away (V. Genovesi, personall communication, 9 July, 
2008)  
5. Naturally, the chief’s intention was to extinguish the fire in the building; 
however, due to the threat posed by the gunmen he could not “accomplish our intended 
goal,” and continuing the presence of the firefighters in that building could have resulted 
in their lives being “thrown away.” 
As can be seen from the above, the observations and comments in the 
abstract and from both philosophy and theology, multiple aspects of the conditions 
surrounding the death of individuals, particularly that of “intent” and the “casual” 
relationship to the deaths, can be directly associated with actual occurrences in homeland 
security scenarios. Such observations could have benefited the chief in his decision-
making analysis. 
B. CONSIDERED RISK CASUALTY EVENT B 
That’s it. That’s it. No more. 
Chief Michael McNamee 
Michael McNamee is a District Fire Chief with the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire 
Department. He has thirty-six years of experience in the department, and he was the chief 
on duty on the night of December 3, 1999. 
At 6:13 pm the police reported a fire at the vacant Worcester Cold Storage 
Warehouse building. The brick building was approximately ninety feet tall, “L” shaped, 
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and 185 by 150 feet in size. Built between 1905 and 1910, the interior walls were 18 
inches thick, made of brick, covered with six to eighteen inches of asphalt impregnated 
cork for insulation. There were windows in the office area of the building, and only one 
interior stairwell in the structure (M. McNamee, personal interview,23 July, 2008). The 
building had been vacant for twelve years, (Eisner, 2000) and the arriving firefighters 
found the fire located on the second floor. The firefighters were told by the police about 
ten minutes after they arrived at the scene that some homeless people had been living in 
the building for several weeks. A search was immediately initiated by Chief McNamee 
who sent two-man rescue teams to the different floors. 
At 6:46 pm two of the rescue personnel conducting part of the search reported via 
radio that they were lost on one of the upper floors of the building. It was impossible to 
determine exactly which floor they were on, so Chief McNamee diverted his entire third 
alarm force to the search effort on the fourth, fifth, and sixth floors. He was in radio 
communication with the lost men and heard them running out of the air contained in their 
breathing packs. One of them said, “Look, if you don’t find us soon, we’re going to die 
up here.” The smoke condition was at zero visibility. The lost firefighters’ loud personal 
locator alarms could be heard sounding in the background of the radio transmissions, 
but none of the rescuers in the building could hear the alarms because the sound was 
absorbed by the thick wall insulation, and because they had apparently gone so deeply 
into the building. The sound never got out of the immediate area that they were lost in. 
At 7:14 pm one of the search teams looking for the lost men requested assistance 
on the fifth floor because they too were running low on air and had become disoriented. 
It was the two man search team from Ladder Company 2 who had been joined by two 
additional men from Engine Company 3, which shared the same fire station with them. 
Chief McNamee sent additional rescuers to the fifth floor to try to assist these additional 
lost firefighters. Their last radio call to the chief was “Ladder 2 to command, we’re 
done…” the balance of their communication was cut off, but no one on the fire ground 
heard it. 
The rescue effort had quickly changed from that of searching for two missing 
firefighters, to searching for six. 
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The search went on for half an hour, with the chief continuing to send in search 
crews. The chief was simultaneously directing the firefighting operation, and was fully 
aware that the fire conditions in the building were getting worse and having an impact on 
the search efforts. He had taken a position at the bottom of the single stairway in order to 
maintain his awareness of who was in the building searching, and those who were 
waiting to enter to start searching.  That group always numbered 10 to 12 people.  As 
each search group came down the stairs, the chief would replace them with another 
group to continue the search.  An hour after the original call for assistance was heard, 
returning search crews reported that the fire and smoke conditions were so bad that they 
were not able to gain access to the floors they had been searching on previously because 
the fire had continued to grow in size and intensity.  The chief thought that the search had 
been ongoing for 15 or 20 minutes, and was shocked to discover that it had actually been 
under way for approximately an hour and 15 minutes.  At that moment, the chief paused 
the rescue operation while he reconsidered the situation.  He realized that this was no 
longer a rescue effort but a recovery, and it had been so for a while.  He thought that 
there was nothing to be gained by sending additional search teams into the building, but 
that there certainly could be additional losses if he continued to send additional 
personnel to the search effort.  Although the missing men were close personal friends of  
the chief, and that was a factor committing him to the rescue effort, looking at the men 
waiting to enter the building, he thought “I cannot do it to these guys.” and “This is good 
after bad.”   
The chief stood in the doorway to block entrance to the stairs and looking at the 
waiting rescuers said, “That’s it. That’s it. No more.” There was an immediate, 
emotional, and angry response from those firefighters waiting to enter the building to 
continue the search.  Chief McNamee yelled at them saying, “We’ve already lost six.  
We’re not going to lose any more.”  The chief described the physical reaction of the 
firefighters as seeming “…like they all collectively got punched in the gut with the reality 
...” he said they felt like they had failed at the rescue attempt, and they had failed their 
friends who were trapped in the building. 
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It took eight days of continuous searching in the remains of the building to 
recover the bodies of the six deceased firefighters (M. McNamee, personal interview, 23 
July, 2008).  
Chief McNamee advised that some of the factors he considered in making his 
decision were similar to what was evident in the previously described scenario: 
a) The time being expended in the search did not favor a successful outcome. 
b) The fire continued to grow in size and intensity. 
c) The amount of air available to the trapped men in their breathing devices 
was limited. 
d) The trapped men were his close personal friends. 
e) The situation for the trapped personnel was a no-gain condition as 
compared to a potential additional loss condition for the searchers. 
f) Continuing the search was expending resources in a futile effort. 
g) He could not ask the remaining rescuers to do more after they had already 
gone beyond the expectations of duty. 
A number of issues from the observations and principles of the other disciplines 
are clearly evident in this scenario 
1. The duty to rescue. 
2. Harming some to save others.  
3. Equal treatment and equal chances. 
4. The significance of status. 
5. Do numbers count when not everyone can be helped? 
1. Philosophy 
a. The Duty to Rescue 
Within the parlance of the emergency services, “rescue” describes an 
attempt to save a living individual, while “recovery” denotes efforts to gather the remains 
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of the deceased. The term “search” can be applied to the task of finding either of the 
above. The full capacity of the fire department was being utilized in an attempt to 
extinguish the fire and simultaneously rescue an increasing number of its own personnel. 
Although the spatial distance between the rescuers and the victims was not known 
specifically, and it could have been substantial, the temporal distance created by the 
visibility barrier and the fire conditions greatly increased what may have been the effects 
of the actual spatial distance. Due to the worsening fire conditions and the increasing loss 
of additional rescue personnel, it was highly doubtful that the firefighters would have 
been able to successfully reach those in the building. The actual and potential aggregate 
cost of the rescue attempt and the risking of other lives exceeded the requirements of 
duty. This was particularly pertinent at the moment that the chief recognized that the 
rescue effort had in fact become one of recovery. 
There are multiple philosophical observations and comments that have an 
influence or direct nexus to the above summary as regards the duty to rescue: 
a) We must distinguish the possible moral importance of absolute 
proximity (nearness) from relative proximity and from just any difference 
in distance. (Kamm, 2000, p. 2)  
1. The chief had a duty to commit personnel and resources to the search 
and rescue attempt for the missing firefighters. While there is sufficient discussion among 
philosophers concerning the relationship between the duty to rescue and the proximity of 
the victim, it is also understood that distance is not measured only by proximity but by 
the time it would take to reach a victim.  The layout of the building, the smoke, and the 
fire conditions can overpower actual measurements of distance, or as  Chief McNamee 
noted about visibility in the smoke conditions in the building, “If you missed them by 6 
inches, you missed them by a mile.” 
b) But perhaps nearness is then mostly a function of the length of time it 
takes to traverse a physical distance. (Kamm, 2000, p. 15) 
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2. The conditions faced by the firefighters in the warehouse was definitely 
one of distance as a time measurement rather than a length measurement, although the 
size of the structure would also have permitted physical distance to be a factor in and of 
itself. 
c) In... [the rescuers case], we may be assured that our efforts will be 
efficacious; in the [trapped firefighter’s case], perhaps we cannot be sure 
that our efforts will pay off. (Kamm, 2000, p. 5)  
3. The chief not only had the responsibility to attempt a rescue of the 
missing firefighters, but he also had to maintain the safety of his remaining personnel.  
By putting an end to the search he could be certain that no additional firefighters would 
be harmed, whereas continuing to commit more personnel to the search provided no such 
assurance. 
d) Then if we aided in one case, what reasons could we give for not-aiding 
in the next case, and then the one after?  But the aggregation of all the aid 
would consume much of our life.  We are not required to give up so much 
in order to aid it might be said. (Kamm, 2000, p. 11)  
4. There are few examples where a philosopher’s comments have such an 
exact correlation to an actual emergency than what can be seen in the discussion of the 
aggregation of effort.  It was clear to the chief that the loss of the personnel that had 
already been committed to the search fully exceeded any requirement of duty to commit 
additional resources. 
e) The strength of the duty may vary with social membership – stronger to 
one’s own society, weaker to other societies (other things equal) – even if 
it does not vary with distance, as the individual’s duty of rescue seems to. 
(Kamm, 2000, p. 31) 
5. Even when one considers the impact of a firefighter’s responsibility to 
protect and save the life of another firefighter, the commitment made by the chief had 
fully satisfied any such requirement at the time he decided to end the effort. 
f) Even if there is no distinction between the cases taken individually, the 
cumulative effort or cost is different in aiding one versus many.  Even if 
there is no magic cutoff point such that the difference between aiding ten 
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and aiding eleven, for example, will involve making more of a total effort 
than is required, we can set an arbitrary cut off so as to aid some but not to 
go on aiding when the aggregate total will clearly be more than required. 
(Kamm, 2000, p. 11)  
6.  The chief could have viewed each rescue assignment independently.  
That is to say, first, there was a search for the homeless; second, there was a search for 
the two rescue firefighters; and third, there was a rescue operation looking for the Ladder 
2 team, and he could have continued to commit additional firefighters to each of these  
rescue efforts separately.  However, he considered the task as a cumulative effort, 
recognized the “aggregate total” cost involved and ended the effort in order to “aid” the 
remaining firefighters. 
g) Having performed a strenuous stringent duty can make it permissible to 
refuse to do a strenuous superogatory act or any less stringent duty, if what 
was involved in the stringent duty depleted the resources also needed for 
those other acts. (Kamm, 2000, p. 32)  
7. By any measure the chief’s rescue effort that lasted in excess of an hour 
in a fire and smoke filled building was a “superogatory act” that was depleting the 
personnel resources that he would have required to continue such acts. 
b. Harming Some to Save Others 
The chief was presented with a situation that demonstrated that all 
attempts to save the missing firefighters was steadily increasing the probability of, and 
actually harming, other firefighters.  It must be noted that the harm befalling the 
firefighters was not caused by the chief but by the fire condition itself; and the chief was 
simultaneously giving maximum effort to reduce the fire conditions which would have  
resulted in further harm to his personnel. The chief was fully aware that the potential for 
additional harm was rapidly outpacing the possibility for success in rescuing those who 
had already been harmed. 
Again, there are multiple observations available from the other disciplines 
that allude to the relationship between harming some and saving others: 
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a) It is permissible to cause harm to someone [the trapped firefighters] in 
the course of achieving the greater good of saving a greater number of 
others [the rescuers]  from comparable harm, if events which produce the 
greater good are not more intimately causally related to the production of 
harm than they are to the production of the greater good. (Kamm, 1989,  p. 
232)  
1. While the chief did not himself “cause harm” to any of the lost 
firefighters (the fire was the cause of the harm), his decision to see to the “greater good” 
of his remaining personnel as regards the threat to them from the fire also is exactly 
within the philosophers observations about such a set of circumstances. 
b) ... an event [ceasing rescue operations] which removes a direct threat to 
the greater number [rescuers] may cause a comparable direct threat to the 
lesser number, [the trapped] but may not in itself be a direct threat…. in 
[this case] therefore, the [ceasing rescue operations], our  means to the 
greater good,[saving the rescuers] has at least as intimate a causal relation 
to the greater good [firefighters saved] as to the lesser harm [the loss of the 
trapped]….The conclusion is that the redirection [ceasing rescue 
operations] is permissible. (Kamm, 1989,  p. 233)  
2.  By ordering an end to the search operation, the chief redirected the life 
threatening conditions away from the remaining firefighters, which was a direct and good 
“causal relationship” to them. The harm that had befallen the lost firefighters had already 
occurred, and the chief’s decision therefore had no more an intimate relationship to that 
harm than it did to the good that came to the remaining firefighters. 
c) ...if actively causing a death that is not intended, but merely foreseen to 
be a side effect of the means used to save [the rescuers] is not permissible, 
it would follow that just passing by a dying person on the way to saving 
the [rescuers] should also be impermissible.  But this makes it impossible 
to ever save some [the rescuers] rather than others [the trapped] in 
situations where we cannot save everyone... (Kamm, 1989,  p. 232)  
3.  The chief did not cause any of the deaths that occurred.  The cause of 
death was the fire itself.  The early rescue attempts, including the additional 
commitments, were done under an impression that significantly less time had actually 
passed and was within standard operating conditions. At the time he made his decision 
and the actual passage of time was realized, it was evident that so much time had elapsed 
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for the lost firefighters, that it was no longer possible that they could still be alive.  His 
decision to save the lives of the rescuers foresaw the condition of the lost firefighters, and 
he, therefore, made the decision to save his remaining personnel. 
d) ...it is permissible to act with the intention that the lesser harm occur as 
a way of maintaining the greater good already achieved. (Kamm, 1989,  p. 
240)  
4.  The chief had to maintain the lives and safety of the rescuers, knowing 
what harm had already occurred to the lost firefighters, which, of course, he never 
intended. 
e) ... another point of view... would not find [harming the trapped] by 
[removing the rescuers] objectionable.... This point of view does not 
emphasize doing versus bringing about, but emphasizes rather the [chief’s] 
having a sufficient hands-on buffer between himself and the harm [that 
results].  Greater good [saving the rescuers] would provide such a buffer 
for a harmful aspect of the act – you can’t get your hands dirty when 
you’re wearing “greater-good gloves.” (Kamm, 1989, p. 250)  
5. Both the chief and the lost firefighters themselves were responding to 
the requirements of duty when they entered the building with search and rescue 
assignments.  The chief’s commitment of these resources had a singularly good intention, 
the rescue of victims.  Similarly, his decision to stop the rescue efforts also had a “greater 
good” intention, the saving of the lives of the remaining rescue personnel.  He was 
therefore more than sufficiently insulated from any cause and effect relationship with the 
harm that occurred. 
c. Equal Treatment and Equal Chances 
The chief gave each incident of trapped firefighters equal attention and 
equal resources in an attempt to save their lives.  At such time as it became obvious that 
the deteriorating fire conditions made additional rescue efforts untenable, he then 
provided the same life-saving attention to the rescuers that he had given to the trapped 
members for as long as he believed it had been possible to save the victims. 
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Philosophy provides a number of examples that demonstrate thoughts on 
the relationship between equal actions and equal opportunities: 
a) ...I believe, with it being better to save the greater number in what I 
shall call partially conflict-free situations, situations in which at least one 
person must die but we have a choice whether more than one shall die. 
(Kamm F. M., 1985, p. 179)  
1.  Once the chief realized that his initial rescue personnel could not still 
be alive, he turned his attention to the larger number of firefighters whose lives would be 
put at risk if the search continued any longer which was the “better” focus. 
b) ...If [the rescuers] die, no one of the [rescuers] will lose more than the 
[trapped] person would lose if he died, and no matter what happens at least 
one person must die.  Still we should save more of the group of [rescuers] 
because we are concerned for the loss to each individual, and each 
additional person of the [rescuers] whom we save has his condition 
improved without making conditions worse for anyone else.  (Kamm, 
1985, p. 180)  
2.   The trapped firefighters had already succumbed to the effects of the 
fire which meant that their condition could not be “improved.” In order to prevent the 
remaining firefighters from losing their lives also, the chief turned his attention to his 
concern for their individual lives and ordered an end to the operation.  
d. The Significance of Status 
The  chief recognized that each of the trapped firefighters were due the 
recognition and respect that came from their willingness to put themselves in harms way 
for the sake of others.  In recognition of the performance of that duty he, and their fellow 
firefighters, were obliged to take the steps necessary to come to their aid as each of them 
knew that the trapped members would have done in turn for them. This is a professional 
obligation that each firefighter accepts, just as they recognized that they also had an 
obligation to do the same for civilians.  However, that same principle applies to the 
chief’s responsibility to secure the safety and lives of the rescuers.  Their equal status 
required equal treatment. 
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Certain philosophers believe that persons are an end-in-themselves, and 
how others interact with them is established by certain constraints that reflect their rights 
as persons:  
a) ...there may be a right to have one’s [the trapped] life saved, but it is a 
less stringent right than the right [of the rescuers] not to be killed (Kamm, 
1992, p. 366) 
1. The chief’s initial dedication to saving the lives of the homeless, and 
then of the rescue firefighters, was exemplary.  He then quickly grasped that the 
remaining firefighters also required his protection, which was when he turned the focus 
of his dedication and duty towards maintaining their safety. 
e. Do Numbers Count When We Cannot Help Everyone? 
The chief was in an exceptionally difficult position with regards to his 
duty and commitment to rescue the six missing firefighters as compared to the numbers 
of rescuers being included in the effort.  Throughout the entire search, it was evident that 
the chief was willing to commit whatever resources might be necessary to locate and save 
the trapped members.  There were multiple, variable factors that were changing 
continuously which affected the proportionality of rescuers to trapped firefighters, these 
were that: the intensity of the fire continued to grow, the number of missing firefighters 
continued to increase, and the length of time the breathing apparatus of the trapped men 
would have continued to function was diminishing.  As the amount of time for each pair 
of firefighter’s life sustaining air diminished and then ended, it became clear to the chief 
that they could not be saved and that he was no longer directing a rescue effort but a 
recovery effort.  At that juncture, the danger to the numbers of the rescuers came into 
direct contrast with the number of victims. 
There is ample discussion among the other disciplines about these very 
explicit conditions vis-à-vis the numbers of people involved and the ability to help them: 
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a) ... from an impartial perspective, of making substantial sacrifices for the 
sake of substantial gains to others, ... they don’t see the point of making substantial 
sacrifices if such sacrifices fail to have a significant impact on the lives of others.  This 
view is supported by the Minimize Great Additional Burdens View (Temkin, 2005, p. 
223).  
1.  The groups of rescue firefighters understood the sacrifice that might be 
expected of them to bring “substantial gains” to the personnel who were lost in the fire 
building.  It would of course be reasonable for them, and for the chief, to question the 
necessity of such sacrifices when there would be no possibility of success gained by those 
sacrifices. 
b) Why then may [the  chief] not stop the aid once started, in order to help 
others more, if the [trapped] will be no worse off overall and being in the 
[effort] gave [the trapped] a chance?  Must the fact that the [trapped] gets 
worse again through failure to continue what has already been done be 
definitive?  I suggest not… First, [The chief] would be refusing to 
continue aiding, and this is not, strictly, harming… Commitments may be 
overridden, for example, by the attempt to help greater numbers of people, 
especially if these are also one’s [responsibility]… Most importantly, the 
idea of a commitment to a [firefighter] suggests that a [chief] would be 
wrong to stop [efforts] that had not yet had any effect on the [trapped] 
when the [chief] knows that continuing [efforts] will lead to some 
subnormal improvement in the future.  But I do not believe that the [chief] 
would be wrong to drop [efforts] for such a [firefighter] in order to offer it 
to others who can reach normality. (Kamm, 2002, p. 376)  
2.  The only chance the trapped firefighters had to be rescued was through 
the efforts of the rescue teams that the chief was dispatching to search for them. At the 
point at which he realized that the men could not be saved, it was also true that the 
trapped firefighters’ condition could not have been made worse by his ending the search 
effort. This decision did not bring harm to the trapped firefighters, since the causitive 
reason for the harm was the fire itself, and his response to what he could do for them now 
must naturally be overidden by his responsibility to protecting his remaining firefighters. 
The trapped firefighters could never return to “normality,” whereas, the remaining 
firefighters need to have their normality maintained. 
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c) ... justice demands that each person on one side should have [their] 
interests balanced against those of one person on the opposite side; those 
who are not balanced out in the larger group help determine that the larger 
group should be saved.  Hence, the number of people saved counts 
morally. (Kamm, 2002, p. 378)  
3.  When the chief said, “No more,” he was expressing an equation that 
balanced the lives of those who had already been lost against those that needed to be 
protected.  The group that needed to be protected (the rescuers) was substantially larger 
than those who needed to be found (the trapped); therefore, in this event, the chief had a 
moral responsibility to see to the needs of the larger group. 
d) ...suppose we have a choice between helping one person, A, who will 
be very badly off and much benefited by our aid, or helping a couple of 
people, B and C, each of whom will be as badly off as A but not benefited 
as much by our aid.  As long as the lesser benefit is significant, it is 
morally more important, I think, to distribute our efforts over more people, 
each of whom would be as badly off as the single person, rather than to 
provide a bigger benefit concentrated in one person... (Kamm, 2002, p. 
380)  
4.  Had any one of the lost firefighters been located by the searchers, he 
would have been “much benefited by our aid.”  However, as had already been 
demonstrated, continuing the search was exposing additional firefighters to becoming “as 
badly off” as the lost members; but doing less of an effort (ending the search), as 
compared to the effort of the search itself, actually bought benefit to the larger group.  
The chief was therefore distributing his efforts over the wider group of firefighters rather 
than concentrating them on the smaller sized group. 
e) The principle that accounts for these judgments is that when need and 
urgency are constant, we ought to [take care of] whoever allows us to 
[take care of] as many people as possible, at least when the greater number 
of people will be helped significantly. (Kamm, 2002,  p. 383)  
5. While there was a clear need to rescue the trapped firefighters, there 
was also an equal need to protect the rescuers.  As the amount of time increased beyond 
which the trapped firefighters could survive, the urgency of their situation actually  
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diminished in comparison to the urgency to protect the rescuers from the rapidly 
increasing fire threat.  The chief’s decision was clearly one wherein “the greater number 
of people will be helped significantly.” 
2. Theology 
a. The Duty to Rescue 
Due to the worsening fire conditions and the increasing loss of additional 
rescue personnel, it was highly doubtful that the firefighters would have been able to 
successfully reach those in the building. The aggregate cost of the rescue attempt and the 
risking of other lives exceeded the requirements of duty. The decision for the chief 
included contrasting the requirements of duty with the number of lives apparently already 
lost with those that could still be potentially lost in a continued rescue attempt. 
a) ...the principle [of Double Effect] is that of in the service of a greater 
good, you tolerate a lesser evil that may come about in the course of 
pursuing greater good. (Ruff, personal communication, 2008)  
1.  When the chief made his decision, he realized through his experienced 
based knowledge that the trapped firefighters were no longer alive.  Inasmuch as that 
outcome could no longer have been changed by continuing the search, he had to 
“tolerate” that understanding and proceed with addressing the “greater good” of ensuring 
the safety of the remaining firefighters. 
b) [on applying the Principle of Double Effect] ...we use the example of 
firemen, I know that there are probably times when fire chiefs make a 
decision like that.  They look at a building and they look at the state that 
it’s in, the severity of the fire and so on and they might say, “We’re not 
sending anybody else in there.  There’s no way that they’re going to come 
out.”  And so at this point we can’t save the lives of the people that may be 
in the building, but we aren’t going to risk any more. That would be my 
guess. (D. Ruff, personal communication, 13 June,  2008)  
2. Upon evaluating the requirements of duty against the loss of life that 
had already been inflicted on his personnel, the chief had reached that point that the 
theologians understand as being beyond the requirements of duty. 
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c) [on applying the Principle of Double Effect]…my presumption was that 
the person making the call would be making a judgment that, in fact, there 
was no possibility of good coming out of this further assistance.  Based on 
their experience, looking at the situation, looking at this fire, looking at the 
state of this building, they’re pretty convinced that any further firefighters 
that they send in are going to be seriously, seriously injured or killed and 
probably will not have any success in rescuing. At least that’s how I was 
thinking about it. (D. Ruff, personal communication, 13 June, 2008)  
3.  The theologians recognize that the potential for success is one of the 
elements of decision making in life and death circumstances and that at such time as there 
is no possibility of success and realizing that the risks outweigh that possibility, a 
decision, based on the chief’s experience, was acceptable. 
d) [on applying the Principle of Double Effect] ... .and his best judgment 
is that it’s not going to be possible to save the lives of perhaps the victims 
in the building and that very likely it’s also going to cost additional lives 
of firefighters. (D. Ruff, personal communication, 13 June, 2008)  
4.  The chief’s decision considered the fact that further efforts in the 
building, in all probability, would have resulted in additional lives being lost. 
e) Yet not even those who engage in the most hazardous work… 
straightforwardly accept death as a side effect; they only risk it, while 
expecting, hoping, in doing their best to survive.  Risking death is 
conditionally accepting it: “Doing this, I know that death will ensue if 
things go badly, and I accept that.”  Thus, the same principles that 
determine the moral character of accepting death as a side effect determine 
the morality of accepting a risk to one’s own life or another’s…“because 
one has a stronger duty to take care of one’s own life than another’s” 
(Grisez, 1993, p. 485)  
5.  Firefighters understand that in their profession death, whether their 
own or someone else’s, is an ever present possibility.  That knowledge is part of what  
they accept in their work environment.  That does not mean that they are cavalier about it, 
just that they accept it as a reality; but they also recognize that they have a responsibility 
to protect themselves. 
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f) ...we shouldn’t try to save a life that can’t be saved.  Have you reached 
the conclusion honestly, let’s say, have you honestly reached the 
conclusion that this life cannot be saved?  If so, then I cannot, and should 
not, commit personnel…I think this allocation of resources is a real factor 
in what were talking about ... you made your point when you say this has 
become prohibitive and so we stop…I would say you could come to the 
conclusion that we really cannot accomplish our intended goal so there’s 
no point in having people go into a situation where their life could be 
thrown away. (V. Genovesi, personal communication, 9 July, 2008)  
6.  The chief’s decision was arrived at after concluding that the lives of the 
trapped firefighters could not be saved.  The theological view is that once that point had 
been reached, it would not have been acceptable to continue to commit additional 
firefighters to the effort and therefore possibly risk their lives also. 
C. CONSIDERED RISK CASUALTY EVENT C 
Increasingly uncomfortable hours. 
First Deputy Fire Commissioner Frank P. Cruthers9 
Frank P. Cruthers is the First Deputy Fire Commissioner of the New York City 
Fire Department (FDNY).  He has 40 years of service with the FDNY, having risen 
through the ranks from firefighter to his current position.  On September 11, 2001, he 
held the position of Assistant Chief of Department, and his regular rotation command 
assignment that day had been that of City Wide Tour Commander. The circumstances 
that morning resulted in his being one of the Incident Commanders at the World Trade 
Center. 
Chief Cruthers arrived on the scene of the attack on the World Trade Center after 
the second plane had hit the south tower.  He immediately sought out and made contact 
with the Chief of Department at the department command post on West Street to confer 
on the immediate conditions, operations, and command responsibilities. Approximately 
 
9 Frank P. Cruthers is First Deputy Commissioner of the New York City Fire Department, the world’s 
largest. He is a forty year veteran of the department having risen through the ranks, starting as a firefighter 
in 1968. The Commissioner is known and respected throughout the fire service, and has lectured nationally 
and internationally. 
 128
10 minutes after his arrival, the south tower collapsed. Having survived the collapse, the  
chief was making his way north through the buildings of the World Financial Center, 
opposite the Trade Center, to reestablish a command post north of the immediate 
collapse area when the north tower also collapsed. 
[The World Trade Center consisted of multiple buildings occupying a sixteen acre 
site bounded: on the west by West Street (a median divided highway); on the east by 
Church Street (a six lane wide street); on the south by Liberty Street (a narrow, one-
traffic-lane wide street); and on the north by Vesey Street (a two traffic lane wide street). 
The addresses of the towers were One and Two World Trade Center respectively, and the 
remaining buildings that formed the perimeter of the sixteen acres were designated as 
Three through Six World Trade Center.  An additional forty-seven story building, Seven 
World Trade Center, the only building in the complex outside the sixteen acre perimeter, 
occupied a space on the North side of Vesey Street opposite the north tower.] 
The collapse of the north tower sent debris into and around building seven, 
starting a fire within the building and doing significant structural damage.  Some time 
later that morning or early afternoon a deputy chief in charge of operations came to the 
command post and advised the  chief that he had been approached by several battalion  
chiefs and other deputy  chiefs with concerns about the stability of the Seven World Trade 
Center building, which by this time had an extensive fire condition.  
At that time he believed that there could have been as many as 50,000 people in 
the trade center when it collapsed. There were also upwards of 1000 firefighters, police 
officers, ambulance personnel, and other rescue workers on the debris pile attempting to 
search for and rescue both the civilians and the original firefighters, police officers, and 
other emergency workers who had been in the buildings at the time of the collapse.  
Seven World Trade Center was approximately 500 feet high and given its proximity to the 
original World Trade Center site perimeter, he knew a collapse of this building would 
spread a debris pile hundreds of feet into the existing and ongoing search area then 
occupied by those 1000 rescuers. 
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The chief quickly considered and evaluated the information that was available as 
well as the additional threat to the lives of the rescue workers that a potential collapse of 
that forty-seven story building would represent, and ordered that everyone be evacuated 
from an area sufficient to encompass a debris field that would be created by the collapse 
of a building of that size.  The 360° collapse evacuation zone included a major 
percentage of the existing debris pile and ongoing search area of the original World 
Trade Center site. 
The search area was a scene of highly charged emotions and super-human efforts 
by the rescuers to reach their fellow firefighters, friends, co-workers, and anyone who 
might possibly still be alive in the rubble.  The chief’s order effectively halted those 
searches over a large area of the collapse site and removed the rescue personnel to a 
safe distance.  At approximately 2 p.m. a meeting was held at the command post with a 
large number of the senior chiefs on the scene to evaluate the progress of the conditions 
and operations.  Among the things discussed was the status of the stability of Seven 
World Trade Center and if the evacuation order for its potential collapse zone had been 
too conservative.  It was immediately agreed by all those in attendance at the meeting 
that the evacuation order was fully appropriate and warranted. 
At approximately 5:20 that afternoon, after burning for seven hours, Seven World 
Trade Center collapsed, (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2002, pp. 1-8) 
causing no additional deaths or injuries, thereby validating the  chief’s earlier 
evacuation order. The chief was aware that during those hours a tension existed on site 
between the desire to continue the search and rescue efforts and the assessment of the 
building’s stability with regards to the actual threat it may have represented to the 
personnel working there.  That tension caused the chief to recall, “Increasingly 
uncomfortable hours.” (F. Cruthers, personal communication, 1 August, 2008) 
Chief Cruthers advised that when first informed about the issue of the stability of 
Seven World Trade Center, his decision to clear a collapse area was largely based on the 
types of experience and operating procedures that are typically found within the New 
York City Fire Department.  He initially described the decision as “...more simplistic...” 
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than what might have been expected; however, upon further analysis it was determined 
that the factors involved in the decision included, but were not limited to the following: 
a) The ongoing search for their fellow firefighters, police officers, etc. 
b) The viability of the victims. 
c) The likelihood of success. 
d) The nature of the hazard. 
e) The potential cost of the effort. 
f) The proximity to the victims. 
g) The magnitude of the scene. 
h) The collapses that had already occurred. 
i) The anticipated collapse of Seven World Trade Center. 
j) The extreme number of lives that were in danger. 
k) That the guiding factors learned in previous events were applicable at this 
scene. 
l) That he had to do everything possible to not lose more lives. 
m) That dangerous activities would need to be undertaken in the current 
search condition. 
n) That if there is no life to be saved, don’t risk life. (F. Cruthers, personal 
communication, 1 August, 2008) 
While it is clear that a significant number of the above decision factors have a 
nexus to the core concept of Considered Risk Casualties, a sample of the most prominent 
observations from the other disciplines that also have a direct corollary to the above 
factors are as follows: 
1. Rationing scarce resources.  
2. The Harming-Versus-Not-Aiding distinction.  
3. Equal treatment and equal chances. 
4. The difference between “killing” and “letting die.” 
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5. Discontinue non-futile use of a scarce resource. 
6. The significance of status. 
7. Harming some to save others. 
8. The duty to rescue. 
9. Ethical values. 
1. Philosophy  
a. Philosophy and Rationing Scarce Resources 
While there were over a thousand rescuers working at the World Trade 
Center site, given the magnitude of the destruction, the size of the area involved,  and the 
belief that upwards of 50,000 people were in need of rescue or recovery, the resources 
available to do that task were not only finite but could have been considered as scarce. 
Additionally, the threat presented by the potential collapse of Seven World Trade Center 
could have significantly increased the number of deaths already inflicted, and it would 
have further diminished the expertise and resources that were needed at the time and that 
would continue to be required in all future operations. The need to husband those 
resources can be seen as a factor in the decision to evacuate the collapse zone. 
There are several philosophical views and comments related to the above 
analysis concerning the rationing of resources: 
a) If an organization can help a few people a lot, or many people a little, it 
makes a great difference whether they will face similar choices many 
times, and also whether it will be the same or different people who are 
affected each time.  If the choice-situation is rare, it may be morally 
imperative to help the few a lot.  Similarly if the choice-situation is 
frequent, but different people will be involved each time, it may again be 
morally imperative to choose on each occasion, so as to help the few a lot, 
rather than the many a little. (Kamm, 2007, p. 276)  
1.  The chief’s decision to assist the smaller group (the rescuers), by 
completely evacuating them from the collapse danger zone, was preferential to 
potentially assisting the larger group of individuals who might have been located 
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throughout the original debris site.  If any trapped victims had been found, the assistance 
afforded them would constitute helping “many a little,” as compared to helping the “a 
few a lot.” It was “imperative” that the chief see to the safety of the rescuers. 
b) ...we are concerned with the allocation of resources, though...sometimes 
concern for benefits that come of the resources must come into the picture. 
(Kamm, 2007, p. 264)  
2. Through this decision it was clear that by maintaining the safety of the 
rescuers “resources” the “benefits” they could have provided throughout the ongoing 
search, rescue, and recovery operation were highly valuable resources that needed to be 
ensured.   
c) (...it could be relevant to allocation that we are more certain of 
outcomes in one group than in another, even though the latter has the 
potential to achieve better outcomes.) Sometimes, differential outcome 
should be relevant to allocating ... (Kamm, 2007, p. 266) 
3. One of the factors the chief was considering in his decision-making 
process was the future work that would need to be done at the site. It was certain that 
maintaining the rescuers safety, cohesion, and capabilities would have resulted in a 
“potential to achieve better outcomes” as described in the concept of the philosopher. 
b. Philosophy and Harming-Versus-not-Aiding 
The chief did not bring harm to anyone.  The harm that had been inflicted, 
and would continue to be inflicted, had been created by the terrorists.  However, the chief 
had been placed in a position of having to make a decision about suspending aid to those 
who were already harmed (the victims) and those who needed to be protected from being 
harmed (the rescuers).  Therefore, the chief had to factor the distinction between these 
two dynamics simultaneously in two different groups. 




a) ...we say either (a) that, with the [decision], four hundred people instead 
of six hundred will lose their lives or (b) that, with the [decision], we will 
save two hundred lives of the six hundred.  In description (a), the baseline 
suggested by the phrasing is a state in which people are now well but face 
getting worse; the baseline suggested by the phrasing in description (b) is 
the near-death state people will be in if there is no intervention, but from 
which there can be improvement.  Subjects think it is worse if two 
hundred people lose life than if they do not gain it and are more averse to a 
[decision] in which people lose their lives rather than in which the same 
number are not saved. (Kamm, 1998,  p. 466)  
1.  At the time of the decision, it was not possible to apply a numerical 
description to indicate proportionality between the number of potential victims and the 
number of rescuers as an element in the chief’s decision. This was due to the fact that the 
number of victims, either dead or alive, was unknown. What was known was that a 
failure to evacuate the rescuers from the danger zone would have resulted in additional 
deaths beyond what had already occurred as compared to the possibility that none of the 
already trapped victims could have been saved. Loss of additional firefighter’s lives at 
that point would have been seen by society as reckless.  
b)  Notice that the distinction between loss and no-gain is different from 
the distinction between an imposed loss (harm) and a denied gain (not 
aiding)... (Kamm, 1998,  p. 471)  
2. Without the chief’s decision, one would have had a condition for the 
rescuers in which leaving them in the danger zone could have resulted in a “loss and no-
gain” because of not being evacuated; this is in comparison to the “imposed loss” directly  
inflicted on the victims by the terrorists and the “denied gain” circumstance created for 
the existing victims by the subsequent collapse threat. This was also created as a 
consequence of the terrorist attack. 
c) The harming-versus-not-aiding distinction is often present in cases in 
which there is a distinction between someone’s losing what he would have 
continued to have [life] independently of our help (when we harm) and his 
losing what he would not have continued to have [life] independently of 
our help. (Kamm, 1998,  p. 473) 
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3.  It can be discerned that the loss of life (harm) created by the terrorists 
was clearly distinct from the temporary condition of not aiding that might have resulted 
from the chief’s decision, since there could be no additional loss that would have befallen 
the victims, inasmuch as there would not have been the possibility of improving upon the 
harm done to them already without the assistance of the rescue workers.  
d) However, if ... the baseline is always set by what would happen without 
intervention, prospect theory would predict that not preventing death should 
always be seen less negatively than causing a death (assuming death is bad for a 
person).  This is because staying at the baseline is a no-gain and is better than 
moving down.  By contrast, causing death moves someone down from a baseline 
set by projecting continued life, if no intervention ensues. (Kamm, 1998,  p. 473) 
[This observation can be applied inversely to both the rescuers and the victims 
simultaneously.]  
4.  The “baseline” for whatever victims existed in the collapse area at the 
time of the chief’s decision had already been established by the original collapse.  Those 
individuals would have stayed at that level of condition without the assistance of the 
rescuers.  The “baseline” of the rescuers absolutely would have been “moving down” 
unless they were removed from the immediate danger zone.  The chief’s decision was 
clearly “projecting continued life” through his intervention to ensure the safety of the 
rescuers. 
c. Philosophy and Equal Treatment and Equal Chances 
Further refining what  is alluded to above, that the  chief in this situation 
was presented with a condition of opposite preferences in relationship to the same threat, 
i.e., what would help one category of individuals (the victims), could have harmed the 
other category of individuals (the rescuers). Inasmuch as their levels of current harm were 
unequal, but their exposure to the threat of the additional collapse was the same; it was 
still an unbalanced equality of treatment and chances situation. 
Although the described situation is somewhat unique vis-à-vis the existing 
condition in comparison to the threat, one can extrapolate guidance from the following 
philosophical observations: 
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a) ... treating people as equals involves counting each one’s preference; 
this is something we simply owe each individual as part of treating him as 
an equal.  Indeed, it might be that the greater number of individuals [the 
victims] actually preferred that the single person [the rescuers] be saved 
instead of themselves.  In such a case the view for which I am arguing 
would recommend that the single person be saved even if it were in some 
sense impersonally better that the greater number be saved.  Since what 
we would be doing in this case would be based on counting each person’s 
preference even when this conflicts with saving the greater number, letting 
each person’s preference count cannot be based on the value of the greater 
number being served. (Kamm, 1985, p. 181)  
1.  While the lives of the rescuers and the lives of the victims are naturally 
seen as having equal value, the thought of what the difference the rescuers, as compared 
to the victims, could bring to the ultimate results of the rescue effort would have had to 
be a consideration in the decision making that went beyond the intrinsic value of 
individual lives. Even though the number of victims was believed to be “the greater 
number,” the responsibility that the chief owed to the living rescuers was to save their 
lives, not only because it would reflect what he believed would have been their 
preference but because their (the rescuers) services would have been needed to assist 
those who were already victims of the event.  
b) Preference ... [between solutions] ...  would indicate a strong preference 
for equality of results.  That is, it would indicate that it is (a) the same 
chance for a fate shared by all which is preferred over (b) the same chance 
for a fate which will not be shared by all.  The preference for equality of 
result could be so strong that it overcame an alternative prospect of 
definitely saving ...  lives while providing each person with an equal 
chance to survive ... The preference would indicate the fact that unequal 
results may come of equal chances ... is a negative factor. (Kamm, 1985, 
p. 190)  
2.  Permitting the rescuers to work in the new danger zone would have 
extended the condition of the victims to now also include the rescuers. Such an event 
would have become an “equality of results” circumstance. Conversely, maintaining the 
rescuers ability to function because they were evacuated, presented the potential for 
having the victims share a fate equal to that of the rescuers, i.e., being saved, rather than 
the opposite. 
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d. Philosophy and the Difference Between “Killing” and “Letting 
Die” 
As in previous scenarios, there is, of course, no suggestion that “killing” 
by the emergency services was ever an issue or factor.  However, there was killing and 
injury on the part of the terrorists, and the emergency services, as a result, could have 
been placed in a position of making decisions that resulted in “letting die” possibilities.  
While there has also never been any indication that a “letting die” circumstance occurred 
at the trade center, the potential for such a decision element was present and is therefore 
worthy of review.  During the interview, the chief advised that he recognized the 
existence of such a potential, and he noted that if trapped victims had been located within 
the collapse evacuation zone, the decision he was required to make would have been 
substantially more complex. 
Some philosophical distinctions concerning the difference between 
“killing” and “letting die” are as follows: 
a) In letting-die cases one refuses to make efforts that would provide life 
to someone already under threat of death.  Efforts made to avoid killing in 
standard cases are not efforts that would provide someone already under 
threat of death with continued life.  Hence the functions of the efforts 
refused by the non-saver and by the killer are different. (Kamm, 1993, p. 
24)  
1.  The  chief’s decision to evacuate the collapse zone did not initiate or 
bring an additional harm to the victims who had already lost their lives, or been put in a 
life-threatening situation by the terrorists, which was the true act of “killing.” With that 
decision, it might have been possible that conditions of “letting die” would have ensued, 
but the magnitude of the situation was such that there was never any indication that 
original victims remained alive at the scene.  Conversely, failing to evacuate the rescuers 
would have placed them directly under threat of death. 
b) Once someone else already stands in a saving relation with B, or B is 
independent of my assistance and dependent on no one else, my 
interference takes from him something he already has.  It prevents his 
having it from continuing into the future as it otherwise would.  When I 
prevent someone from initiating aid to him I do not, in the same way, 
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prevent the continuation of some state that already existed and would 
continue in the future.  It is in the former, not the latter, type of case that 
we speak of killing. (Kamm, 1993, pp. 25, 26)  
2.  No trapped, living victim had been located at the time of the evacuation 
order, and hence no known victims were prevented from gaining the continuance of life 
through the rescuers’ assistance.  The evacuation order therefore did not remove any life 
that “would continue into the future.” 
c) If an agent terminates aid and so allows a potential cause of death 
actually to kill someone, but it is aid that the agent himself was providing, 
or aid that belongs to the agent then we have a letting die. (Kamm, 1993, 
pp. 28, 29)  
3.  Since the ability to save was entirely within the domain of the rescuers, 
and without which (had there been any known living victims in the rubble), the victims 
would have had no chance of survival at all, the suspension of that aid could never be 
interpreted as a “killing” as compared to the acceptable “letting die.” 
d) ...the following properties...are conceptual components of letting die: 
...Letting die does not itself create an original cause or an original threat of 
death. 
...The victim of letting die faces a cause of death independent of any the 
non-saver produces in virtue of non-saving. 
...The victim loses only life he would have had via the agent. 
...Efforts made by the agent could have provided the victim with continued 
life. 
...The nonsaver exercises control over what is his. (Kamm, 1993, p. 31)  
4. The original cause of death was due to the acts of the terrorists and was 
in no way associated with any of the subsequent acts of the rescuers.  The victims’ 
conditions were such that the only possibility for them to live would have been through 
the efforts of the rescuers. Thus, the removal of the rescuers from the location in order to 
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save their lives would have been within the confines of “letting die,” had it not been for 
the fact that those victims had been killed outright in the initial collapse.  
e) The  implicit traditional view is that killing and letting die differ 
morally only if, other things equal between them, one of the terms has 
definitional properties that have moral significance (sometimes or always) 
and these properties are never present in an instance of the other term.  
(The obvious factor here is creating an original cause of death, which is 
definitionally true of killing.) (Kamm, 1993, p. 33)  
5. As noted above the “original cause of death” was entirely due to the 
actions of the terrorists. 
e. Philosophy and Discontinuing Non-Futile Use of a Scarce 
Resource 
As noted previously, the ratio of rescuers to the potential number of 
victims at the time the chief made his decision would have permitted him to consider the 
rescuers as being ‘scarce.” This would have been further justified by the nature and type 
of operations at the scene that would be required in the days, weeks, and months to come.  
The futility or non-futility of any such efforts was an unknown at the time of the decision. 
An array of observations from philosophy on the discontinuance of use of 
resources is demonstrated below: 
a) It is not stopping [rescue efforts] per se, even when we know this will 
prevent some future improvement, that seems morally significant relative 
to not starting [rescue efforts].  What seems morally significant is stopping 
an improvement in the [victims] condition that has already occurred by 
stopping what was already being done to achieve it. (Kamm, 2002,  p. 
375) [It must be noted that no victim’s condition was being improved in 
the evacuation zone at the time of the order.]  
1. It is important to note that no active “rescue” operation (i.e., no one had 
been found alive in the debris) was under way at the time of the evacuation order.  
However, there was an extensive search operation, which is distinct from an ongoing 
rescue attempt. Had there been a rescue effort ongoing, it would have created a different 
level of importance and propriety in the decision-making process to evacuate the site.  
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The chief registered his awareness of this point when he noted that his decision would 
have been a much more complex one had there been live victims located and an ongoing 
rescue attempt being made within the evacuation zone. 
b) Why then may [the  chief] not stop the aid once started, in order to help 
others more, if the [victim] will be no worse off overall and being in the 
[rescue effort]  
gave him a chance?  Must the fact that the [victim] gets worse again 
through failure to continue what has already been done be definitive?  I 
suggest not. (Kamm, 2002,  p. 376)  
2. The decision made to evacuate therefore meant that none of the people 
already victimized by the terrorists would have been any “worse off” than they already 
were due to the attack.  Conversely, had they not been ordered to evacuate, the same 
reasoning would inversely apply to the rescuers.  In essence, this is an application of the 
traditional “triage” process. 
c) On the assumption that there are now always additional urgent cases 
who could reach a normality, and that it is not always wrong to stop or not 
start treating the most urgent to confront us, we should drop those who are 
urgent but have only moderate outcomes after [a period of effort] so as to 
search for those who are now urgent and who will achieve normality (as 
long as the probability of finding these is sufficiently high and sufficient 
good is done in the interval of the search). (Kamm, 2002,  p. 387)  
3. The rescuers were in a normal state, but whose condition certainly 
would have been made worse in the event of an additional collapse, thus, urgently seeing 
to it that they were removed from the a potential hazard in order to maintain that normal 
state was preferential to continuing the search for other victims, who were not in their 
normal condition. 
f. Philosophy and the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the 
Significance of Status 
At the time the chief had to make the decision to evacuate the collapse 
zone, he was presented with two competing status groups 1) the victims who had been 
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harmed and were in need of rescue, and 2) the rescuers who had not been harmed but 
were in need of protection from a life threatening condition. 
Philosophy notes the following relative to status in this type of situation: 
a) ...there may be a right to have one’s life saved, but it is a less stringent 
right than the right not to be killed. (Kamm, 1992, p. 366)  
1. The ongoing search for the original victims was clearly a reflection of 
the right of those individuals to be saved, whenever and wherever such a thing might 
have become possible.  However, the rescuers also had that same right to life, and in the 
circumstances that were presented at the time of the decision, the rescuers right not to be  
killed too would naturally have been given precedence, particularly since it was entirely 
plausible that many of the people for whom they were searching had, in all probability, 
already been killed. 
g. Philosophy and Harming Some to Save the Others 
The other disciplines note that there are occasionally undesirable cause 
and effect relationships between harming and saving. 
It has been noted previously that there have been no suggestions being 
made that harm was being caused to the victims by the emergency services.  All the harm 
that existed was created by the terrorists.  There is, however, the possibility that had any 
victims been found in the collapse zone prior to the evacuation order, the emergency 
services would have had to decide about permitting the harm to continue in order to save 
others. 
a) ...if actively causing a death that is not intended, but merely foreseen to 
be a side effect of the means used to save [others] is not permissible, it 
would follow that just passing by a dying person on the way to saving the 
[others] should also be impermissible.  But this makes it impossible ever 
to save some rather than others in situations where we cannot save 
everyone ...  (Kamm, 1989,  p. 232)  
1. The chief’s intent can clearly be seen as one of bringing good to the 
rescuers, i.e.,   saving them from injury and death that would be a certain outcome if left 
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to operate in the collapse zone. Those victims who were already in the site had had a 
cause of death already inflicted on them.  The chief was clearly attempting “to save 
some” in a situation where it was no longer possible to “save everyone.” 
b) When the lesser harm is a side effect of the greater good, the greater 
good does not occur by way of the lesser harm to others, according to the 
analysis of “by” provided by the [principle].  In these cases what we do, -- 
or any other event that helps to cause a greater good – is more directly 
related to the greater good than to the harm, since the greater good is 
either the direct cause or the indirect cause of the lesser harm. (Kamm, 
1989,  p. 235)  
2. Any potential “harm” that would have ensued from the evacuation order 
would have been a “side effect” of the original intention, which was purely one of seeing  
to the good of the rescuers.  Thus, the pre-existing condition of the victims already being 
harmed was not a direct result of the chief’s well intentioned decision about the status of 
the rescuers.  
c) ... it is permissible to act with the intention that the lesser harm occur as 
a way of maintaining the greater good already achieved. (Kamm, 1989,  p. 
240)  
3. Conversely to the above, the good outcome of keeping the rescuers 
alive was a direct result of the chief’s decision. 
d) (1) It is acceptable that greater good have lesser harm as one of its 
aspects or as its direct or indirect effect. (2) It is permissible that a mere 
means to a greater good have (a)  lesser harm as an indirect effect, if it has 
greater good as a direct effect or as an indirect effect achieved by a causal 
route independent of the lesser harm, or (b) lesser harm has a direct effect, 
if it has greater good as a direct effect.(c) lesser harm as its aspect, if it has 
greater good as its aspect also ... (Kamm, 1989, p. 242)  
4. Although it is not possible to claim that any “lesser harm” was an aspect 
of the chief’s decision, there was clearly a “greater good” that came to the rescuers as a 
result of the decision. Thus, even if “lesser harm” had come from the decision it would 
have been acceptable. 
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h. Philosophy and the Duty to Rescue 
The chief’s decision to evacuate the collapse zone clearly was a response 
to his duty to rescue people, in this case, the rescuers themselves.  He had already 
responded to that duty in regards to any victims that may have been in the original debris 
pile, as is evidenced by the fact that the very people he had to order to evacuate were 
already engaged in search efforts.  Thus, the chief was making a decision about both 
simultaneous and superseding rescue duties. It is important to remember that the issue of 
“distance” between the victim and the rescuer is not just one of proximity, but also of 
time.  Those who the chief could order evacuated were immediately accessible, whereas 
any trapped victims (although none had been found at that time) would have taken an 
extensive period of time to release.  Hence, they could be thought of as temporally 
“distant.” 
Philosophy sums up this mixture of issues surrounding the duty to rescue 
as follows: 
a) For when costs to reach or to aid people are high and people with whom 
one is not interdependent (“strangers”) are involved (even when all other 
factors are equal), we may have a duty to pay the costs only for those who 
are near. (Kamm, 2000, p. 9) [The cost being paid to rescue those who 
were near was the cessation of the victim searches.]     
1. There was a duty on the part of the emergency services to aid, assist, 
and rescue the victims at the World Trade Center, and that is exactly what the rescuers 
were attempting to do when the evacuation decision needed to be made. The “cost” of 
making this decision meant that the search effort would have had to be suspended until 
the safety condition in the collapse zone stabilized.  Given the duty of the fire 
department, this was indeed a substantial cost.  The chief was near to the rescuers in the 
sense that he had immediate access to them, whereas the conditions across the site 
prevented him from being “near” the original victims. Leaving the rescuers to work under 
the additional collapse threat could have resulted in an additional “cost” that would have 
been unacceptable. He accepted the existing cost and made a decision that gave aid to the 
near. 
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2. Bio-Ethics and Ethical Values 
There is no question that the decision to pause the rescue efforts due to the 
additional threat of building collapse required an ethical assessment between the lives of 
the current victims and the lives of potential victims. 
The discipline of bio-ethics offers a corollary of issues found in the treatment of 
pandemic patients: 
a) ... authorities faced hard choices in deciding which ... services to 
maintain and which to place on hold.  They had to weigh risks, benefits 
and opportunity costs.  It is necessary for such hard decisions to be made 
in a fair manner, including the appropriate access to limited resources.  
There needs to be equity between [victims and rescuers]….In the case of 
[a threat] it is important to control the spread of the [threat], but as much 
attention should be paid to the rights of the non-[injured] who need urgent 
[attention]. (University of Toronto Joint Center for Bioethics, p. 24)  
1.  The chief had to weigh the impact of the threat related decision he was making 
on both the rescuers and the victims. Whereas he could not control the threat (the 
potential collapse of the building), he could affect the risk it represented to the rescuers 
by removing them from the threat.  Their need for urgent attention was obvious, and his 
decision addressed and reflected that urgency. 
b) While [emergency] professionals have a duty to care for the [victims], 
this must be tempered by a duty to care for themselves in order to remain 
well enough to be able carry out their duties.  To extend the analogy 
introduced above, the firemen would not knowingly jump into a burning 
inferno.  Where to draw the line between role-related professional 
responsibilities and undue risk is a question [we] ... did not fully resolve. 
(University of Toronto Joint Center for Bioethics, p. 8)  
2. Ensuring their safety had a future beneficial effect on both the rescuers 
themselves and on any potential victims, inasmuch as the capabilities and talent resident 
in the saved rescuers could be brought to bear on the overall site conditions. Removing 




a. Theology and Death as a Side Effect 
At the time the chief made his decision, he had no information to indicate 
that any victims in the original debris pile were alive, had been located, or would have 
been left on their own because of the evacuation order.  Conversely, he did have 
information that large numbers of rescuers would be in a life threatened situation by 
remaining within the collapse zone of Seven World Trade Center.  Based on experience, 
one might have been able to presume that there may have been victims within the 
evacuation zone, but presumption can never be equated to fact.  The chief had to address 
the facts and the predominance of evidence that had been brought to his attention. 
Theology addresses certain aspects of morality that could attach to the 
decision factors and outcomes that the chief was addressing, as noted in the following 
examples: 
a) ...if one knowingly brings about someone’s death as a side effect, one is 
not responsible for intentional killing if one neither wants the death nor 
chooses to kill. (Grisez, 1993, p. 482)  
1. It can be argued that the chief had a responsibility to protect the lives of 
his personnel and the other rescuers operating at the scene of the collapse, and that in 
fact, not addressing that responsibility would have carried a moral burden with it.  It was 
death and additional killing that he was trying to avoid. His decision had no intention of 
causing or bringing harm to any of the rescuers or victims at the scene, and while there is 
absolutely no indication that any death occurred due to his decision, had such a thing 
happened, it would have been a direct result of the terrorist actions rather than his. 
b) It is always wrong to accept one’s own or another’s death that’s a side 
effect of doing something that would be wrong in any case. (Grisez, 1993, 
p. 482)  
2. The chief’s decision was clearly one of the rejecting rather than accepting death 
for anyone. 
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c) Accepting death as a side effect means making and carrying out a 
choice to do something other than kill and with a purpose other than death, 
but with the  
expectation that a death, one’s own or another’s, will result.  Risking 
death as a side effect is similar, but the expectation is that someone’s 
death might result. (Grisez, 1993, p. 482) 
3. The chief’s actions can clearly be seen as being in accordance with his 
moral responsibility towards his rescuers and “carrying out a choice” to save their lives.  
Any “side effect” of other outcomes that might have happened would have been a 
“risking death” circumstance as understood and described by the theologians: 
d) Sometimes one’s responsibilities to others make it clear that it is unfair 
to accept the risk of death to them or even to one’s self.... High public 
officials whose death would be detrimental to the common good take 
unfair risks if they evade [measures to secure their lives]. (Grisez, 1993, p. 
486)  
4. Leaving the rescuers in the new collapse zone would have been a case 
of “unfair risks” to them and in their loss would certainly have been “detrimental to the 
common good.” 
b. Theology and the Principle of Double Effect 
As alluded to above, the decision to evacuate the collapse zone had two 
potential outcomes: the first was the intended one of saving of the rescuers lives, and 
another possible outcome was that of leaving victims possibly trapped in the rubble 
without aid. 
The direct and indirect results of the above described decision purposes 
are directly related to the types of events envisioned in the theological Principle of 
Double Effect: 
a) ... the Principle of Double Effect... starts out with the idea that your 
initial action has to be itself a good action or what they call a morally 
indifferent action, and that action is seen as having two effects.... The 
second criterion after you have the performance of this morally indifferent 
or good act, it has to be that your intention is also to achieve the good end 
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and not what is called the bad end or the evil, so the intended effect is 
called the direct effect and what happens in terms of the evil effect is only 
permitted or tolerated but not intended.  The third criterion is that the evil 
effect cannot be the result of the good effect.  So in other words, the good 
and the bad have to arrive simultaneously as a result of the first action that 
you take and then the last criterion is that there has to be a proportion 
agreed for initiating that good or indifferent act in the first place. (V. 
Genovesi, personal communication, 2008)  
1. The chief’s order to evacuate the collapse zone clearly had an 
“intention” to achieve the good of saving the lives of the rescuers; any other outcome was 
not intended.  The “evil effect” that was present at the World Trade Center site was 
entirely a consequence of the acts of the terrorists. 
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VII. DECISION MAKING 
This thesis has examined the observations of multiple and varied disciplines 
concerning matters involving issues of life and death. Much of what has been looked at is 
derived from the moral core concerns and influences that would naturally surround such 
events.  A significant amount of the discussion has been conducted in an abstract, 
intellectual, and academic environment where such discussions and debates can be 
exchanged freely without an actual cost in lives being expended.  It is this free exchange 
of discussion about the circumstances, conditions, and cultural drivers that serve to 
expand knowledge in this most important realm. 
This thesis has also examined a series of events and circumstances that are as far 
removed from that abstract world first analyzed as it is possible to travel.  The real-life 
experiences that were described were examples of life and death situations that were 
completely devoid of the luxury of detachment that was reviewed in the earlier examples 
from the other disciplines.  These were actual situations where some people would live, 
some people would die, and decisions were made with that understanding. 
The chasm between these views of the same issue is not new.  In 2002, the 
National Science Foundation convened a workshop, “Integrated Research in Risk 
Analysis and Decision Making in a Democratic Society.”  One of the participants 
described this chasm: 
...the field appears focused on serving the needs of policymakers and 
analysts, to the exclusion of those with line responsibilities either in 
anticipation or in response to disasters.  The other notable bias is that risk 
analysis and its brethren receive far more attention than decision making, 
which I think of as the place where “the rubber hits the road” ….My first, 
perhaps naïve, suggestion would be to make sure that we take a broader 
view to include others.  In my conception, decision makers fall into two 
major categories: 
1. Those who set policy  in a relatively static world, where there is time to 
do careful analyses, subject decisions to public and political processes, and 
fine-tune  them based on experience, if any. 
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2. Those who are “on-line” in trying to anticipate, react to, rescue the 
victims of, and restore infrastructure in the wake of potential or actual 
disasters.  This is  
probably a much larger community, many of whose members may not 
even know that they will play such roles until a disaster happens. 
(National Science Foundation, 2002, p. 77) 
What should be evident at this juncture, though, are not the extreme differences 
noted above, but rather the leitmotif that runs continuously as an undercurrent throughout 
both the abstract discussions and the operational scenarios.  What each is fully involved 
with is decision making.  The philosopher, theologian, ethicist, etc. are each describing 
the various factors and conditions that permit or tolerate loss of life when an individual 
has to make a decision relating to the possibility or probability of that loss. The fire 
chiefs, completely removed from an academic discussion, but fully immersed in a life-
threatening crisis, have given insight into the various factors and conditions that 
contribute to both the saving and the loss of life when such a decision has to be made. It 
is that decision process that actually places all these disciplines in immediate proximity 
with each other, rather than at opposite ends of the academic/operational spectrum.  It is 
important to note, however, that that proximity is rarely, if ever, recognized by the 
individual participants in those disciplines. 
While some decisions concerning the continuance of life can be made at a pace 
that permits and, in fact, encourages a deliberative process, such as with the CDC 
pandemic vaccine distribution plan, it is probably more commonly experienced in crisis 
circumstances that do not allow for deliberative opportunities. In both of these types of 
activities, however, the decision makers do share an observer status, albeit with great 
differences in distance from, and personal involvement in, the crisis, but it is only 
through their ability to observe under these varying conditions and influences that permit 
them the wherewithal to make the necessary decisions. For example, it would be 
unreasonable to expect those whose lives might be lost to be a neutral and reasoned 
observer concerning that possibility.  The ability to be an observer of the condition, to 
absorb, and consider all the issues, whether it is something in the distant future that may 
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not actually ever occur (as with the vaccination plan), or a situation that the decision 
maker is seeing, hearing and experiencing at the moment, would still appear to be a 
mandatory requirement for making such a decision. The ability to take stock of a 
situation and remain distinct from it long enough to weigh the known facts and conditions 
is a major requirement of the decision maker. Developing and maintaining that observer 
status is a pivotal contributor to creating a substantive outcome. 
A. THREAT AND RISK 
Where risk is a balance point between “vulnerability” and “consequence,” the 
decision maker must first have awareness of the threat that creates the life-threatening 
situation.  If there is vulnerability for individuals involved in a circumstance that could 
result in a life-threatening situation, then there is a threat and risk condition that will 
require a Considered Risk Casualty decision. For the sake of this discussion this thesis 
will always presume the consequence to be death rather than injury alone. As seen in the 
described scenarios, vulnerabilities can vary significantly in response to a single threat, to 
multiple threats of different types, to multiple threats for a single group, to single or 
multiple threats to different groups simultaneously, and even to a group who, having 
died, moved beyond both threat and vulnerability, but whose situation can continue to 
have consequences for other groups. Naturally, the higher the level of vulnerability 
and/or consequence, the higher the level of risk involved.  It is the realization and 
understanding of that level of risk, or its continuing increase, that brings the decision 
maker to a point of having to make a Considered Risk Casualty decision. What the 
decision maker may not immediately comprehend is that there is also an inherent risk for 
themselves with regards to any subsequent review of the need for their decisions in these 
situations.  Even when that is understood, however, it remains the ability of the individual 
to move beyond that and other concerns and to make the decision in a timely manner that 
reduces the threat to all concerned.   
Clearly, such decisions are among the most important that any individual can 
make, or as so succinctly stated by Chief Cruthers,  “You risk little to save little, and risk 
more to save a lot, and the most important thing you can save is a life” (F. Cruthers, 
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personal communication, 22 January, 2008). The basis of the Considered Risk Casualty 
decisions in each of the scenarios examined were not made with the benefit of complete 
data, confirmed factual information, or multi-discipline observations and input. It might 
be proposed that the above described decisions were made in moments of intuition, but 
intuition is generally not explicable in subsequent analysis; that is to say it is not a 
derivative moment. Each of the chiefs in interview was able to describe the facts they 
weighed in reaching their decisions in the above scenarios. They may have been able to 
analyze the conditions so rapidly that it appeared intuitive, but that, in fact, was not the 
case. The decisions were made on the basis of vast professional experience. 
1. Factors Considered 
a. Similar Factors 
Just as risk and experience are variables, so are the dynamic influences 
and conditions under which these decisions are made. Some factors in the scenarios 
appear to be constant, or indeed, must be constant, such as the threat to life, but there 
were others involved that are worthy of note due to the nature of the impact they can have 
on the decision maker. Some of those factors are as follows: 
1). Time.  The time factor can be either elapsed, anticipated, or 
both simultaneously. For Chief McNamee, the amount of time that had elapsed since the 
trapped firefighters had first gotten into distress was a major factor influencing his 
decision.  The longer that time continued, the less likely it was that those firefighters 
would have been found alive.  Simultaneously, the more time that fire had to advance, the 
greater the risk it was to the lives of his remaining firefighters. 
For Chief Cruthers, the more time that the fire in the remaining 
tower had to burn, the closer was the possibility of a collapse, thereby increasing the 
threat to his firefighters. Conversely, the more time the rescuers were away from their 
search duties, the greater was the possibility that if other victims had remained alive, that 
they could have succumbed to their existing condition. 
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2) Distance.  Distance is not just a matter of linear proximity 
but also one of time.  A short, actual distance can take a substantial amount of time to 
traverse due to obstacles created by a threat such as fire, smoke, debris, etc. Distance can 
also equate to a change in the level of threat. 
For Chief Dunn, the closer his firefighters got to the gunman, the 
greater the risk to their lives became.  Conversely, the further away from the fire the 
firefighters moved, the greater the risk to the hostages from the fire. 
For Chief Cruthers, the greater the distance from the remaining 
tower the firefighters and other rescuers moved, the more their chances of survival 
increased. Conversely, the further away from the search area they were, the less the 
chance for creating victim rescue or recovery opportunities.  
3) Threat.  A threat condition can impact all individuals at a 
scene equally, but addressing the threat when there are different categories of individuals 
can impact those groups in distinctly opposite ways. 
Chief Dunn encountered two separate threats simultaneously, but 
he had the capacity to address only one of them.  By addressing the fire, he was reducing 
that threat to the hostages but increasing the vulnerability of the firefighters to the 
gunman.  Conversely, by responding to the threat presented by the gunman to the 
firefighters, he was increasing the threat to the hostages presented by the fire. 
Chief McNamee also had two categories of individuals for which 
he had to make a decision: the trapped firefighters and the rescuers. However, the factor 
of time had overridden and concluded the threat for one of these groups, the trapped 
firefighters, which enabled him to focus all his attention on the surviving rescue 
personnel. 
Chief Cruthers was faced with a situation wherein the initial threat 
had seemingly passed, only to be replaced by an additional but similar threat.   The two 
groups that he was concerned about would be unequally impacted by this new threat.  If 
the group that had become victims of the first threat were subsequently impacted by the 
second one, (given the magnitude of the first threat and its results), the condition of those 
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initial victims in all probability would not have been changed.  On the other hand, the 
rescuers who had survived the first threat could easily be killed by the second one. 
b. Standard Operating Procedures 
Planned and practiced response patterns by homeland security entities can 
be of dubious benefit in these circumstances.  They can increase the risk to personnel, but 
they can also contribute to risk reduction. 
For Chief Dunn, the personnel under his command were proceeding 
according to established operating methods when they moved into the building to attack 
the fire, but it increased their risk from a source that had not been in their normal 
problem/solution process.  It was the chief’s ability to recognize the difference between 
those two conflicting issues that bought him to the point of making a Considered Risk 
Casualty decision. 
In the Massachusetts warehouse fire, the standard and completely 
necessary practice of committing personnel to search for trapped people in a fire 
contributed to the dimensions of the loss. Chief McNamee’s ability to recognize that 
continuing to increase the commitment of personnel, according to a plan designed for 
routine situations, was no longer applicable in a crisis setting and was what saved the 
lives of the remaining firefighters. Conversely, it was that same commitment to standard 
practice that caused the resistance from the remaining firefighters to his order ending 
rescue operations.  Only when those personnel understood the novelty of the 
circumstance in the same way the chief did their resistance to the order stop. 
At the World Trade Center, the magnitude of the disaster was such that 
there was no existing procedure or plan anywhere that could have addressed the actual 
situation.  It was, however, the ability of Chief Cruthers and his staff to rely on the model 
of past events and procedures that gave him the means to not only make the decision, but 
to have the directive carried out successfully. 
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c. Different Factors 
As described in the scenarios, it is possible to see how there were also a 
number of different factors present in each of the situations that were modified or not 
present in the other circumstances. 
Chief Dunn had multiple overlapping threats, for which the solutions 
would have created inverse cause and effect outcomes for the hostages and firefighters, 
even though there were only a few unknown factors that needed to be considered in his 
decision making. Also different from the other scenarios, he had no ability to address one 
of the threats, (the gunman, which was a law enforcement matter rather than a fire 
department issue), and his decision did not create a negative reaction among the 
firefighters. 
The items that made the warehouse fire different from the other incidents 
were that Chief McNamee had a singular threat for which he had the required resources 
and ability to address. His response to the threat followed protocol which was one of 
increasing commitment to meet an increasing threat, which was a process that the 
subsequent conditions later caused him to reject. The outcome was that the decision he 
made caused recalcitrance and resistance, albeit briefly, among his personnel Chief 
Cruthers was presented with a disaster of unprecedented scale that was caused by an 
intentional act.  The resources and ability to address an event of such magnitude was 
beyond the capacity of any existing plans or emergency service to fully address. The 
unknown circumstances that he would have had to consider far surpassed the facts that he 
had available to him, and they could not be determined in the amount of time that he had 
available before having to make a decision about a new and growing threat. 
The National Science Foundation spoke to all of these dynamics thusly:  
...decision analysis seeks out the diverse views of interested and affected 
stakeholders.  It attempts to assess the probabilities associated with all the 
outcomes believed to be important, and assigns values to those outcomes 
in ways that can be sensitive to equity, personal control, catastrophic 
losses, or other factors deemed important by the affected parties. 
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...whereas risk analysis often strives for some magic number that defines 
an “acceptable risk,” decision analysis recognizes that there is no 
universally acceptable level of risk.  In decision analysis, acceptable risk 
depends upon the problem context and can be understood only in 
association with the management option at its best in a particular context.  
In other words, acceptable risk is decision driven: as the decision changes, 
so too will the magnitude of the risk that is acceptable (that is, the 
probabilities, consequences, etc. that are acceptable). (National Science 
Foundation, 2002, p. 73)  
The process of making these decisions is not unlike that of a battlefield 
commander in war: “It is sometimes work just like that on the battlefield, with 
conclusions reached many times more often by informed judgment than by precise 
analysis.” (Franks, 1996, p. 11)  
How that is achieved in battle is insightfully described this way:  
For some, especially those commanders at battalion level and below, it 
means seeing, listening, roughly imagining what you cannot immediately 
see and then deciding – and sometimes in nanoseconds, sometimes 
without much consultation.  For senior tactical commanders, it means 
doing a lot of listening, gathering information and seeing what is going on 
in the present but having the discipline to remain detached enough to 
imagine or forecast the future or what you cannot see.  Senior 
commanders deal more with what they can imagine and what they cannot 
see. (Franks, 1996, pp. 20, 21)  
The corollary to the decision-making process of the above fire chiefs is 
unmistakable, particularly the requirement to “remain detached.” 
In the above factors and circumstances, one sees how great the variables 
created in the aggregate can be to both the vulnerability and consequence aspects of risk, 
as well as the factors that are included in the decision process and eventual outcomes. It 
is this ever changing status of threat, risk, and factors matrix that is a defining aspect of 
Considered Risk Casualty situations and the decisions that such events demand. 
B. EXPERIENCE 
In each of the homeland security events that were reviewed with regards to their 
decision-making conditions, it is clear that there is a highly complex, interrelated mix of 
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factors that compete for prominence in any Considered Risk Casualty situation. The fact 
that lives can be saved or lost on the basis of these decisions should mean that each of the 
factors is carefully weighed and considered according to its hierarchy of importance.  
Unfortunately, the urgency of these scenarios indicates that the time available to give the 
appropriate attention to each and all these details is a luxury that is simply never going to 
be available to the decision maker.  At least, that is how the circumstance appears in an 
initial examination.  The opposite is in fact the truth. It is actually a question of how 
much time is actually required to give “appropriate attention” to each of these factors. It 
appears that with experience, the time requirement is remarkably short or as described 
above by the military, “nanoseconds.” 
A factor that was similar in each of these scenarios, but was not noted above, is 
that of the experience level of the decision makers.  Each of the chiefs involved in these 
events had decades of experience and were among the most veteran officers in their 
departments. That experience enabled them to gather, absorb, and evaluate the factors 
and the cause-and-effect probabilities that all their years of responding to emergencies 
could bring to the decision-making process. That experience level was so great that it 
gave them the ability to establish an information hierarchy matrix not only as to the 
importance of the facts, but also for the probability of factors whose exact status was 
unknown or unknowable in the conditions under which they were operating.  
Additionally, their professional experience gave them the ability to foresee the cause-and-
effect relationships of each of those individual factors in comparison to each other. It 
likewise enabled them to do all of these things at a speed so great, again, “nanoseconds,” 
that they did not always realize themselves that they were processing this information.  
Two of them described the time necessary to build and evaluate this matrix as a 
“moment,” and the other chief described the process as “simplistic.”  It was only through 
subsequent discussion that the complexity of the process that they were involved in 
became known to and realized by them.  There were at least twenty-five independent and 
often conflicting factors in just one segment of the overall problem matrix in the decision 
described as “simplistic.” That decision included the following factors: 
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a) The ongoing search for their fellow firefighters, police officers etc. 
b) The viability of the victims. 
c) The likelihood of success. 
d) The nature of the hazard. 
e) The potential cost of the effort. 
f) The proximity to the victims. 
g) The magnitude of the scene. 
h) The collapses that had already occurred. 
i) The anticipated collapse of Seven World Trade Center. 
j) The extreme number of lives that were in danger. 
k) The guiding factors learned in previous events were applicable at this 
scene. 
l) He had to do everything possible to not lose more lives. 
m) Dangerous activities would need to be undertaken in the current search 
condition. 
n) If there is no life to be saved, you don’t risk life. 
o) The ongoing fire condition across the site. 
p) The FDNY experience in creating collapse zones. 
q) The FDNY experiencing withdrawing units from firefighting operations. 
r) The FDNY experience in retreating to exterior operating positions. 
s) The FDNY ability to continue to fight fires from outside positions. 
t) The FDNY experience in enlarging or shrinking zones of operation. 
u) The FDNY Officers and firefighters had experience in the above fire 
ground operations. 
v) The size of the structure in danger of collapse. 
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w) He needed to differentiate between what is worth saving (lives) and 
protecting (property). 
x) The experience of the firefighters was being applied in a condition that it 
was exceptionally more dangerous and greater in size than they had ever 
experienced previously. 
y) He had available to him the collective experience of many other chief 
officers that he had known and worked with for years. (F. Cruthers, 
personal communication, 1 August, 2008) 
This type of thought process was noted in the National Science Foundation 
workshop as: 
...besides risk analysis (and its close relative, decision analysis), we have 
another mode of thinking that is essential for rational decisions in the face 
of danger.  This is the experiential mode.... Experiential thinking is 
intuitive, automatic, and fast.  It relies on images and associations, linked 
by experience to emotions and effect (feelings that something is good or 
bad). (National Science Foundation, 2002, p. 72)  
The connecting and key element in this statement is the reference to experience 
and, as noted previously in many  homeland security events that may result in serious 
injury or death, the conditions that lead to that possibility arise quickly and early-on in 
the development of a crisis.  It is during that developmental stage that the first responders 
are most likely to be present, and it is also the time when the most senior and experienced 
decision-making personnel are least likely to have arrived at the crisis scene.  
Of all the drivers influencing outcomes in Considered Risk Casualty decision-
making instances, none has more impact in the selection of the solution chosen then does 
the experience of the decision maker. In that experience there exists both the strength and 
the weakness in Considered Risk Casualty situations. In short, in order to improve, if not 
ensure the best outcomes in Considered Risk Casualty situations, it would be beneficial to 
increase the experience base of those individuals who may be tasked with making life and 
death decisions in  homeland security events. The pivotal question is how to create the 
benefits derived by experience for those who have not yet acquired that experience.  
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However, it is not just any experience in Considered Risk Casualty incidents that is 
universally valuable; the worth and credibility of the experience is situational specific as 
revealed in the following. 
Both the fire service and the military have vast experience in making these types 
of decisions and with almost instinctive action, as seen in the above, will respond to save 
their own, even to putting their own lives at risk to do so. At the Pentagon on September 
11, 2001, in spite of the raging fires, members of the military made numerous entries into 
the destroyed parts of the building to search for and rescue those trapped inside. As the 
fire service presence increased at the scene, they commenced searching as part of their 
duty, and quickly recognized, based on their experience that the conditions had become 
untenable for further searches. The military personnel, though having abundant 
experience in operating in life threatening conditions, had no experience in doing so in 
infernos and, therefore, failed to realize that the time for further rescue efforts had passed. 
This dichotomy of experience created at least one incident of altercation between 
representatives of the military and the fire service before fire-ground control was 
established (Creed and Newman, 2008, p. 144) This incident strongly indicates that 
Considered Risk Casualty decision-making experience must also be viewed and 
evaluated within its developmental realm to be fully applicable in times of crisis. This 
does not mean that decision making can only be credible within the field of the decision 
maker, but it does dramatically point out the need for acquiring experience based 
education across a wide range of disciplines in order to meet the current and future 
homeland security conditions that can occur. 
C. THE MILITARY 
At the start of this paper the author discussed the traditional military experience of 
expending personnel and materiel in order to attain a particular objective in warfare.  
That process is understood in a loosely defined concept referred to as “Acceptable 
Losses.”  Given the volume of such instances, it would be normal to anticipate that a 
metric exists within the military for determining the number and type of losses that would 
be “acceptable” for an objective of a particular type, size, or importance, but this is not 
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the case. This was stated quite clearly and noted previously as: “Just War moral 
principles and doctrine provided few, if any, specific guidelines to help military decision 
makers value and weigh alternative choices in the very chaotic environment of war” 
(Roblyer, 2005, p. 10). Even at the individual decision maker’s level the search for such a 
metric would be pointless as noted during an interview at West Point,  “...that scale 
doesn’t exist other than in the commanders considered judgment” (B. Imiola, personal 
communication, 19 May, 2008). 
The only recognition given to the search for a metric that might be of assistance to 
the decision maker is summed up with the word “proportionality,” which is taken to 
mean an inexact equation between the “costs” and the “objective” or the gain anticipated 
and/or achieved.  In the military, it is stated as a legal understanding that “Proportionality 
requires that any incidental civilian injury or damage to civilian property arising from 
such an attack be proportional to the military advantage anticipated” (Stephens and 
Lewis, 2005, p. 4). Clearly, this leaves one without a defined calculus in times of crisis.  
However, it is just as clear that the vast military experience with this problem must place 
its reliance for these decisions somewhere.  It appears that place is with the on-scene 
commander.  In reference to this issue, in the Geneva Conventions it has been described 
as: “When incorporated into operable rules of engagement, difficult choices need to be 
made, choices that vigorously test the limits of the concepts.  Kennedy correctly observes 
that commanders will often conclude that it is a ‘judgment call’ [49]...” (Stephens and 
Lewis, 2005, p. 5). 
There is no shortage of observations and analysis throughout the military field 
that continue to repeat citations about a commander’s judgment in determining exactly 
what the portions are in the factor of “proportionality” when discussing “acceptable 
losses.”  A continuing legal analysis of this focus states, “The principle of proportionality 
necessarily requires that ‘value judgments’ should be made as to the respective worth of 
attaining military objectives against the cost of securing such an objective [124]” 
(Stephens and Lewis, 2005, p. 11). These repeated references to “judgment” and “values” 
seems to push the decision-making process further from definable standards and into an 
area that is not only nebulous, but since it is dependent on the individual, could be 
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expected to be dramatically different from decision maker to decision maker.  This would 
then seem to beg the question if there is a discernible criteria available within 
“judgment,” if not proportionality per se. Unexpectedly, the military experience seems to 
suggest that the structuring of values is more discernible and developmental than any 
criteria for proportionality, 
The modern commander is compelled to weigh the loss of all lives 
(enemy, civilian and own forces) when planning an attack and, under the 
prevailing law, must apply requisite values to both lives and military 
objectives when deciding whether the proposed attack meets the 
proportionality criteria.  These values are shaped by both the cultural 
background of the officer as well as the significance of the military 
objective and the broad cost of securing it.  [119]” (Stephens and Lewis, 
2005, p. 11) 
This is re-emphasized as “To the extent that decisions concerning target selection 
under the principle of proportionality are based upon value judgments, it will necessarily 
reflect the values of the military commander making those judgments” (Stephens and 
Lewis, 2005, p. 12).  
Even though legal in nature, the above observations might be thought of as 
distinct from the operational issues, but again that is not the case.  Military field 
commanders not only accept the “value” based standard for determining proportionality 
and acceptable losses but also suggest how such a value system is created and applied: 
It is also the moral dimensions of accumulated individual decisions that 
perhaps register the most clearly in any determination of the overall 
morality of an organization – or a country.... the people of the United 
States desire a military that strives to attain the highest moral standards, 
and military members involved in the targeting decision process deserve 
the best moral preparation and decision making tools their nation can 
provide. 
…This process description is followed by considerations from the fields of 
applied ethics and decision analysis as they pertain to identifying possible 
issues in the decision support provided to military members who must 
make very difficult moral judgments in the targeting process. (Roblyer, 
2005, p. 2)  
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Although this statement is a direct reference to the full range of other 
discipline observations examined, it is clear that this is obviously not an 
abstract issue for the military, but rather a true operational objective that 
has been considered and evaluated over many years in numerous combat 
operations.  They have manifestly concluded that “acceptable loss” 
decision situations ultimately come to rest with an individual commander 
or decision maker on whom they rely to have the appropriate system of 
values necessary to make the requisite decisions under these conditions, 
“...I think that when we go to complex situations where there are a wide 
variety of factors and perhaps imperatives that are included in there, it’s 
going to come down to that considered judgment.” (B. Imiola, personal 
communiation, 19 May, 2008)  
Accepting this, it is then reasonable to inquire about the genesis of such a value 
system and whether or not that can be inculcated and/or enhanced to provide some 
repeatable dependability to these most critical decision moments.  West Point has also 
considered this issue: 
Clearly people who enter into the military already come in with a world 
view of their own.  We all come in with our worldview shaped by our 
culture, and our parents, and our religion, or whatever other things we 
believe in…I think the model of the Army and certainly here at the 
Academy is an Aristotelian model where we come in, we’re taught certain 
things, were taught that these things are good, and these things are bad, 
these values are good values, these virtues are good virtues, these are vices 
rather than virtues, and having taught them we habitualize them and then 
we practice them and we do them through habit, they’re reinforced for us 
and finally...we internalize those values and those virtues so when faced 
with a situation like that, a person of good character, which we hope as 
officers and gentlemen we’d all be, would then…understand and know 
what to do…In the Army I think we like to think more in terms of that 
person’s good character being in the forefront and…understanding what to 
do…so I think in that case what comes to the forefront is the person’s 
training, experience and character and the hope that that person is a good 
person, and a moral person, and does the right thing, and makes the right 
decisions. (B. Imiola, personal communication, 19 May, 2008) 
From the above observations, it is obvious that the military experience 
demonstrates that an individual’s values and character can be developed through a 
program that provides education and opportunities to test those abstract elements by 
which an individual’s morals and cultural standards are recognized and understood.  
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However, it is in the application of those values that the test of the decision maker 
resides. The military also has observations on that: 
...I think that we would find that in a profession over time, the profession 
will narrow that possible range of responses down where, for example, 
you and I with perhaps completely different backgrounds, two people with 
completely different backgrounds, given to make a decision about the 
same thing might very well lead to completely different outcomes and 
different responses.  However, someone in a profession with a 
professional ethic, and a training program, and a common set of values 
and virtues, even if it’s mere training, I think that will become a drastically 
narrowed down ... possible range of responses.  So rather than see a 
response that’s going to be from A to Z you might narrow it down to a 
response from H to J…I think there would be much more in common 
rather than differences because of the experience and the profession. (B. 
Imiola, personal communication, 19, May, 2008)  
Battlefield commanders, the decision makers themselves, have also endorsed this 
concept: 
The combination of the pressures and high stakes of the wartime decision 
environment, the moral – legal tensions and resulting conflicts, and the 
well-trained, but fallible, human beings making the decisions are 
unavoidable factors.  It is precisely because these factors are inescapable 
that the human decision makers deserve the highest quality decision 
support that can be made available to them. (Roblyer, 2005, p. 30)  
They have also commented on a suggested source that would inform such an 
educational support program designed to create and establish the structure upon which 
life and death decisions can be made: 
Principles and cautions from ethics and judgment and decision making 
provide different and important lenses through which to view the very 
difficult issues posed in the targeting process.  More fully incorporating 
those concepts may contribute to better moral preparation of United States 
military decision makers and, in the final analysis, may contribute to 
making wars of the future less costly in terms of innocent lives. (Roblyer, 
2005, p. 35)  
The decision maker in battle takes these ethical experience concepts that through 
education have been “internalized” into values and combines them with personal 
experience to become a decision-making ability and talent described as: 
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They must see the present, imagine the future – both friendly and enemy – 
as it should be to accomplish the mission and then figure out the best way 
to get from one state to the other at least cost to their soldiers.  They must 
see in their “mind’s eye” what others cannot.  That is where the long years 
of practice and study, plus information about the reality of the present, 
cause your intuitive senses to be able to see what others cannot. (Franks, 
1996, p. 21)  
In the civilian realm, one of the papers submitted to the National Science 
Foundation workshop concluded this way: 
The world has always been a dangerous place and today’s risks are 
certainly no less daunting than these of earlier eras.  However the nature of 
these risks has definitely changed, posing unprecedented combinations of 
relatively high probability, catastrophic outcome’s surrounded by vague 
knowledge and substantial uncertainties.  Coping with such threats 
requires all the skills we can muster.  This means tapping into the 
strengths of trained human judgment and intuition and integrating these 
with formal methods of analysis. (National Science Foundation, 2002, p. 
74)  
If one transposes the lessons learned from years, indeed centuries, of military 
events in “acceptable losses” issues to its parallel civilian homeland security concept of 
Considered Risk Casualties and combines it with the identification of effective and 
efficient examples of decision making from the civilian world, one is able to identify the 
two core educational requirements for decision makers, Those requirements are 
experience and moral values. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY ISSUES 
Deciding who lives and who dies is a daunting responsibility.  It is an element of 
very few professions, and even among them, the occasions on which it actually becomes 
a necessary and conscious decision can be rare moments. It is understandable how this 
rarity, when combined with the seriousness, magnitude, and finality of the consequences 
of such decisions, can also make them among the most difficult and remembered 
moments in a lifetime.  Apparently, it is these very same factors that create a substantial 
amount of discomfort in discussing this topic, and at times just surfacing it for discussion. 
These decisions take place across a wide spectrum of activities and conditions. It 
can be seen in the relatively abstract writing of plans to serve some future and distant 
event that may never occur and within which no defined recognition is given to the life 
and death consequences of the use of the plan. It is also recognizable in active, ongoing, 
and immediately urgent crisis and disaster situations. The scale of events under which 
these decisions are required are equally as broad, encompassing both a doctor’s 
relationship to an individual patient and a head-of-state’s decision concerning the use of 
nuclear weapons. Yet, throughout all of these circumstances there is no one identified 
calculus or metric that has been developed and applied for use during this decision-
making process.  That may be at least partially due to its complexity or to the reluctance 
to discuss this topic at all. However, it may also be a reflection of the seriousness with 
which society views this situation through tacitly recognizing that no metric would ever 
be sufficient to serve such a purpose. 
These above factors result in a condition that leaves the homeland security 
executive and/or decision maker in a very isolated position.  They are left essentially to 
their own devices to reach a solution that addresses the probability or actual death of an 
individual or large numbers of people. As seen throughout this thesis, these decisions are 
frequently made under circumstances that preclude having all the information and data 
that would assist in making such decisions, and frequently fall on the shoulders of a 
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single individual. Even as society does not provide a metric for these moments, it 
simultaneously expects that the decision-making individual will have all the capabilities, 
experience, and morality necessary to make a decision that is equal to the circumstances 
presented. For professions that routinely require decisions that are far less consequential 
than matters of life and death, society provides, and in many cases requires, that they be 
rigorously educated to adhere to a level of acceptable performance. As one can see from 
the above, even with professions and occupations where a level of expertise is required, 
that the fitness for, or ability to make life-and-death decisions may not be universally 
applied with equal rigor. 
Enhancing that decision-making ability through an educational process focused 
on such moments would not only serve society as a whole, but it would also provide a 
means of filling that void created by the absence of a metric while simultaneously giving 
much needed support to the decision makers themselves. This concept was endorsed 
repeatedly during the research for this thesis across a number of different disciplines.  For 
example, from the military: 
...risk analysis tools…one way to think of them is a useful role in the 
training and development of members so that in real life those decisions 
can be made falling back on training and experience rather than 
necessarily a checklist ... thought processes may be a valuable educational 
piece of the training and development of knowledge and experience in 
professional leaders so that when it comes time to make these decisions, 
that’s part of the background they can fall back on and then be able to 
make those decisions in light not only of their training experience but also 
in the other factors that are involved in that. 
…junior members who are much more inclined perhaps in times of crisis 
to fall back on their own personal beliefs, values, morals, upbringing, 
world view than the organizations.  So I think that training them on 
perhaps talking about those other things but incorporating them 
underneath the umbrella of the organizational values might be perhaps a 
clear path for them to achieve the level that I would think we’d want them 
to have which would be either to habitualize or then eventually internalize 
those values so they can make those decisions... (B. Imiola, pesonnal 
comminication, 19 May, 2008) 
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From the emergency services: 
Anything that causes firefighters to think about ... life and death and 
emergency situations ... from the theologians or the philosophers and from 
the terrorism experts ... is good information…. I want to know more about 
it.  I think the fire service should know more about it.  So I’m more about 
this theologian’s views on life and death and philosophers so all that 
information will make us better decisions at the fire ground. (V. Dunn, 
personal communication, 26 June, 2008) 
...if I sat down and went through one of these programs, if one were 
developed and I sat through one of these programs, I would most 
definitely be looking at it from a whole different angle than I would have 
prior to December 3, 1999, absolutely...everybody on the job at that time 
had not experienced a violent line of duty death….We had our deaths and 
things like that, but as far as violent fire ground line of duty deaths...it was 
not a reality.  It was a concept.  It was way in the back of our heads.  We 
knew...it’s a possibility, these things happen, but what our incident did 
was brought it right back in full view of our face, right in our face the 
reality of the things that we had kind of pushed into the back of our mind 
because nobody had experienced it on the job at that time. (M. McNamee, 
personal communication, 23 July, 2008) 
I don’t think something like this can be left…if you work intuitively, 
you’re going to get a different answer every time…if you’re going to deal 
intuitively, you’re not even dealing with the same intuition each time so I 
think that’s one thing I would dismiss, is that it be left to intuitive handling 
by whoever happens to be the on-duty commander who drew the short 
straw….Intuition. It’s certainly a factor…but I don’t think that can be the 
factor. (F. Cruthers, personal communication, 22 January, 2008) 
From the theologian: 
…are dealing with a population who will be involved in the decision-
making process.  What’s the best way for them to learn? …we don’t even 
ask the questions maybe because we don’t know what the questions are, so 
it seems to be that whatever educational program was developed, it should 
begin with sensitizing people to knowing what the questions are that need 
to be asked.  Then you start to figure out how do we get some answers?   
You know, you expose them to probably case studies and that kind of 
thing, scenarios that actually have happened or scenarios that are likely to 
occur... it is very practical, it’s not overly theoretical or speculative…we 
would bring to the scenarios and case studies probably a combination of 
material, background material that you’ve been exposed to, to the  
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philosophers…there are principles that I think are pretty far ranging and 
pretty generally accepted as operative principles for what we have with 
some of these questions. 
...I think it’s safe to say generally that sound theological principles depend 
to a large extent on sound philosophical principles and now when you 
make the theological and moral decision, you can’t do it apart from 
philosophy but you also can’t do it in a vacuum that doesn’t take into 
consideration what we might call empirical facts and the empirical facts 
are provided by an in-house ... social analysis, circumstantial analysis, or 
what have you, but you need to know the facts to make a moral decision 
and we begin with general acceptance of the position of the dignity of life 
and the obligation we have to preserve that, we do that within the context 
that is the real world and so you deal with it as best you can. (V. Genovesi, 
personal communicatin, 9 July, 2008) 
I think it would be encouraged.  We’re talking about conscience, for 
example, you don’t develop a conscience necessarily only by directly 
engaging in every type of virtue and/or wrongdoing yourself.  You can 
also learn from examples.  You can learn from role models.  You can learn 
from reading experiences of others…direct experience is not the only 
acceptable kind of experience. (D. Ruff, personal communication, 13 June, 
2008) 
From the government leader: 
I think it’s very hard to make it formulaic…. I really think it comes down 
to experience and professional judgment and training but that ultimately 
for all the hard and fast numerical criteria you might create, it has to be 
done based on a professional judgment at that time. 
…ultimately at any disaster of significant magnitude, a responsible 
executive in the government will be there and that executive should not be 
entirely passive, even in the presence of professionals, that executive 
should not pretend to be a professional, it should not try to dictate to the 
professionals but ultimately the decisions should be those of the executive 
when you’re making critical decisions, obviously with heavy reliance on 
the professionals but you can’t walk away from critical decisions...you 
don’t replace their experienced professional judgment with your  less 
experienced political judgment. 
I think the most important thing is to know the personnel who are the 
professionals in key positions, know their experience and know their 
capability, because ultimately while you have the power to impose your 
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judgment, if, in fact, you know and have confidence in the professionals, 
in their training and their experience, then you’re more inclined to act in a 
cooperative way as opposed to an impositional way. 
You can’t train someone to make a decision at the time of a crisis.  I don’t 
believe.  You can’t train a political leader, a governor, a mayor to say that, 
all right, when this happens, this is how you should decide.  It’s got to be 
something that comes from a wealth of experience and judgment.  What 
you can train the executive are the institutional capabilities and individual 
capabilities of the people whose judgment, people whose opinions are 
going to be critical… (G. Pataki, personal interview, 19 March, 2008) 
From the military lawyer: 
Although it is not my purpose to comment on the ethics of future war, I 
would suggest that ethical precepts could prove invaluable in assisting ... 
policy-makers, and combat leaders to interpret the existing law in the 
context of new methods and means of warfare.  Moreover, ethics can 
assist them in determining how best to fill normative lacuna in 
humanitarian law that will become increasingly apparent over time.  Thus, 
I enthusiastically welcome this initiative ... to create a dialogue between 
the legal and ethics communities.  Such a dialogue is essential as we 
contemplate, and prepare for, 21st-century conflict. (Schmitt, 2002) 
Whether it is theologians, military lawyers, fire chiefs or governors, it is their 
unanimity of belief that not only is the experience and competence, but also the education 
of the decision makers that is the source of the greatest benefit in times of crisis.  It is also 
worthy of note that they credit the observations of other people and disciplines as being 
worthy to expand the decision maker’s own experience level. The level of acceptance for 
a concept of an educational program can best be determined by noting that each of the 
chiefs involved in the scenarios reviewed has strongly supported the development of such 
a program. 
B. DRAWING INFORMATION FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES 
One needs to grasp that the individual homeland security decision maker is not 
alone.  Throughout the other disciplines that have been examined in this paper one finds 
that the experts resident there have discussed and evaluated the conditions under which 
Considered Risk Casualties can and have occurred.  They discuss the level of tolerance 
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for such events and the factors that make them acceptable to their disciplines and the 
societies that they exist within.  Some of their observations have been evolving since 
antiquity and have clearly found acceptance in a number of civilizations.  Obviously, the 
conditions under which people have died throughout the ages and for which different 
societies had a tolerance were not always conditions that one would equate with the 
contemporary homeland security discussion.  For example, the range of circumstances 
involved in those instances encompassed not only military events but also religious 
purposes and even matters of entertainment.  It is a way, however, of demonstrating that 
sensitivity to such matters has varied greatly over time and that the disciplines reviewed 
therefore, have a deep wealth of knowledge from which to draw their contemporary 
observations. 
At a news conference on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, Mayor Giuliani 
responded to a question inquiring as to how many people had died by saying in part  
“...more than we can bear.” (James, 2002) Inherent in that comment is the indication that 
under certain conditions, and within certain numbers, society is capable of accepting 
losses.  It is the understanding of those conditions and their scale in which one discovers 
and is informed of the decision-making tolerances.  As noted several times in this thesis, 
the right or wrong aspect of the decision and its outcomes was never an element of this 
review.  The purpose here is to conduct a sampling across and within disciplines to 
determine if there was information there that could be of assistance to the homeland 
security decision maker regardless of the above tolerances. What was found is that those 
disciplines exist, and are a rich source of such knowledge for the decision maker. 
What has also been revealed is that while such information exists in 
philosophical, military, medical, ethical, and theological arenas, among others, their 
observations frequently stay within their own disciplines.  Some, such as the medical and 
ethical fields have significant crossover and observations, but one is far less likely to find 
it between the philosophical and military environments.  The traditional  homeland 
security entities, however, seem to be isolated from the wider group on this topic, and it 
also must be noted that these  other disciplines are  in turn equally isolated from  
homeland security. It is imperative that these largely self-imposed isolations end and their 
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inquisitiveness, advice, and counsel expand to meet not only the concepts contained in 
each other’s discipline, but also to inform each of them about the needs and concerns of 
the other. 
There exists a new and relatively untapped  use for the centuries of wisdom 
contained in the  humanities and social sciences, just as there is an endless source of 
experiences and scenarios resident within the multiple entities of  homeland security that 
can legitimately test and serve the otherwise hypothetical observations of the other 
disciplines. Establishing a means of communication and information sharing between 
them can be mutually beneficial to all parties concerned. 
It is unfortunate, but a reality of current times and cited in numerous warnings 
from the government and other responsible individuals, that Considered Risk Casualty 
events can be expected to continue, if not expand, for the foreseeable future. Those 
individuals, who are in positions of authority and bear responsibility for the safety of the 
civilian population as well as that of their own personnel, will be tasked with making 
these most difficult decisions.  While they have always recognized that as a condition of 
their professions, the frequency of and scale on which these decisions will have to be 
made is currently unknowable.  However, the deaths from worldwide terrorism, natural 
disasters, and “all hazards” have reached proportions that could not have been anticipated 
or predicted even if few short years ago.  Therefore, just as one must recognize the 
change to society that can result in Considered Risk Casualty events, one must also 
recognize that the means by which those decisions have been made in the past now need 
to be modified to meet the current challenge. In the development of this thesis it has been 
revealed that such decisions are comprised of three segments. From the other disciplines, 
the various elements that can be considered in decision making is one of those segments. 
From the fire service comes the necessity for experience being a second segment, and 
from the military comes the third segment, individual values. These form the foundation 
of Considered Risk Casualty decision making. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. An educational program should be developed for use by homeland security 
practitioners and decision makers, particularly within the emergency 
services, that will serve to assist, support, and inform those decision 
makers and practitioners in making judgments in Considered Risk 
Casualty situations.  
This program should be applicable to both planning and operational 
environments, and draw upon the body of knowledge accumulated in other disciplines, 
particularly the humanities and social sciences.  That knowledge should be reviewed to 
form a syllabus that incorporates an appreciation for the full range of conditions, factors, 
variables, criteria, and relevant issues that can factor into making decisions appropriate to 
events management that can involve life and death outcomes. 
The results of such a syllabus should enable the decision makers to gain support 
for and the benefits from the experience of the experts in other disciplines when 
considering the whole spectrum of solutions possible in a Considered Risk Casualty 
environment. 
2. A structure should be established that creates both a forum and a 
continuous mechanism for the mutual exchange of knowledge and 
information between homeland security entities and a complete range of 
other disciplines that have an expertise about, interest in, and nexus to 
making decisions about matters that have, or potentially can have, 
outcomes in matters of life and death.  
This process should be designed to be mutually beneficial to both the  homeland 
security policy makers, executives, and operational managers at all levels of government, 
as well as the humanities, social scientists, researchers, analysts, and academicians whose 
expertise can inform the practice of decision making for Considered Risk Casualty 
events. The homeland security personnel should be able to utilize this mechanism to 
enhance the reliability of their decision making in both the planning and operational 
environments involving Considered Risk Casualties.  The other disciplines should be able 
to draw upon the actual and practical experiences and conditions found in homeland 
security and crisis/disaster management events to expand their observations to address 
actual conditions found in those environments. 
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IX. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The stimulus for this thesis was the author’s personal involvement in the events of 
September 11, 2001 and ongoing reflections about those events.  There are certainly 
numerous issues that trace their genesis to that morning that have been written about and 
discussed extensively and will continue to be for the foreseeable future that could also 
have served as a legitimate thesis topic.  What continues to draw this author to this topic, 
however, is its unique array of elements.  It is not only fundamental to an analysis of 
homeland security; it is simultaneously a policy matter, an operational issue, an 
intellectual topic, an emotional element, and, yes, a controversial problem. Any of these 
elements would by themselves make this a topic worthy of review, but collectively they 
present a most compelling area for research. 
Subsequent researchers should be aware of the emotional and controversial 
aspects of this topic as regards any future endeavors that they may choose to bring to the 
discussion.  Decisions that result in life or death are instinctively problematic and 
controversial.  Indeed, on more than one occasion during the research on this thesis, the 
author had the topic described to him as “taboo;” yet even in those instances, the same 
individuals strongly encouraged the development of the thesis to proceed inasmuch as it 
“needed to be brought to a head.” The future researcher would be well advised to not fall 
into the endless debate about the “right or wrong” of the results of these decisions, since 
that is only knowable through outcome, and serves only to add to the mass of information 
that already exists about that aspect of the topic.  As noted previously in the thesis, what 
is being discussed here is the type of knowledge and information the decision maker 
needs in order to make a decision.  It well may be that a modicum of the “right/wrong” 
topic discussions would evaporate if the decision maker had a more complete repository 
of knowledge to draw upon before making a decision. 
This document attempted to discover if there was information available in other 
disciplines that would help the homeland security decision maker in times of Considered 
Risk Casualty events.  Even a cursory examination revealed that there is a wealth of 
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information available that involves a number of disciplines outside of homeland security, 
but that information remains nearly unknown within homeland security circles. 
A. THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Further research in the other disciplines is fully warranted in that in each of the 
disciplines examined; it was readily evident that both broader and more in depth 
commentary and observations are available.  This is true both within a particular 
discipline and across multiple disciplines.  Research into multiple scenarios and the 
continuum of variability in conditions and elements involved in them would be highly 
valuable for advising a decision maker.  Likewise, an analysis of the criteria that make 
losses appear to be “acceptable” is a critical area for further study.  Equally important is 
an analysis of the issue of scale in these events.  For example, if it were decided that an 
arbitrarily selected number of 100 was the Considered Risk Casualty tolerance in a terror 
attack on a skyscraper, why would that same number not be applicable in an elementary 
school? 
Situational factors have a major impact on Considered Risk Casualty decisions. 
Other disciplines should be scoured for their explanations of how to assess a full range of 
scenarios and conditions, and how they can be thought of, evaluated, and applied 
singularly and in combination with each other across a spectrum of events that contain 
the element of life and death situations. 
B. DECISION MAKING 
Calculating, intuition, personal experience, values, emotions, motivations, and 
intentions are just some of the elements that contribute to that “gestalt” moment in 
Considered Risk Casualty decisions. The new and growing science of decision-making 
analysis should be examined for the how, when, where, and why decisions of this 
magnitude are made, particularly in times of great stress.  Also worthy of examination is 
a study of the ability of different individuals to separate themselves from a stressful 
condition and to recognize the uniqueness of the circumstances they are in and, thereby, 
enable them to make decisions that they would not have realized or made otherwise. 
 175
Discovering the queues that initiate the ability to recognize a Considered Risk 
Casualty event as it occurs, or preferably before it occurs, in order to make decisions that 
will save lives sooner is an area of research that can be of untold benefit. 
C. EDUCATION 
It is through the educational process that the conditions described in this thesis 
will be properly addressed.  The development of an education methodology that bridges 
both the environment of the abstract, academic expert, and the difficult and stressful 
arena of the homeland security planner and operations manager is a process in need of 
development.  An in-depth analysis that distills the experience and observations of those 
practitioners to gain knowledge of the critical elements that are pivotal to these solutions 
will provide the substance for Considered Risk Casualty decisions. 
Identifying the essence of the principles that create patterns of understanding and 
acceptance in both the other disciplines and operational arenas where both can be 
mutually supportive of the other and it will represent an initial step in developing a means 
to apply these patterns. Educators also need to develop a methodology to teach these 
diverse ranges of knowledge and experience, whether that is through case studies, 
classroom exercises, tabletop drills, or field exercises. It will also be necessary to create a 
process that not only inculcates professional acceptance of this knowledge in all the 
participants, but also codifies a repeatable measurement of success. 
1. Homeland Security 
All agencies, at all levels of government, who are or may become involved in 
Considered Risk Casualty events planning and/or operations should recognize, support, 
and make available educational opportunities for their decision-making personnel.  
Developing a protocol and mechanism that permits this, and that simultaneously 
establishes a process of liaison with other disciplines outside of homeland security is an 
important area of future research.  Similarly, the creation of a structure that immediately 
assists and supports Considered at Risk Casualty decision makers during and after such 
events will be one of the most important areas of study for subsequent researchers. 
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